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ABSTRACT
The thesis argues that the dominant theories of fishery 
management are rooted in an orthodox paradigm or perspective 
that favours the more powerful industrial interests over the 
less powerful community based interests. The orthodox 
theories are assumed to be neutral, objective and value free, 
but in reality are biased, selective and opinionated. The 
thesis outlines the development of fishery management theory 
from the second half of the 19th century to the present and 
shows the consistency of the underlying assumptions and values 
which support them. The thesis reviews the liberal critique
o. orthodox theories made by welfare economists and maritime 
anthropologists during the 1970s and 1980s and shows that 
despite these criticisms, orthodox theories continue to 
dominate as the most legitimate basis for managing the 
fishery. The thesis compares the fishery management 
structures, policies and practices of Canada and United States 
and shows how the theory when it is translated into policy 
either does not solve fundamental problems (Canada) or cannot 
be fully imposed on fishery participants (United States). The 
thesis examines an alternative paradigm for understanding 
fishery management problems and concludes that a political
ii
economy approach offers new research and policy formulation 
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Most differences between economists and between economic 
models result from political differences in which fundamental 
cultural values and philosophical arguments are involved. All 
models have their own associated ideologies as these sets of 
values are termed (Barrett Brown, 1984:9).
Various aspects of the fisheries have been studied over the years 
by many scholars working within different disciplines (Lamson and Reade, 
1987). Historically the bulk of the theoretical literature on fisheries 
management has developed within an orthodox paradigm which views society 
as functionally integrated and social change as evolutionary. This 
paradigm is based on certain assumptions and values that see scientific 
research as neutral, objective, and value-free (see Kuhn, 1970). The 
orthodox paradigm has structured a dominant perspective* that determines 
what should be investigated, appropriate methodologies, theoretical 
models, and policy applications. This perspective has lot only restricted 
the definition of fishery management problems historically, but has also 
limited the range of potential solutions open to the industry.
’The dominant perspective in this thesis will be referred to as the orthodox 
perspective. Other descriptions found in the literature and used to categorize 
this perspective include traditional, mainstream or classical.
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A management crisis in many of the world’s fisheries has called into 
question the adequacy of the orthodox perspective. Nevertheless, most 
fishery problems and crises continue to be addressed from this 
perspective; it continues to dominate the thinking of fishery management 
approaches at all levels of analysis.
As fishery managers attempt to put theories based on this 
perspective into practice, they are forced to confront the everyday 
realities of the fisheries, realities that are generally ignored by 
orthodox perspective theories. Yet the continuing hegemony of the 
orthodox perspective prevents serious consideration of alternative 
perspectives that view problems and solutions differently. The orthodox 
perspective continues to define the objectives for today’s management 
systems and underlies the policy and practice processes for management 
strategies.
This thesis aims to show that the orthodox perspective is inadequate 
to the task of providing a sound basis for effective fisheries management. 
I argue that the orthodox perspective is inadequate because in its 
theoretical explanation it defines fisheries problems and solutions too 
narrowly, and it fails to address the wider political, cultural and 
economic context within which problems exist. It ignores the distribution 
of the resources and benefits between fishery sectors such as inshore and 
offshore, large and small companies and between industry and fishing 
communities. Moreover, I argue that the orthodox perspective is biased 
toward key economic interests. While the theory that is based on this 
perspective is normally seen as neutral, objective and scientific in 
reality one finds that it is somewhat biased, selective and opinionated.
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This view is based on my findings that most fishery management theory 
emphasizes economic productivity and efficiency criteria over other 
potential benefit measurement criteria. By only using this narrowly based 
criteria for addressing problems, orthodox perspective theory implicitly 
favours some interests and sectors of the fishery over others, in 
particular, large over small fishing interests and industrial interests 
over community interests.
In Chapter One I show how the orthodox perspective theories have 
developed historically. While theory within the orthodox perspective is 
always presented in neutral, objective, and scientific terms (i.e. 
developing rational solutions to specific problems), in fact, the 
questions raised and solutions posed have been biased to a great extent 
as simply responses to the particular concerns of the more powerful 
fishery interests. Because of these biases one finds that the entire 
fishery management history is cloaked in an ideological shroud.
Chapter Two shows how changing political and economic conditions 
during the early 1970s caused by the management crises in many of the 
world’s fisheries gave rise to greater interest in fishery management 
theory. Scholars working from disciplines other than fishery biology and 
neo-classical economics, began to argue that traditional bio-economic 
theories were either too simplistic or misleading. The new critiques of 
traditional theories led to different kinds of questions and different 
types of solutions to fishery problems being raised. Nevertheless, the 
traditional theories have continued to remain dominant by either 
incorporating minor criticisms into their analysis or ignoring more 
fundamental criticisms.
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Chapter Three provides case studies of two countries that subscribe 
to the same orthodox perspective of fisheries management - Canada and the 
United States. It shows that in developing their management systems each 
country faced quite different political, economic and cultural conditions. 
These conditions have in turn resulted in each management system 
developing quite differently. The differences in the two management 
systems have had a significant effect on the way in which the shared 
fisheries management objectives have been translated into policy and 
practice.
Chapter Four illustrates the problems faced by fishery managers in 
Canada and the United States as they attempt to translate orthodox 
perspective theories into policy and practice. The limitations of the 
orthodox perspective become clear as fishery managers attempt to develop 
and implement policies in different political, economic and cultural 
contexts. It shows how fisheries problems and solutions can only be 
defined in terms of the realities of peoples everyday lives and in 
relation to historically specific national and regional concerns and 
interests.
Chapter Five outlines the political economy approach which presents 
a different paradigm and perspective from which to assess the problems of 
the fishery. It emphasizes the importance of the way the fishing industry 
is organized, power is distributed among sectors, and the role played by 
the state. While it also has its limitations, the political economy 
perspective is shown to address in more realistic terms many of the 
problems confronting the fishery.
The thesis concludes that a new perspective of fishery management
is necessary if fishery problems are to be effectively addressed. To 
progress, a new model for defining fishery problems and solutions has to 
replace the orthodox paradigm and perspective. The key problem to overcome 
has been, and continues to be, the pervasiveness and unquestioned 
acceptance of the dominant orthodox perspective which continues to block 
or limit the emergence of a new perspective within which new theories of 
fishery management can develop.
CHAPTER TWO 
The Orthodox Paradigm 
of Fisheries Management
1. Introduction
This chapter traces the development fishery management theory from 
the last half of the 19th century up to its neo-classical economic 
antecedents in the 1950s and 1960s. I show how orthodox perspective 
theories have historically maintained their hegemony for defining fishery 
problems and solutions. That is the orthodox perspective understandings 
of the fishery are justified as simply products of evolving scientific 
research and knowledge which is both objective and value-free.
I challenge this understanding by showing that the development of 
management theories have historically focused only on the biological and 
economic dimensions of the fishery. I show that this narrow focus has 
reflected and supported the concerns and interests of the industrial 
fishing sector, while overlooking and downplaying the concerns and 
interests of the traditional sectors, as well as other important fishery 
dimensions (i.e. the ecological, cultural and political).
I describe and categorize the development of orthodox perspective 
theories as historically going through four distinct pUses; the fishery 
as an inexhaustible resource (1850-1900), the fishery in ecological 
equilibrium (1900-14), the over fishing problem (1918-45) and the fishery 
as a common property (1950-60).
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Each one of these phases can be shown as focusing almost exclusively 
on the problems of production which were the concerns of the emerging and 
later dominant Industrial fishing sector, rather than the more generalized 
problems of either the resources themselves or the traditional 
participants and communities most dependant on them.
The orthodox perspective theories continue to provide the primary 
focus, direction and range of policy alternatives used for managing 
fishery resources at the present time. Understanding historically how the 
concerns of the more powerful Interests have been reflected In the 
theories Is important If alternative perspectives and fishery management 
theories are to emerge and develop.
2. The "Inexhaustible fisheries" approach of the 19th Century
Prior to the last half of the 19th century, fish stocks were 
generally assumed to be abundant. The formal study of fish was concerned 
with conducting empirical observations and taxonomic studies of freshwater 
and anadromous species (Graham, 1948:10). Nevertheless, records Indicate 
that many fishing restrictions had been legislatively enacted In many 
countries at this time. These restrictions were designed to protect 
specified fisheries and specific locations from the use of certain gear 
and from fishermen who were outsiders.’ Britain alone, In tne middle of
’ History appears to be full of Incidents whon restrictive measures have 
been Imposed on new technologies. Peter Pearce, recounted that In the course 
of his study of fisheries regulation In the Mediterranean fisheries that he 
"chanced upon an ancient French document that described prohibitions on paired 
trawling (chalut-boeuf) on the Mediterranean coast In 1724, and restrictions on 
the use of trawl nets as early as 1681 (Pearse, 1980:11).
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the century, had over fifty parliamentary laws that restricted and 
controlled fishing operations.
The first formalized and recognized rationale for a theory of 
fishing began during this period in Britain. In 1866 a Royal Commission 
began a process of deregulating the British fisheries by recommending to 
Parliament that all the laws restricting fishing be repealed. The 
Commission members, using the general notion that fish stocks were 
inexhaustible, felt that the existing restrictive laws were holding back 
the fishing industry’s ability to develop and expand production. The 
regulations were repealed and the fishery resources were now available 
for unrestricted exploitation (Russell, 1942:14).
Once the restrictions were removed the fishing industry was free to 
use the revolutionary new industrial methods and technologies of the age 
to expand fishing operations and supply the increasing market demands of 
an industrializing Europe. These new markets along with the lifting of 
restrictions on fishing gear types resulted in a rapid transformation of 
the industrial structure of the fishing industry. For example, icing of 
catches at sea began in the 1860’s, the beam trawl was developed for 
groundfish fisheries in 1865,' steam engines were introduced on fishing 
vessels in 1881, and otter trawl technology was pioneered in 1894 
(Russell, 1942). The industrial transformation was occurring throughout 
all the fishing fleets and areas In Northern Europe.
In addition to the industrial transformations underway,
' The beam trawl was first developed for use on sailing vessels and later 
was used on steam vessels, but from 1894 onwards this (method) gave place to the 
more efficient otter trawl (Russell, 1942:13),
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organizational Innovations were also dramatically changing the social 
structure of the fishing Industry. For example, there was an Increase In 
the concentration of ownership and decision-making In the hands of non- 
fishermen (Anderson, 1979:16)'. All of these changes made fishing 
operations more productive and efficient at the vessel and firm level of 
operations. At the level of the fishery resources however, the effect 
was not efficient or productive since the traditional fishing areas became 
more crowded and appeared to be producing less fish.
Soon changes began to be noticed on the fishing grounds as f1sh 
stocks began to manifest dramatic fluctuations In population levels. Even 
though the more mobile fleets were able to move to newly found and more 
distant fishing grounds, controversies began to arise "as to whether or 
not the amount of a given kind of fish which man Is able to take from the 
sea Is sufficient to have any noticeable effect on the supply" (Schaefer, 
1957:669). It was becoming clear to both the Industrial fishing Interests 
and many small boat local fishermen that the theory that the fishery 
resources were "Inexhaustible" and not affected by fishing activity would 
have to be reconsidered (Smith, 1987:4).
Political pressure from those who were concerned about the effects 
of the new fishing methods forced fishing nation governments to take some 
action (Russell, 1942:106). By the late 19th century government boards 
of inquiry were being set up to examine and make recommendations on the
' An Interesting historical point Is the slow Industrial development of 
the fisheries In comparison to other sectors of the economy. For example the 
British fisheries were Industrializing some 50 years after the British economy 
Itself had peaked (Anderson, p.16).
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State of the fisheries. Scientific expeditions to study the marine
environment were funded and organized. Biological research laboratories
were founded in order to study the marine resources. And international
agencies such as the International Council for the Exploitation of the
Seas (ICES) were established as a means of dealing with conflicts between
fishing fleets on international waters (Russell, 1942:107; Smith, 1987:4).*
The resulting scientific mandate was to find out the reasons for the
drastic stock fluctuations and to determine the effects, if any, that
fishing has on them.
It was within this context that the beginnings of present day
theories of fishing appeared. The first debates in the literature centred
on whether fishing had any effects on fish populations at all. On the one
hand, T.H. Huxley, the great Darwinian naturalist, and W.C. Macintosh, the
well-known Scottish fisheries biologist, argued, in separate articles
published in 1883 and 1899 respectively, that the sea was inexhaustible
and therefore restrictive fishing measures were unnecessary. For example,
Huxley stated that,
it may be affirmed with confidence that, in relation to our 
present modes of fishing, a number of the most important sea 
fisheries, such as the cod fishery, are inexhaustible. An I 
base this conviction on two grounds, first, that the multitude 
of these fishes is so inconceivably great that that the number 
we catch is relatively, insignificant; and, secondly, that the 
magnitude of the destructive agencies at work upon them is so 
prodigious, that the destruction effected by fishermen cannot
* For example, in Britain, the Trawling Commission reported in 1885 (20 
years after the Royal Commission) of evidence of stock "diminution" in inshore 
waters, the industry itself between 1883 to 1892 pressed the government to 
protect coastal fisheries, scientific investigations of trawl fishing had begun 
in Scotland by 1895, and the International Council for the Exploration of the 
Sea was founded in 1902 by the fishing nations of northern Europe (Russell, 
1942:107).
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sensibly Increase the death-rate, (quoted in Graham, 1948:34).
On the other hand, a newly-hired government biologist, T.W. Fulton 
(1896), in his trawler studies for the Fishing Board of Scotland, had 
determined that, "the rate of fishing was surprisingly high, sufficient 
to make it likely that stocks would not prove inexhaustible" (Graham, 
1948:45-46). Following the same argument and in response to the 
Huxley/Maclntosh thesis, William Gartang, another well-known biologist, 
conducted more experimentation and re-evaluated previous research in order 
to confirm Fulton’s position in 1900. By the end of the century, as a 
result of such high profile debates, it was generally understood by 
researchers that fishing activity might not only affect the abundance of 
commercial marine fish but also the complex interactions of other non­
commercial species (Smith, 1987:10).
In the 19th century the approach which initially saw the marine 
resources as "inexhaustible" was effectively used to legitimate the 
industrial transformation of the fishing industry. As a result of 
excessive fishing, however, both the industry and depen^snt fishing 
communities became quite concerned about the continued supply of fish. 
This concern resulted in pressure for scientific research into the 
relationship between fishing effort and the continuing supply of fish. 
As we will see later, this particular formation of the problem forms a 
basic approach which continues up to the present day in orthodox fishery 
management theory.
3. The "ecological equilibrium" approach: 1900-1918
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By 1900 it was recognized that the introduction of industrial
technology into the fisheries had affected and changed the commercial fish
stocks. Fishery scientists began collecting data on fishing fleet
activities and operations in order to determine the extent of these
changes. This resulted in detailed resource surveys and studies beginning
to be conducted throughout Europe during this period (Gulland, 1974:47).
The limited availability of relevant statistical information, and the
absence of any proven analytical framework within which to determine the
effects of fishing on fish stocks, limited the scientific understanding
of the processes underway within the fisheries. As a result, an intuitive
understanding that saw natural resources in ecological equilibrium arose.
Russell wrote of this period that,
in the early days of fisheries science most workers thought 
that the main thing to aim at was to keep up the supply of 
mature fish, so that an abundant supply of eggs and larvae 
young fish might be assured" (Russell, 1942:71).
The general approach to fisheries at the time was, according to Baranov,
the natural stock of fish is the untouched capital of which 
only the annual interest, leaving the capital untouched, 
should be taken advantage of by the fishing industry. 
(Baranov, 1925:7).
Thus the accepted theoretical approach was that the fishery 
resources were in a state of natural or ecological equilibrium in the 
marine environment.* It was now generally assumed (as was the case in
* T.D. Smith points out that the beginning of this approach can be cited 
as early as 1884 when Ray Lankester was arguing against the Huxley inexhaustible 
position by writing "that any removals of fish from the sea had an impact [on 
populations], if not directly then indirectly by removing potential parents of 
young fish. These young fish were not ’superfluous’ as Huxley has implicitly 
argued, but had "a perfectly definite place in the complex interaction of ... 
living begins" (Smith, 1987:5).
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agriculture) that a natural fish stock would, in any given year, produce
a surplus that could be harvested without damaging or affecting either
the overall population or the equilibrium of the environment.
Based on this ecological equilibrium understanding of fish
populations, E.W.L. Holt's 'propagation theory' argued that every
individual fish in a particular population should have the opportunity to
spawn at least once.* Danish biologists Peterson and Garstang, writing
between 1900-1905, used growth or thinning fishery theories to argue that
fish may be too plentiful for available food and so fishing can have
beneficial influences.' Later, in 1908, working from the ecological
equilibrium approach, Hjort introduced the idea of determining population
age distributions as a means for understanding the fluctuations of fish
stocks (Russell, 1942:55). Smith (1987) summed up Hjort's contribution
to the theory of fishing as follows:
Hjort provided one answer to the question that had been 
plaguing fishermen and politicians for centuries: why do the 
catches vary? Hjort's conclusion was very important 
theoretically and practically. Theoretically Hjort's 
observation suggested that the size of fish populations may 
be determined by processes occurring at very young ages. This 
suggestion would help focus future research for many years. 
Practically, Hjort's results would provide "a method of 
predicting the probable future course (and hopefully the 
yield) from year to year of some of our most important 
fisheries.(24). (Smith, 1987:24)
* This theory still underlies many of today’s fisheries regulations for 
controlling fishing effort. For example, the Canadian lobster and salmon 
fisheries regulations can trace their roots back to Holt’s ideas.
 ̂ Peterson was also well known for his work in studying fish migrations 
and developing fish marking techniques such as the disk tag (Smith, 1987:16).
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The ecological equilibrium approach provided the framework for the 
development of fishery management theories: the need to thin stocks, to 
protect spawn, eggs, larvae, and to determine future yields. In effect, 
this approach again suited the interests of commercial harvesters. By
ensuring that the ecological equilibrium of a fish population was
preserved the theory argued that the fishery would continue to be 
productive and support a viable industry. This approach to fish stock 
dynamics stated that fish harvesting could have a positive effect on the 
stocks. Thus the “ecological-equilibrium approach" was compatible with 
the fishing industry interests as well as the economic interests of the 
nations within which fleets operated.
In 1905 we see the first introduction of economic factors into 
mainly biological theories of fishing. In a paper entitled the
“Statistics of the North Sea Fisheries", H.M. Kyle, enlarging on the
ecological approach, separated out two important elements involved in a 
fishery. The first element was biological. Kyle, following Peterson’s 
theory, felt that, depending on the amount and size of fish caught, the 
population and the catch of a fishery would eventually stabilize based on 
the “natural laws of nature". The second element was economic, or 
'rational fishing', to use his term. This concerned the "monetary side 
of the matter, the expenditure in boats and gear on the one hand and gross 
and net income on the other". Kyle perceptively concluded that these 
economic factors determine the fishing effort, which in turn determine the 
size of the stock population. He further speculated that “a good 
mathematician might be able to calculate the precise point where 'over-
15
fishing* begins" (quoted in Smith, 1987:13).
Although some writings, such as Kyle's, began to show theoretically 
that other factors, such as the organization of the industry itself, 
affected the ecological-equilibrium of fish stock populations, the impact 
of these factors did not seem to be fully considered until after World War
I. The main reason being that the mobile trawl vessel sector was able to 
develop and continually expand their production by exploiting newly-found 
fishing banks farther away from the depleted traditional fishing areas. 
The ability to maintain productivity and profits through continually 
expanding the range of operations tended, at least to some extent, to mask 
the economic reality of stock depletion. As a result the fishing industry 
did not encourage or support any restrictions on fishing practices other 
than purely scientific efforts directed at understanding the ecological 
equilibrium of fish stocks and the potential production levels from them.
The lack of a practical and predictive theory of fishing that went 
beyond the ecological-equilibrium understanding, along with the ability 
of the industrialized fleets to expand their production, slowed any real 
consideration directed toward controlling the overall fishing effort 
placed on the resources. This lack of control was becoming more important 
as international disputes began to occur on the high seas between 
competing fishing fleets of different countries (Smith, 1987:13). Many 
European governments began providing public funds to support the formation 
of international organizations dedicated to studying fishery problems 
extended beyond the control of any one country. For example the 
International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) was founded 
in 1902, after King Oscar II of Sweden had convened in 1899 a preliminary
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conference in Stockholm (Graham, 1948:49). The main reasons for having 
ICES was to facilitate the sharing of scientific information between 
nations and to conduct consultations directed towards resolving fishing 
conflicts on the high seas.
By this time the fishing industries in most European fishing nations 
had become heavily dependent on the fishery resources. Their concern 
about the state of the resources was particularly acute because of the 
apparent limited opportunities for expansion due to new fishing grounds, 
the increased competition between fleets for the known available 
resources, and heavy capital investments already held in the industry. 
These concerns greatly influenced the direction that scientific research 
took in developing new theories of fishery management after the war.
4. The over-fishing approach: 1918-1945
The commercial fish stocks of the North Sea, after the four-year 
period of forced fishing inactivity during World War I, had made 
remarkable recoveries in population levels. A 1923 report submitted to 
the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES), showed 
that not only were catch rates up over 100%, but that the average catch 
of larger fish was higher.* This clearly pointed to the relationship
' This report resulted in a committee of ICES, the Plaice Committee, 
recommending protection measures such as minimum fish size and nursery area 
closures (Smith, 1987:23). As Smith noted these recommendations were not 
accepted by countries fishing the resources largely because the fishery had 
improved so much. In fact, he points out that the numbers and size of vessels 
increased and eventually the catch rates dropped to pre-war le.els.
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between excessive fishing effort and stock depletion. This was now not 
only recognized by the researchers, but as already noted, began to be an 
economic concern for the highly capitalized industry and communities 
dependent on them.
Also during this period, in addition to fishing effort being seen 
as having a negative effect on fish stocks, the fishery resources 
themselves began to be conceived of as a "common property'. Common 
property refers to the freely accessible character of a natural resource. 
This concept included the view that common property resources are doomed 
to over-exploitation and depletion by users, each of whom has no reason 
to restrict or conserve what might otherwise be caught by competitors.
Therefore after the first World War, scientific efforts turned, from 
determining the equilibrium mechanisms of the fish stocks to trying to 
quantify the effects of fishing effort on fish stocks. In Europe the 
first theory of fishing to show mathematically the effects of effort on 
a particular stock was proposed by the Russian scientist F.I. Baranov. 
He showed through the use of a mathematical model, that commercial fishing 
is an important factor in depleting a fishery. Specifically he pointed 
out,
that fishing and a natural stock of fish are incompatible, 
that the industrial stock of fish is a variable quantity, 
depending upon the intensity of fishing. The more fish we 
take from the basin, the less the basic stock of fish and the 
less fish we take, the greater the basic stock which 
approaches the natural stock as the fisheries approach non­
existence (Baranov, 1925:7).
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His model related the yield (catch) to population factors such as species, 
size, growth, and population abundance (Gulland, 1974:49)'. Baranov's 
work provided an important step in the development of a realistic 
methodology for determining the effect of fishing effort on a fish 
population’” and thus some measurable way to control over-fishing of the 
marine resources. The requirement for a general approach that could be 
used in a practical way for managing commercial fisheries and preventing 
over-fishing was first tackled by E.S. Russell in 1931. Russell drew 
together the various theories developed up to the time of his writing and 
proposed that:
the average catch per hour at any particular time is an index 
of the stock remaining on the grounds at that time. Therefore 
over a period of time, this index could be used to indicate 
both the average state of stock during the period and the 
amount of fishing being imposed on it (Russell, 1931:19).”
Later, Michael Graham, and English biologist who also worked on many 
aspects of the over-fishing problem became very concerned about the nature
' Baranov also "showed that catches much larger than equilibrium levels 
would necessarily be taken for a few years immediately after any substantial 
increase in fishing mortality rate" (Ricker, 1977:8). Ricker also wrote that 
this phenomena accounted for much of the nostalgia for the 'good old days' of 
big catches and easy fishing that commonly exists amongst fishermen (Ricker, 
1977:8).
Unfortunately, Baranov's theory was published in an obscure place and 
time and as a result was not widely distributed until the late 1930's and 1940's 
(Ricker, 1954; Gulland, 1974:49).
” Russell's method was to examine factors that affect the size of 
harvestable populations over time. The factors that he identified, and expressed 
as absolute rates of change in the weight of the fish population, were 
recruitment, growth, natural death, and catches (Russell, 1931).
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of the fishing effort on the resource. Writing in 1935, Graham felt that 
because:
fishermen must, if they are to be good fishermen, persist when 
stock fluctuations are against them. Consequently, they 
remain in business and fish as hard as they can, so long as 
anybody is getting a profit; so we continued in the same way 
for year after year in the 1920’s and 1930’s with only the 
fortunate few making a fair return for their capital and work 
(Graham, 1948:69),
This led Graham to develop what he termed the "Great Law of Fishing". 
This law states that "those fisheries that are unlimited (open access or 
common property) become unprofitable" (Pearse, 1980:14).
Again we see that a conception of fisheries as common property 
subject to over-exploitation was becoming an important underlying 
assumption in the theoretical developments. This was also a time when 
international agreements were being sought by fishing nations in order to 
control harvest levels. These international efforts also reinforced and 
illustrated the idea of the fishery resource as being common property. 
That is countries, given their historical fishing patterns were forced to 
seek ways to protect not only the resource from unrestricted fishing 
effort but their own rights to harvest the resource. In Europe, however, 
before any of these agreements could actually be acted upon the Second 
World War broke out.
In North America, interest in the fishery was directed by a 
different type of momentum than in Europe. By the late 1930*s the 
conservation movement had reached its height. This social movement 
developed as part of a general reaction against the devastating impact 
that the industrialization process was having on the existing natural
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resources. As a result, the fisheries, like all other natural resources, 
were being Intensively researched and regulatory measures were beginning 
to be proposed and implemented in order to conserve them for the public 
good (Royce, 1965; Hayes, 1969; Larkin, 1977). The conservation of 
natural resources during this period had begun to be seen as a public 
policy matter in which questions about whether natural resources should 
be used immediately by society or whether they should be set aside for 
future use were being debated.
Therefore, as in Europe, the focus of research in North America 
changed from the ecological-equilibrium approach, with its focus on the 
natural balance of stock populations, to considering how to control short­
term fishing effort to protect long-term economic interests. The new 
focus on over-fishing resulted in one of the first attempts to actually 
manage a fishery through specific restrictions on fishing activities.
This attempt to manage a fishery took place on the west coast of 
North America when the International North Pacific Halibut Commission 
(INPHC) was established in 1942. The mandate of this organization was to 
develop a scientific basis for co-managing the Canada-United States 
halibut fishery. Two scientists, Thompson and Bell concluded from their 
research in 1934 that the halibut fishery was facing depletion through 
too much fishing effort (Larkin, 1977:1).^ Using their findings, the 
fishery was managed in both Canada and the United States by implementing 
fishing season closures. This development provided an example for the
'* As a data source, Thompson during the course of the research project, 
pioneered the use of fishermen’s logbooks. In fact he worked with fishermen in 
designing more complete logbooks and encouraged them to keep accurate records.
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fisheries of Europe. As Smith (1987:30) points out, this "demonstration 
of the value of managing a fishery was closely watched" by the European 
biologists at the time.
S. The B1o-econom1c approach: 1945-1969
After World War II, new technology such as diesel engines, 
electronic navigation aids, sonar, deck machinery, and freezers ushered 
In a second major Industrial transformation of the Industry and the so- 
called modern era of fishing. In addition to technical Innovations, 
fishery resources were now being harvested by long distant fleets which 
were fishing on a world-wide basis. Before long the new and Increased 
fishing effort resulted In major fishery stock collapses throughout the 
world.
Murphy (quoted In Waugh, 1984) recounts the sudden collapse of the
herring and sardine fisheries:
Three years after the peak catch of 1,723,000 tonnes, the 
Norwegian herring fishery was virtually destroyed with a small 
catch of only 24,000 tonnes In 1969. A similar decline In 
catch Is described for the Pacific sardine fishery. In 1950- 
51 the catch was over 350,000 short tonnes, a figure It had 
rarely fallen below for 20 years, and then only marginally so.
In 1952-53 the catch fell sharply to 15,000 short tonnes, and 
rose over the ICO mark only once in the next ten years (Waugh, 
1984:65).
The stock collapses resulted In not only tremendous biological losses, 
but they had devastating economic effects on the fishermen, processing 
companies and dependent communities.
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To those studying the fisheries, it had become apparent that if the 
fisheries were to be sustained biologically and were to ensure an economic 
future for those dependent on them, the harvest had to be not only 
effectively controlled but also effectively managed. Therefore, after the 
Second World War it was widely recognized that effective restrictions on
effort were needed in order to protect the resource. However, the
implementation of these controls had to be tempered by the reality that 
the fishery resource was economically important to the countries
harvesting them. The fishery must be not just controlled, it must be 
managed. And management required that the relationship between the
population dynamics of commercial stocks (biology) and the actions of the 
harvesting/processing industry (economics) had to be understood. 
Understanding this relationship became the focus for the development of 
the new theories of fishery management. These new theories in turn 
concerned themselves strictly with the processes of resource production 
and the economics of fishing them. For example, Dr. Martin 0. Burkenroad 
(1953) in his paper entitled "Fishery Management as Political Economy" 
noted that:
... management of the fisheries is intended for the benefit 
of man not fish; therefore the effect of management upon fish 
stocks cannot be beneficial per se (Gordon, 1954:124).
In other words, the fishery should be managed not for the ecological 
benefit of the fish stocks but for the economic benefit of humankind and 
specifically, the fishing industry.
The 1950-1960 period represents what Larkin termed the "golden age" 
of biological fisheries theory development. The theoretical developments
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In biology were now refocused to explain the relationship between fishing
effort and the maximum biological yield from a fishery’*. Ricker (1954:559)
summarized the theoretical developments leading up to the period under
discussion as follows:
there is a considerable body of knowledge which goes by the 
name of 'the theory of fishing* or 'the modern theory of 
fishing* ... It Is concerned with predicting what catch can 
be obtained from a given number of young fish recruited to 
fishery, If their Initial size and the growth and natural 
mortality rates prevailing are known. That Is, methods have 
been developed for computing the effects of different rates 
of exploitation, of changes In rate of exploitation from year 
to year, of different minimum size limits, etc., upon the 
yield obtained. Not only that, but much progress has been 
made in developing methods of determining the actual 
magnitudes of the population statistics required to 
make this calculation."
With respect to future research efforts, Ricker (1954:559) defined
the approach to be undertaken in the following way:
it has become an urgent problem to have a scientific 
description of the regulation of abundance of fish stocks, in 
order to complete the basis for predicting optimum levels of 
exploitation.
**It was during this period that the concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield 
(MSY) was developed. The MSY concept is the level of fishing mortality that 
produces the greatest physical yield on a long-term basis. This yield is usually 
associated with a surplus production curve and as such combines the elements of 
recruitment, growth and mortality into one factor (Roedel, 1975).
" This is not to say that other factors such as environmental conditions 
and fecundity etc. were ignored. Smith (1987) provides an excellent review of 
the research that took place between the First and Second World Wars by 
scientists trying to isolate and understand the factors that influence population 
fluctuations. Despite this, the majority of fishery research was essentially 
focused during this period on trying to determine the extent that fishing effort 
affects the yield from the fishery resources.
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Schaefer, also saw his work as being concerned with maximizing catch 
levels. Discussing his understanding of the nature of the fishery 
resources and their exploitation by the fishing industry, Schaefer argued 
that:
Experience (history) having shown that the stock of commercial 
sizes of a sea-fish species, and the annual harvest obtainable
from that stock, is related to the amount of fishing effort
applied, there arises the important question of how the amount 
of fishing should be managed in order to provide the greatest 
benefits to mankind (Schaefer, 1957:670).
Following the Second World War, then, the orthodox approach was 
again redefined and based on the MSY concept. This approach structured 
the ways in which both biologists and later economists, studied the marine 
resources and their uses for society. For example, the biologists and 
economists of the 1950*s and 1960’s worked on the problem of identifying 
and quantifying the biological and economic factors that affect the
population and harvest levels of fish stocks (Graham, 1956). This work 
concentrated on developing the means for calculating "catch equations that 
would maximize present and future returns from the living aquatic
resources" (Emmerson, 1980:10).'®
15 For biology, the most important contribution during this period was the 
formulation of mathematical relationships or models of fisheries being exploited. 
These models provided a means to estimate potential yields from fisheries under 
specific fishing conditions. Two different methodologies, the 'yield per 
recruit’ method and the 'surplus production' method emerged and became the basic 
approaches used to calculate maximum sustainable yield levels of fish 
populations. The yield per recruit method (also known as the dynamic pool 
method) is associated with the research of Beverton and Holt (1957) while the 
surplus production method is associated with work of Milner Schaefer. The 
Beverton-Holt method analyzes the yield data (the weight or number of fish per 
year class) for a number of different catches made under different fishing 
conditions and compares this data with the average number of fish that are 
produced under the same conditions. The Schaefer method analyzes the total 
population trends of a fishery and compares this to the total catches by the 
fishing effort (under non-equilibrium conditions).
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Beverton provided an insight into his understanding of the fishery
resources and how they should be used by society when he wrote that:
During the first half of the present century the history of 
the development of the North Sea demersal fisheries has 
provided a practical demonstration of the behaviour of an 
unregulated fishery. The main feature is that a rough balance 
has been set up between the fishing activity on the one hand 
and the natural productivity of the stock on the other, but 
the level at which this steady state was maintained has on the 
whole been unfavourable to man, many fishing industries being 
forced to operate at an undesirably low economic level 
(Beverton, 1953:56).
According to Beverton, the fisheries were to be managed and harvested in 
the interests of the fishing industry. Again we see that the theories of 
fishery management being developed by biologists and economists continue 
to be heavily influenced by the economic interests of the times.
Beginning during the early 1950*s Beverton and Holt worked out their 
theory of fishing, based on a yield per recruit or dynamic pool model, at 
the Lowestoft Laboratory in Britain. Building on the works of Baranov 
(1918), Russell (1931), Graham (1935), and Ricker (1944) the two 
researchers were able to develop a theoretical fishery management model 
that could take "the main dynamic properties of a fishery and 
...[suggest]... the first steps which are required to regulate it" 
(Beverton, 1953:59)."
’* Beverton pointed out that their theoretical model differed from the yield 
equations of Baranov and Ricker in that stock recruitment is measured when fish 
enter the fishing area when they are being caught. As well the use of the von 
Bertalanffy growth function for analyzing the relationships between stock growth, 
food consumption, and population density differed from cubic and exponential 
equations that Baranov and Ricker respectively had used (Beverton, 1953:59).
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An important aspect of their work was that they differentiated
fishing activity into the two variables: fishing intensity and selective
properties of the gear (Beverton, 1953:61). By changing either of these
variables it was possible to manage a fishery at what was termed as the
"eumetric” fishing level (Beverton, 1953:63).”' Beverton proposed that the
eumetric level of effort by the objective for fishery management as it
would obtain the best balance between the mortality (both natural and
fishing) and the growth/recruitment processes of fish populations
(Beverton, 1953:65).
Similarly Milner Schaefer worked out his theory of fishery
management based on surplus production under non-equilibrium fishing
conditions. He wrote that:
Populations of sea fish belong to a different type of natural 
resource, for which the annual rate of renewal of the resource 
is a function both of the physical environment, which is 
presumably constant, on the average, over the long run and 
ofthe magnitude of the standing crop, or population, of the 
resource, which is diminished by the rate of harvesting (Schaefer, 1957:672).
With respect to fishing the economics of the issue Schaefer pointed out 
that:
...the harvesting by man is simply an additional source of 
mortality by production, which is met by a compensating 
increase in the rate of population renewal, so that the 
population again comes into balance at some lower population 
level (Schaefer, 1957:673).
The key to understanding these two biological theories is that they
The term "eumetric" or "best steady state" or "well-balanced" fishing 
was a term proposed as a means for describing the range of fishing options available to regulatory authorities.
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work from an orthodox perspective that uses the Maximum Sustainable Yield 
(MSY) concept as the basic principle. This concept fitted in perfectly at 
the time with the economic interests of both fishing companies and fishing 
nations that had been modernizing and rationalizing their fishing fleets 
using greatly expanded and more efficient harvesting technologies. Each 
theory suggested ways in which effort could be conducted while at the same 
time maintaining the goals of maximum harvest levels and economic returns. 
For example, limiting catches to set quota levels, implementing season 
closures and using selective gear restrictions (net mesh sizes, vessel 
capacity, etc.). However, beginning in the mid-1950's, and throughout the 
1960*s, the MSY based approach failed in controlling the expanding fishing 
harvests and protecting the resources. It was clear that any of the 
restrictive measures proposed by the biologists based on the MSY concept 
were either rot working or not being effectively enforced (Larkin, 1977). 
The devastating effects of over-fishing on the commercial fisheries and 
the subsequent deteriorated economic positions of most fishing industry 
sectors left little optimism for improvement under MSY conditions (Larkin, 
1977). The failure of the biological MSY approach to provide a 
comprehensive and effective method to manage the fisheries opened the door 
for neo-classical economists to argue for their own theories of fish 
management.’*
"The fact that the biological characteristics were not the only factors 
affecting the well-being of fish resources had been first recognized at the turn 
of the 20th century. As already noted, Kyle (1905) identified economics as one 
of two parts of what he termed the over-fishing problem. Baranov (1918:65) saw 
his work as an attempt to clarify theoretically some questions of fishing 
economics and Graham, in 1935, concluded that moderate reductions in fishing 
effort would increase yields (Russell, 1942:76).
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The obvious limitations of the biological management theories at 
the time stimulated classical economists to examine the problem of over­
fishing and depletion In terms of efficiency. They began by first 
Incorporating the fishery production theories of the biologists into their 
own economic theories or models. These new models were founded on neo­
classical assumptions about both the nature of the fishing industry and 
the fishermen's behaviour harvesting the resources. This approach became 
known as the discipline of b1o-econom1cs. For the first time, fishery 
management theory now focused on both the structure of the Industry and 
the behaviour of fishermen as the key factors for explaining over-fishing 
problems and the resulting socio-economic malaise In the Industry.
This post-war period was the high point for using a neo-classical 
or "orthodox" analysis In public economic policy development throughout 
the world. Tom Emmerson wrote that It was a time "when free market 
competition was widely agreed to further efficiency and thus progress" 
(Emmerson, 1980:14). While fundamentally subscribing to the older 
classical dogma of the competitive free market acting as the Invisible 
hand that most effectively regulates the economy, the neo-classical 
economists of this period recognized very early that the fishery was In 
fact a special case for resource economics. The original classical 
economists had theorized that natural resources only become valuable when 
they become limited and able to be appropriated. However, since this 
methodology had long since been discredited, the neo-classical economists 
reformulated their analysis to focus on the question of efficiency. An 
"efficient" Industry would mean economic health and progress, while an 
"Inefficient" Industry would mean economic stagnation and social distress.
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The neo-classical economists saw competition between fishermen for 
common property resources as the main cause of resource over-exploitation. 
This type of competition they argue had led to depletion of resources 
because ownership did not occur until after they were physically caught 
by individual fishermen. The solution proposed in overcoming this 
depletion tendency, was to replace individual competition with ownership 
or property rights over fishery resources before they were captured. This 
would allow for a process of industry rationalization to take place which 
would force the fishing industry to become more efficient by eliminating 
inefficient and redundant harvesting and processing capacity.
As noted, the neo-classical fishery economists incorporated the 
sustainable yield models of the fisheries biologists into their own 
analysis {Cushing,1968,1981,1983; G u l l a n d , 1 9 7 7 ) B y  relating the 
potential yields of a fishery and the total costs involved in harvesting 
them, economists developed a new theoretical concept for fishery 
management called Maximum Economic Yield (MEY). This MEY approach 
incorporated both biological and economic perspectives and assumptions 
about tho nature of the resource and fishing into a theoretical framework. 
These new theories or models were able to formulate
This is the same perspective which continues in much of the present day 
literature. This view rests on an important assumption about the character of 
fish populations. As Wilson (1982:430) pointed out, "the traditional view 
assumes that the relationship between current and future stock sizes is 
continuous, stable and shaped so that it yields a long-run maximum sustainable 
or economic yield. When one perceives the environment in this way, it is 
reasonable to urge management to pursue the fine tuning of the fishery, 
especially through controls on fishing effort in order to affect the size of 
current stocks". (Wilson, 1982:430). This assumption focuses attention on the 
production aspect, but overlooks other characteristics of fish populations, such 
as their tendency to fluctuate dramatically over periods of time.
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a relatively simple and direct method [for] analyzing the 
equilibrium conditions under open-access regimes and the 
optimum conditions under managed regimes (Waugh, 1984:58).
Thus a flexible mathematical approach that Integrated the biological 
characteristics of fish populations with the economic characteristics of 
the fishing Industry had been created.
This methodology orthodox perspective proponents argued, provided 
the necessary tools for analyzing and solving over-fishing problems In 
terms of increasing economic efficiency (Clark, 1981:231-232). Neo­
classical economists were convinced that solutions to the problems for 
managing of the fisheries were simply a matter of implementing policy 
mechanisms that would maximize Industrial efficiency. They argued that 
If these types of policies were Implemented then society In general would 
benefit because both conservation and best use of the fishery resources 
would be achieved.
This neo-classical or bio-economic approach began with the work of 
Scott Gordon in the early 1950’s.” He argued that because the fisheries 
were open access resources, they naturally attract increasing fishing 
effort. Gordon (1954) felt that the theories of fishery management had 
yet to include the economic principles at play within the fisheries. 
Specifically, the problem In Gordon's view was that the biological 
theories had not placed the behaviour of fishermen as "an integrated
"Peder Anderson (1981:1) writes about his discovery of Jans Warming's 1911 
published article, which he claims dervlved the same results as Gordon postulated 
more than 40 years later. Anderson enthusiatically notes that Warming's 
classical results "have withstood the test of time... and are as applicable today 
as when they were first written."
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element of a general and systematic ’bionomie* theory" (Gordon, 
1954:128).*’
While he acknowledged that sime biologists had been aware of the 
inter-relationship between biology and economics, Gordon was quite 
critical of the fact that economic analysis had not been formally Included 
in the management theories (Gordon, 1954:124). As Waugh points out, the 
Gordon analysis contributed greatly to the development of the modern day 
bio-economic approach. He provided a simple framework for understanding 
the over-fishing of resources in which an economic equilibrium is achieved 
and where the costs used to harvest them equals the prices received from 
them (Waugh, 1984:31).
Gordon’s idea was to replace the biological MSY concept of fishing 
with the new MEY concept.” Gordon (1954) saw MEY as simply the optimum 
utilization of a resource defined in terms of the total revenue or value 
of production, minus the total harvesting costs (Gordon, 1954:129). Since 
the fishery resources are open-access and inevitability reach a point of 
economic equilibrium where the rent (or economic yield) is completely 
dissipated, Gordon proposed that they be made either private property or
It should be pointed out that Scott Gordon felt the application of 
economic principles to the fishery was appropriate because "the large numbers 
of fishermen permit valid behaviour generalizations of their activities along 
the lines of the standard economic theory of production" (Gordon, 1954:128). 
Using this behaviourial assumption he demonstrated that over-fishing of fishery 
resources was rooted in the economic organization of the industry.
” Gordon was quite critical of past restrictions used to control fishing 
effect. He wrote that "practically all control measures have in the past, been 
designed by biologists with the sole attention paid to the production side of 
the problem and none to the cost side. The result has been a wide open-door for 
the frustration of the purposes of such measures" (Gordon, 1954:132).
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public property and subjected to a central controlling authority (Gordon, 
1954; 135).**
The next year, the works of Anthony Scott furthered the cause for
enclosing or privatizing the fishery resources. Scott (1955:117)
modifying Gordon’s ’open access’ conception of the fishery to a ’common
property’ analysis and the HEY concept as the most effective theoretical
approach for fishery management. He argued that the achievement of
efficiency in the fishery could only occur by the complete appropriation
of all resources in a particular marine area to a sole owner. This he felt
was a much superior regime to competition under conditions of common
property. He based his argument on the assumption, that if fishermen or
companies actually own the resources, then the incentive to maximize
individual profits would also inadvertently maximize the net social
benefits to society. Scott stated it in the following way:
As long as the user of a fishery is sure that he will have 
property rights over the fishery for a series of periods in 
the future, he can plan the use of the fishery in such a way 
as to maximize the present value (future net returns 
discounted to the present) of his enterprise. From the social
point of view it can be said that he will bring about the
**A modern applied example of Gordon’s theoretical conceptions of a fishery 
theory is given by Clark (1981:233) when he described the progression of events 
leading to the 1972 collapse of the Peruvian anchoveta fishery. First, there 
is a phase of expansion of fishing capacity and increases in annual catches. 
The need to control catches in order to prevent depletion eventually becomes 
apparent (possibly only after catches have already begun to decline), and 
institutions are established to assess the resource and to recommend catch limits 
and other regulations. But fishing capacity continues to expand - even though 
such expansion is clearly unnecessary - with the result that the fishing season 
must be progressively shortened to prevent over-fishing. Eventually a rather 
tenuous economic equilibrium may become established with income to existing 
vessels and fishermen so low as to inhibit further expansion ;.. Fisheries 
managed in this way are characterized by brief fishing seasons, crowded fishing 
grounds, poor product quality due to inadequate handling of the catch, idled 
vessels and processing plants for much of the year, and in some cases the 
ultimate demise of the fishery, possibly triggered by an environmental change.
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'best' use of the fishery and of all other factors Invested 
in It over future periods by thus allocating outputs and 
outlays over time in accordance with the current rate of 
discount. (Scott, 1955:122).
Scott was contemptuous of the biological conservation restrictions 
justified by the earlier MSY theory in order to control fishing effort. 
He drew attention to Gordon's early observations that biologists seemed 
to be quite ignorant about the effectiveness of their restrictive measures 
in actually conserving and protecting any fish populations (Scott, 
1955:117). What concerned Scott was that biological fishing restrictions 
were imposed at an economic cost and they obstructed the trend towards the 
increased economic efficiency within the industry (reducing input costs 
through technological advances and organizational innovations).
This theme of advocating the MEY concept over the MSY concept was 
supported by the research of another important neo-classical economist, 
Crutchfield (1956), who in a paper entitled "Common Property Resources 
and Factor Allocation" tested the theories of Gordon and Scott in his case 
study of the Pacific halibut fishery. Crutchfield recognized that there 
were difficulties in getting the fishing industry's support for any 
conservation measures that go beyond the purely biological aspects. He was 
cautiously optimistic that increased efficiency in the halibut fishery 
could occur if the necessary policy restrictions (imposition of property 
rights) were implemented gradually so that disinvestment in capital 
equipment and forced occupational shifts of fishermen would be minimized 
over tim» (Crutchfield, 1956:300).
Later Crutchfield further clarified his understanding of the 
relationship between conservation and efficiency by writing that:
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Conservation Is essentially an Investment decision. Is It 
wiser to take all the fish now or to take some now and
'Invest* In the productive capacity of the fisheries stock 
Itself? This decision Is no different In concept from
Investment In a factory, a store, a truck, or any other type
of capital Investment. What Is confusing In the case of a
fish population or a forest Is that the Inventory of final 
products and the factory are one and the same thing; the 
problem Is to find an optimal balance between a fishery stock 
viewed as a source of consumer goods and the same fishery 
stock viewed as a piece of productive equipment. In either 
usage It Is essential that the largest net benefit from both 
Investment and consumption be obtained" (Crutchfield, 
1965:55).
Emmerson (1980:14) In his review of the period, shows that by the 1960*s 
the neo-classical fisheries economists had succeeded in making the MEY 
concept and the exclusive ownership over now what was being termed as 
common property, part of the orthodox perspective approach to fishery 
management.
This orthodox approach was supportive of the general policy 
Initiatives undertaken by governments and Industries during this period. 
Governments were subsidizing their fishing Industries in general and the 
corporate sector in particular, with the aim of modernizing them (Barrett, 
1984:79). It was envisioned at the time that modern, technically advanced 
fleets would harvest the resources in the most efficient way, as predicted 
by the MEY theory. Later as management agencies failed to adequately 
control and regulate the Increasing harvest levels (using the MSY inspire^ 
restrictions), the now heavily capitalized fishing Interests became 
Increasingly concerned about the state of what they saw as common property 
fisheries. They were concerned that no more effort through Increased 
participation be put on these resources or else their economic Interests 
could be jeopardized.
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The common property argument now became the focal point in the 
orthodox perspective. The argument simply states that since common 
property resources are free to be harvested by everyone, the fishery is 
inescapably subject to over-fishing. Competition rather than conservation 
eventually becomes the major aim of those fishing the resources. 
Fishermen increase both their fishing effort and capital equipment in 
order to catch as much fish as possible as quickly as possible. 
Inevitably a tragedy of the commons results. This tragedy takes the form 
of fish stock depletion, underutilization of capital, over-supply of 
labour and where alternative work opportunities are scarce, low incomes 
(Crutchfield, 1965:44-64). It is at this point in time that acceptance 
of the orthodox fishery management approach with its emphasis on efficient 
harvesting and enclosure of the commons becomes important to the
industrial interests of a fishery.
The orthodox perspective, which now has culminated in the
development and use of bio-economic fishery management models, as we have
seen can trace its historical roots and theoretical assumptions, back to 
the mid-19th century. The main assumption of the orthodox approach is 
that the fishery is a system that can be understood in terms of 
equilibrium equations. These equations are used to calculate the balance 
between fishery productivity and harvest levels or between value of 
catches and cost of- harvesting. The competition between fishermen 
harvesting the resources is assumed to be conducted on a basis of
equality. For example, because the number of fishermen in a fishery is 
deemed to be so large that for the purposes of analysis each fisherman is 
assumed to have relatively equal amounts of skill, capital equipment, and
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access to resources and markets. The orthodox perspective also assumes 
that the fishery system is essentially autonomous so that social, 
cultural, and political influences have neutral or marginal impact on the 
harvesting, processing and marketing processes. Today, these same 
orthodox assumptions continue dominating and influencing the decision­
making process in most fishery management systems throughout the world 
(Anderson,1981, 1983, 1986; Bui tin,1975; Christy, 1977; Christy and 
Scott,1965; Clark, 1977, 1985, 1986; Clark and Munro,1980; Cruthchfield, 
1970, 1975; Cushing,1974, 1983; Dickie, 1976, 1979; Gulland and Robinson, 
1973; Larkin, 1977, 1980, 1982; Larkin and Wilimovsky, 1973; Munro, 1979; 
Pauly and Murphy, 1982; Pearse, 1979, 1980a, 1980b; Retting, 1988; 
Rothschild, 1973; Scott, 1979, 1982; Turvey, 1964; Turvey and Wiseman, 
1957).
6. Conclusion
This chapter has traced the historical development of the orthodox 
perspective theories of fishery management from their European roots in 
Darwinian Biology, in the last half of the 19th century, to their neo­
classical economic antecedents in the 1950's and 1960*s. The traditional 
understanding of these developments have been that the theories are the 
product of an objective, value-free evolution of scientific research and 
knowledge. This chapter challenges this traditional understanding by 
showing that competing theories and debates shaped by the political and 
economic context within which they developed, were instrumental in shaping 
the end product.
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The orthodox theory of fishery management emerged at every stage 
with close ideological justifications for fairly specific economic 
interests. For example, in the early 19th century, theorists saw the 
fishery as inexhaustible, a view that legitimized the industrial 
transformation of the industry. If the fishery was inexhaustible then 
the use of new technology that significantly increased the catch limits 
was easily justifiable. This approach also eliminated the need for the 
emerging industrial sector to examine the impact of new trawler technology 
on the resources even though fishing communities and small fishermen were 
arguing for just such an examination. In the pre-WWI period there was 
a shift to the ecological equilibrium approach which attempted to address 
what was by that point in time clearly recognized as imbalances and 
fluctuations in the stocks. The ecological-equilibrium theory stated that 
every fish stock produced a surplus. The solution to fishery problems was 
to discover and capture the level of surplus produced by the natural 
stocks. This, it was argued would not only protect and support the 
industry, it would be beneficial to the fishery by keeping it in natural 
balance. Although the industry recognized that problems with the stocks 
existed, their ability as a result of the new trawler technology, to 
maintain productivity and profits through continually expanding their 
range of operations tended, at least to some extent, to mask the economic 
reality of stock depletion. Thus the powerful interests in the fishing 
industry did not encourage or support any proposed restrictions or fishing 
practices other than purely scientific efforts to understand the 
ecological-equilibrium of the fish stocks.
After the war fish stocks were replenished as a result of forced
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fishing Inactivity and It became clear that the problem was one of over­
fishing, This became clearer In the context of the Increased use of 
Improved fishing technology and nations competing and claiming historical 
rights to particular fishing grounds. As a result, research shifted 
towards developing theories of fishery management that would balance the 
production of the resource with the commercial harvesting effort.
Post WWII ushered In a second major Industrial transformation of 
the fishing Industry. New technological Innovation made It possible for 
the large industrial sector to Increase fishing effort through the use of 
long distance fleets. Before long there was major fishery collapses on 
a world-wide basis. As a result, the Ideas of the pre-war period were 
taken up again, especially the Ideas of regulation and restrictions 
Involved 1n managing a common property. The fishery problem as they saw 
It was with the competition between fishermen vying for common property 
resources. This competition, they argued, leads to resource depletion 
because ownership does not occur until after the fish are caught by 
Individual fishermen. The solution proposed was to replace Individual 
competition with ownership or property rights over the resource before 
the fish are captured. This would allow for a process of Industry 
rationalization, forcing the Industry to become more efficient by 
eliminating Inefficient and redundant harvesting and processing capacity. 
This view, although appearing neutral, In fact favoured large over small 
fishing Interests and Industrial Interests over community Interests. It 
Is these ideas, first raised by bio-economists that underlie the present 





By the 1970’s because of dramatic changes In the fisheries
throughout the world, the orthodox perspective theories and their 
underlying assumptions were being challenged by new critical views. What 
caused this re-examination of the orthodox approach?
During the 195G’s and 1960*s, many fisheries were undergoing
dramatic industrial transformations which reached their peak in the early 
1970’s. The transformations resulted in the industrial sector of most 
fisheries were becoming increasingly concentrated and more powerful 
relative to the traditional small-scale sector. The organizations
responsible for managing fisheries such as International Commission of 
the North Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) had failed in their efforts to
control harvest levels and protect the resources. Important fish stock 
collapses were occurring throughout the world on a regular basis causing 
economic crisis for many fishing industries and dependent fishing nations. 
All of these transformation factors led to a widespread recognition and 
consensus that fisheries must be managed effectively if stocks were to be
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rebuilt and future crises avoided.’ Since most fishery resources existed 
in international waters, it was perceived that only an international 
effort could adequately address the complexities and management problems 
involved.
In 1973, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS III) was convened to negotiate an international framework for 
agreements between nations on the future use of sea resources and 
management responsibilities.* The fishery was one of the first resources 
to be dealt with since it was already in crisis. The UNCLOS III 
negotiations specified that each country could declare 200 mile Extended 
Economic Zones (EEZs) and determine their own fishery management goals, 
so long as they abided by the guidelines set by UNCLOS III. Each 
country's goals were individualized and shaped by their particular needs. 
Needs were based on the economic priorities of each particular country, 
and ranged from being supportive of the industrial business sector as was 
the case in Canada, to being supportive of the local community interests 
and small boat fishermen interests as was the case in Norway. By the 
1970’s many countries began setting up legal and administrative structures 
to implement their management goals within the newly declared extended
’ The International Commission of the North Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF), 
one of several international organizations had been set up after WWII in order 
to manage and control fishing effort. Their failure resulted in many communities 
of coastal fishing states traditionally dependant on these resources finding 
themselves in economic distress and often poverty.
* The conference was convened on November 16, 1973 under the authority of 
the United Nations General Assembly resolution 3067 (xxxviii) and concluded in 
1982. For the text of the convention see International Legal Materials 21 
(November, 1982:1261.
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economic zones (EEZs) adjacent to their coastlines and based on the UNCLOS 
III Convention.®
It was during the UNCLOS III negotiating process between 1973-82 
that the social, political and cultural Importance of fisheries for the 
welfare of local, national and International Interests was formally being 
recognized. In addition to the economic Importance traditionally 
emphasized for the fishery, the legal, regulatory, geographic, historical, 
and cultural Implications of fisheries management policies began to come 
Into focus and the complexities Involved In particular management 
approaches began to be debated. Researchers from disciplines and fields 
outside of fisheries biology and neo-classical economics were consulted 
on Issues and In turn they became Interested In the study of fishery 
resources and their future use and management. It was this Interest that 
stimulated the new critical research effort of the 1970’s and 1980’s and 
resulted in the creation of new fisheries social science literature 
(Bromley and Bishop, 1977; Anderson and Wadel, 1972; Anderson, 1978).
The new literatures brought to light facts that showed fishery 
management policy and practice had Implications that went far beyond the 
biological and economic concerns of conservation, protection, and 
production. For example, there were Implications for traditional rights 
of access to the resources, for future uses of the resources, for 
allocation of management responsibilities, for viability of fishery 
dependent communities, for historic fishing patterns of foreign fleets,
® UNCLOS III enabled Individual countries to assume custodial 
responsibilities (management and protection) over the resources In the newly 
declared EEZs but the Convention did not bestow actual ownership.
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for Increased conflict between competing Industrial offshore Interests 
and traditional small boat fishermen Interests, and for the rights of 
other users of the seas Including commercial transportation, military 
freedom and oil and mineral rights. The realization of these implications 
made clear that proper management of the fisheries Involved not only 
consideration of the biological and economic factors but also the 
political, social, and cultural factors affecting all users of the seas 
and resources. The new research raised Important questions about the 
management of fishery resources and attempted to broaden the orthodox 
perspectlon foundation upon which most management theory and policy was 
based (Anderson and Stiles, 1973; Apostle, Barrett, et al, 1985; Apostle 
and Barrett, 1987; Cormier, 1980; Fricke, 1985, 1973; House, 1986; 
Jentoft, 1988, 1985; Jentoft and Kristofferson, 1987; McCay and Acheson, 
1988; Pinkerton, 1987; Stoffle, Jensen and Rasch, 1984; Thiessen and 
Davis, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c; Williams, 1985).
Townsend (1985), an United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAQ) consultant, argued that the biggest problem with present day fishery 
management theory Is that It continues to be dominated by neo-classical 
economists and biologists. He writes that traditionally trained 
biologists and economists are generally not suited for the task of 
analyzing the complexities of the fisheries. He notes that not only are 
the social, cultural, and political factors unfamiliar to them, but that 
these factors cannot be understood within the scientific (b1o-econom1c) 
methodology of the mathematical models they use. He suggests that what 
really Is required are the research skills and professional judgments of 
political scientists, cultural anthropologists, and sociologists. These
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skills and judgements are necessary to address the social needs of the 
fishery and that "economists and biologists must yield part of their 
virtual monopoly In fishery research to other social scientists" 
(Townsend, 1985:2052).
A review of the ’state of the art’ orthodox theories of fishery 
management’ was an obvious point of departure for the new research 
efforts. It was generally agreed that traditional neo-classical 
approaches were Inadequate, that the assumptions underlying them were 
Incomplete, and that the theories themselves only advocated certain 
narrowly defined policy directions, and excluded equally viable 
alternatives. For the first time explanations began to emerge which 
attempted to explain the often spirited responses of fishery participant 
groups and Individuals who had been most affected when orthodox based 
policies were Imposed. This chapter reviews the new literature 
criticizing the neo-classical approach, examines some of the key issues 
the criticisms raised, and shows how despite the criticisms the neo­
classical approach continues to prevail and dominate as the most 
legitimate perspective for addressing fishery management problems.
2. Welfare Economics
As we have seen. It was the economists working In the neo-classical 
tradition who began In the early 1950’s Incorporating existing (and 
failed) biological models of the fishery Into their own analysis and link 
the biological problem of resource conservation with the neo-classical 
concern for economic efficiency. After the 1970s a number of economists
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working In the area of welfare economics began having serious difficulties 
with the bio-economic analysis approach (Bishop, 1977; Bromely, 1977; 
Copes, 1972; Bishop, Bromely and Langdon, 1981; Wilson, 1982, 1986a, 
1986b; Wilson and Acheson, 1980; O ’Neill, 1984). For instance, the 
orthodox definition and application of the efficiency concept; the bio- 
economic conceptualization of the capture and distribution of net benefits 
from the resource; and the traditional assumptions underlying the way that 
marketing processes were all seen to be inadequate or wrong given their 
own research findings.
Bromley and Bishop (1977) observed that although the efficiency 
focus has formed the cornerstone of the orthodox approach for addressing 
bio-economic issues, it’s application for solving equitable distribution 
issues was inadequate. Bishop and Bromley found in their review of five 
bio-economic case studies that an unequal relationship existed between 
the efficiency issues and the equity issues. For example, while bio­
economics has focused solely on inefficiency in the industry (too much 
labour and capital for the potential returns), issues of equity have been 
degraded as unimportant or assumed away. Little or no solid research had 
ever been presented on the distributional implications of particular 
management policies promoted as solving problems in each of the studies 
they reviewed.* They note that this is a typical feature of the orthodox 
fisheries literature in general and write that:
since there are a definite number of efficient solutions all
based upon a different distribution of rights and endowments.
* The aim is efficient productive conditions in the market which creates 
the largest feasible wealth for society. The problem with the theory is that 
any competitive advantage in the market also creates a distributive benefit.
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to talk of efficiency In public policy issues is totally 
without normative meaning; efficiency is without meaning in 
isolation from reference to distribution" (Bromley and Bishop, 
1977:287).
Bromley and Bishop are not against the use of the concept of
efficiency in fisheries, but they are against the way that orthodox 
theorists ignore other possibilities and alternatives. They felt that 
the question of distribution is deliberately ignored in orthodox 
literature. They argued that even if orthodox economists agreed on the 
need for including an analysis to provide for a more equitable
distribution of fishery benefits, other questions concerning the effects 
of some policies and as limiting entry to a fishery arise. For example, 
the fishermen who are permitted to fish would also be those who generally 
have the greatest potential to be employed outside of the fishery, while 
those who are excluded would be those who are the most dependent on the 
fishery for their welfare. Policies such as limiting entry they 
discovered actually encourage greater social inequity between fishery 
participants. Bromley and Bishop lament the fact that the fishery 
management literature has to date very little information offer no 
direction to addressing the distributional implications of their analysis 
(Bromley and Bishop, 1977:295), They point out that other fishery
conditions including the existing distribution of income, power, and
natural rights, influence the demand and supply equations of orthodox 
perspective theories, which provides only one efficient solution to any 
particular problem. Change any one of these other conditions and the 
particular efficient solution also changes. Bromley and Bishop conclude 
that:
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...If economists are to have something to say of relevance In 
the design of practical fisheries management policies, we are 
going to be forced to move beyond the conventional fascination 
with economic efficiency as traditionally defined In the 
literature (Bromley and Bishop, 1977:296).
Wilson (1982) and Emmerson (1980), further the critique of the 
orthodox approach for Ignoring the distributive Implications of their 
work. They felt that compared to the Issues of production and 
conservation, the distribution Issue had received Inadequate theoretical 
attention. Emmerson (1980, p. Ill) noted that orthodox theory’s concern 
with trying to obtain the maximum sustainable yield or maximum economic 
yield from a fishery had Important distribution Implications for those 
communities who are totally dependent on them for subsistence. He points 
out that by Ignoring distributional aspects, the orthodox approach falls 
to be sensitive to ways that different communities and societies use 
fishery resources by adapting themselves to the seasonal/yearly 
fluctuations of resource availability. The point of Emmerson’s argument 
was to caution against unilaterally Imposing policies that force vertical 
Integration of fish Industries. For example. Implementing policies that 
Improve catch technology, expand shore facilities, reorganize markets, 
without at the same time, also considering the alternative benefits of 
’horizontal’ Integration that enables low-lncome participants to also 
benefit from opportunities for continued participation and employment. 
He felt a fishery management change from an orthodox approach, to an 
approach that combined more sensitivity to marine resources and maritime 
communities could form a better basis for policy making, especially in 
developing fisheries.
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James Wilson (1982) noted that since orthodox b1o-econom1c theory
usually presents the fishery as a stable single species system It greatly
overslmpllfys the understanding of the problems of the fishery. He put
forward three fundamental issues faced by policy makers when they try to
Implement orthodox based management theory.
First, the Imperfections of our knowledge and the 
uncontrollable variations on fisheries systems severely 
constrain the range of economically feasible management 
options. Second, the social cost of rule making and 
enforcement (for example, collective transactions costs) are 
high when a complex, uncertain and highly variable environment 
Is the target of management. And third, efficiency In this 
kind of environment Is much more closely related to adaptive, 
learning behaviour of Individual economic factors than to the 
traditional notion of Input cost minimization (Wilson, 
1982:417).
These three Issues, Wilson feels, fundamentally undermine orthodox 
perspective theories. He argues that fishery problems have to be placed 
within an environmental, economic, and social context and the elements of 
this context are not necessarily continuous or stable. Some of these 
elements he refers to Include human Interactions (exchanges) which are 
continually having undertaken over-fishing which Is a collective problem, 
and management solutions that unless they are specifically "tailored to 
the particular context of the problem" may exceed the social costs of 
their Implementation (Wilson, 1982:433).
Orthodox based fishery theory was criticized for Ignoring the 
Involvement of existing political Institutions In the harvesting, 
processing, and marketing of fishery resources. Any Influence that these 
Institutions exert Is generally assumed away by orthodox theory proponents 
unless It Is so dramatic that It demands consideration. The usual
48
orthodox response to this criticism is to provide an ad hoc explanation 
of the disturbing force (Evensky, 1987:178), Evensky feels that the 
problem with orthodox methodology in general is that the bio-economic 
models are built on a presumption that social and political structures 
have no effect on the fisheries. Therefore in this way the orthodox based 
approach does not need to provide a systematic accounting for the non­
neutrality of social and political influences on the fisheries.* As a 
result orthodox theorists simply provide ad hoc explanations or 
qualifications for results that differ from the predictions of their bio- 
economic equations. This lack of explanation however has undermined both 
the credibility and relevance of much of the work using an orthodox 
approach when it is applied to the problems of the real world (Evensky, 
1987:183).
One of the first critiques of the orthodox approach on this basis 
was made by Bromley and Bishop (1977).“ They pointed out that the 
orthodox approach relies on only a few concepts. These concepts generally 
are applicable to the firm level of analysis (optimization of profits) and 
do not apply the level of considering how political facuurs affect the
* An important economic advantage that one can have in any economic 
competitive process is determined by the amount of influence and control of the 
social and political structure exerted. Social and political institution control 
enables one to access a tremendous number of opportunities and overcome many 
obstacles not available to competitors (Evensky, 1987:185).
* Bromley and Bishop also object to a theoretical approach that has not 
only distorted the direction of economic research, but also the advice that 
economists give to fishery policy makers. They argue that the orthodox fisheries 
legacy has been one of a virtual domination of the issues dealing with the 
management of these resources.
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fishery management process. For example they write that:
... in all the relentless searching for instances of "market 
failure" and "externalities" (crowding, mesh, and stock 
externalities) we have ignored the pervasive "externalities" 
emanating from the political arena. For when public choices 
are made on a basis of less than unanimous consent of all 
participants -and all public choices are thus characterized 
- production runctions and cost functions are directly 
influenced by other decision-making units. What better way 
to influence the production function of a fishing firm than 
to restrict its access to the fishery (Bromley and Bishop, 
1977:296).
Welfare economists argue that the benefits and costs of fishery 
management must be seen as more than a profit maximization proposition. 
They feel that other benefits, and costs must be included in any analysis 
of the fisheries. They emphasize that the fishery is not only a 
competitive industrial process but also an industry upon which communities 
and fishermen are dependent. Although the welfare economists are not 
against the general market principles of economics, they do try to expand 
and integrate the strictly economic interests of industry owners 
(harvesters ard processors operating for profit) with the social and 
cultural interests of dependent fishermen and their communities. They 
point out that other participants such as fishermen organizations, 
politicians, government managers, community leaders, all have interests 
in fisheries and these participants both influence and play important 
roles in the nvocesses for managing them.' In addition other agencies 
and groups including foreign governments and competing industries.
' Bromley and Bishop note "that it has taken more than two decades for 
(neo-classical) economists to realize that the fishermen, themselves, might have 
something to say about the rules which define their opportunity for economic 
welfare (Bromley and Bishop, 1977:298).
50
markets, and financial conditions can effect the state of any fishery. 
All of these other social factors can be seen to be exerting different 
and often contradictory influences on the fishery management problem. 
The contribution of welfare economists to the fishery management 
literature is to expand the orthodox methodology from a sole focus on 
efficiency issues to an expanded form that incorporates other relevant 
factors such as the distribution of benefits and costs. This welfare 
economic critique of the orthodox approach however it must be kept in mind 
comes from within the economic discipline itself. The aim of the welfare 
economists contribution is to modify and revise but not fundamentally 
transform the general orthodox approach. For that reason, welfare 
economists themselves also, overlook other important analytical factors 
and conditions that affect the management of the fishery resources. Some 
of these other factors include: the inclusion of the perspective of
fishermen themselves, the internal organization of fishing communities and 
the contradictory nature of interests between companies and fishermen.
3. Maritime Anthropology
The anthropological analysis of the fishery generally focuses on 
how fishermen and their communities depend on and adapt to both the 
availability of resources and their environment. Since the fishery 
resource itself is variable (dramatic population fluctuations and seasonal 
migration patterns), anthropologists emphasize strategies that communities 
and fishermen use in order to ensure both their own survival and long-term 
economic stability of their communities. Anthropologists provide a
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social, cultural and economic context for understanding the fisheries and 
the Implications that particular management policies have on dependent 
fishermen and communities. In particular, they examine questions that 
focus on how policies operate and change communities, how policies are 
perceived and responded to by those most affected, and how policies 
differentially affect the various Interest groups that depend on a 
fishery.
The anthropological fisheries literature appearing In the early 
1970*s was aimed at challenging certain basic assumptions that the 
orthodox approach promoted the common property nature of fisheries, the 
behaviour of fishermen exploiting the resources, and the role that social 
Institutions and communities play In a fishery.
One of the most Important concerns that anthropologists take Issue 
with orthodox approach proponents Is the characterization of fishery 
resources as common property that Is free and readily accessible to 
everyone (McCay and Acheson, 1988; Apostle, Kasdan and Hanson,1983; 
Breton, 1987; Dewar, 1983; House, 1986; Kearney, 1983; Lamson and Hanson, 
1984; Mathews and Phyne, 1988; Pinkerton, 1988; Poggle and Gersuny, 1974, 
1984). Anthropologists emphasize that fishery resources are variable, 
seasonal and unpredictable, and that fishermen and their communities 
confront this reality, on a dally basis and have adapted themselves 
accordingly. They analyze the way that fishermen and their communities 
have historically developed and employed particular fishing strategies and 
lifestyles which are tailored to the vagaries of the resources (Gunda, 
1984). They stress that dependent fishing communities and fishermen are 
concerned with more than the harvest levels but also with the long term
52
husbandry of the resources. To counter the orthodox notion that unmanaged 
fishery resources are common property which are inevitably destroyed by 
uncontrolled harvesting methods, anthropologists argue that in reality 
fishermen have traditionally controlled fishing levels, used non­
destructive technology and developed harvesting methods that are 
appropriate to the availability of resources. Using community case 
studies, anthropologists show how maritime cultures often treat resources 
as community based property and have social mechanisms that provide 
community self-management of them (Acheson, 1972, 1975, 1981; Acheson, 
Poggie, Pollnac, and Wilson, 1980; Anderson and Stiles, 1973; Anderson, 
1979; Davis and Kasdan, 1984; McCay, 1980, 1981, 1986; McCay and 
Acheson,1988).
Acheson, Poggie and Pollnac (1980:818) argue that because the use 
of the common property concept is such an important intellectual 
foundation for the orthodox approach, the range of management alternatives 
for fishermen have been blocked or not adequately considered. The 
prevalent use of the common property concept focusing solely on the 
negative biological and economic effects of non-management,has resulted 
in policies designed to only control fishing effort (limiting entry 
schemes) and increase economic efficiency (use of technology over labour). 
These policies overlook the fact that as people are excluded from the 
fishery and forced to leave their communities, other economic and social
S3
costs to society are incurred.®
Since the orthodox approach sees the fishery management problem in 
terms of the need to control exploitation rates, policies are always 
directed towards reducing existing fishing effort. Anthropologists such 
as Acheson (1980:x1-xii), Acheson and Acheson (1980:824), McCay and 
Acheson (1988:1), all point out that orthodox methods for measuring 
fishing effort (based on statistical records and mathematical equations) 
are deficient and do not provide a proper or accurate assessment of 
fishing effort. They note that fishing effort differs depending on which 
fishery is being exploited. They also note that fishing effectiveness 
(differences in success rates) is never considered or accounted for in the 
orthodox analysis. Moreover, they argue that anthropological studies have 
demonstrated that a number of social, cultural, and psychological factors 
influence the amount of fishing effort placed on the resource at any given 
time. Thus, fishing effort depends, not only on the amount of time spent 
fishing and the size and power of vessels as orthodox researchers assume, 
but also on the effectiveness of the vessels and men involved in fishing 
operations. Acheson and Acheson (1980:839) argue that in the short run, 
fishing jrt is determined by the skills, information networks, and crew 
composition of fishermen and vessels, while in the long-run fishing effort 
is controlled and limited by the number of fishermen with the necessary 
commitment, experience, and resources to enter the fisheries.
* M. Estellie Smith notes in her criticism of orthodox based policies that 
many of the problems in the fisheries are simply a result of the creation and 
encouragement in the growth of large industrialized fishing fleets (Smith, 
1977:8).
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The orthodox assumption that inevitable and destructive competition 
between fishermen always leads to over-exploitation of fishery resources, 
is also challenged by anthropologists. Anthropologists, by studying 
community based fisheries and the behaviour of fishermen harvesting them 
resources write that fishermen are capable and willing to conserve the 
resources upon which they depend. John J. Van West argues that fishermen 
have intensified the harvest in fisheries not because of profit 
maximization but because of a need to maintain their income at levels 
which would enable them to survive the adverse market conditions created 
by dominating processor groups. His research on Port Dover fishermen 
showed that fishing intensity increased as a direct result of low dockside 
prices, processor Imposed fishing quotas, or a combination of both, which 
was negatively affecting fishermen incomes (Van West, 1986:43). In other 
words, the source of fishing intensity originated not in competition with 
the harvesting efforts of independent fishermen, but with competition from 
processor-owned vessels, and processor-controlled market conditions. Such 
studies show that the orthodox conception of the destructive competitive 
behaviour of fishermen on the fishery resources is at best incomplete and 
at worst misleading when used in trying to understand problems associated 
with stock depletion and resulting economic distress.
Another concern with the orthodox approach, raised by 
anthropologists, is with the portrayal of fishermen indiscriminately 
exploiting the resources for individual gain. The orthodox perspective 
sees fishermen participation in the fishery solely as an economic 
activity, where they are described as competitive and predatory 
individuals who work alone trying to catch as much fish as quickly as
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possible. Anthropologists have tried to correct this picture by offering 
alternative viewpoints. In countering the orthodox perspective, 
anthropologists expose the lack of distinction made between traditionally 
defined economic activities and non-economic activities (the non­
competitive dimensions of fishermen lives). These other dimensions show 
that fishermen in their community settings often do not differentiate 
between work and leisure in the same way that land-based workers do. A 
pattern of work as a lifestyle usually characterizes individuals engaged 
in fishing (Poggie and Gersuny, 1974; Yngvesson, 1976).* As a result, the 
orthodox assumption that fishermen live and operate as individualistic 
competitors is discounted by anthropologists who argue that this is not 
a real representation of them. For example, Poggie et al. research show 
that fishermen are quite capable of cooperative behaviour. In their 
discussion on the ideology of fishing Poggie writes,
...of the readiness with which seemingly individualistic 
fishermen seize upon the idea that cooperation in some 
domains is more effective than solitary effort. But in 
order to adapt to their physical and social environment, 
autonomous fishermen are clearly able to perceive the 
benefit of cooperation as a way to retain their 
individuality against the constraints of these 
environments (Poggie and Gersuny, 1974:104).
Also, many anthropologists [Acheson (1981), Anderson (1979), and later 
Townsend (1985)] found that fishermen fish for reasons beyond those of
* For example, Poggie and Gersuny point out the personality characteristics 
of fishermen, when compared to local land-based workers tends to be less passive 
and routinized. They attribute these different characteristics to many factors 
including the physical environment of the sea, the social environment, the types 
of technology used, ideology, and the hunting skills fishermen need to overcome 
a hostile environment and migratory resource (Poggie and Gersuny, 1974:100-106).
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just earning a living. They argue that fishermen receive in addition to 
a monetary return for their efforts, an important non-monetary benefit 
such as worker satisfaction. As Townsend puts it "work as a fisherman is 
not just another job; work for a fisherman is a fundamental part of his 
way of life" (Townsend, 1985:2051).
All of those researchers (Acheson, Poggie, Pollnac, and Wilson, 
1980:811) are convinced that other factors are more important in the 
occupational decisions of fishermen than the strictly economic factors 
emphasized by orthodox theorists. Using his research in fishing 
communities in the northeastern United States, Acheson found that there 
are many different reasons that fishermen use to remain in the fishing 
industry and these reasons differ substantially from one area to another. 
He concluded that income and alternative economic opportunities can only 
explain part of these reasons.
The orthodox approach does not acknowledge the role that social 
institutions and communities play in facilitating the exploitation, 
processing, and marketing of fishery resources. By ignoring information 
networks, peer reference groups, and informal rules of behaviour between 
fishermen, the orthodox perspective overlooks factors which are essential 
for community based fishing to be undertaken in the first place.
Acheson and Acheson make a very interesting observation about the 
phenomena of particular interest groups attempting to maintain control over 
information and expertise. They found that the conflict over fishery management 
issues that is so prevalent between fishermen and professional managers (usually 
orthodox policy makers) is not in reality about differences in problems 
understanding but rather in protecting their own interests. For example, Acheson 
and Acheson note that "if biologists and lobstermen differ on management issues, 
it is because their interests differ, not because of different or superior views 
of the world" (Acheson and Acheson, 1980:828).
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Therefore, a major concern for anthropologists has been the way that the 
orthodox approach underestimates or ignores the role that social 
institutions and communities play in the fisheries. Acheson feels that 
because the orthodox approach lacks basic information on the uniqueness 
of different communities, it cannot account for the impact that policies 
developed from an orthodox perspective have on these communities. He 
writes that:
...the biologists, managers (neo-classical economists), and 
industry representatives often have a good deal of information 
on the biology of the species in question, and good economic 
data on catches, incomes, and so on. They (however) have no 
systematic information on the social organization of fishing 
communities or the values of people who live in them. In 
short, they have very little information on the differences 
among the communities they are trying to regulate, the basic 
socio-cultural factors which so strongly influence the impact 
of fisheries management plans, and the reactions of fishermen 
to those plans (Acheson, 1980:xii).
Anthropologists (Vanderpool, 1985; Lamson, 1984; McCay, 1981; McCay 
and Acheson, 1988; Davis and Kasdan, 1984) have studied particular 
fisheries extensively and determined that in order to fully appreciate 
the impact of management policies it is necessary to understand fishermen 
organizations and the differences between fishing communities.
The anthropological fisheries literature largely consists of case 
studies that focus on fishing communities or fishermen organizations 
located where fishing or fish processing is an important industry (McCay, 
1985; Kearney, 1981, 1983, 1986; Lamson, 1984; Sider, 1980). Acheson 
(1981) in his review of the literature feels that the social ties 
fishermen have with their kinsmen, neighbours, business associates and 
friends have been studied and their importance recognized. However, he
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argues that the social relationships of fishermen fishing the same species 
with the same technology has not been adequately addressed. He feels that 
with a deeper understanding of these relationships, one can gain an 
understanding of how fishermen cope with the social, economic and 
biological realities of their lives." He categorizes these types of 
relationships or ties as being either clustered or institutional. 
Clusters are networks formed between fishermen fishing the same species, 
in the same area, with the same gear, during the same time period. 
Institutions are bilateral agreements (formal or informal) which structure 
the relationship between these fishermen. Acheson (1980:806-812) argues 
that there are two major reasons for the formation of these relationships 
by fishermen. First, relationships are formed by fishermen in order to 
overcome the uncertainty that is inherent in the fisheries. For example, 
availability of fish (as a result of natural stock fluctuations and 
seasonal migrations), gear conflicts, marketing conditions and 
commitments, and sharing arrangements (of risks, costs, and benefits). 
Second, these relationships serve as the means through which necessary 
information and knowledge for successful fishing operations is shared 
between fishermen.
" Anthropologists are particularly concerned with the orthodox assumption 
that misleads people into thinking fishermen cannot or will not organize to 
conserve resources on which their livelihood depend. For example, Acheson (1980) 
notes that fishermen using the same resources do not all know each other and 
their vessels are not capable of fishing the resources equally. Some fishermen 
live in close proximity of each other while others live in remote isolated eas 
and the range of most vessels is not equal to the range of many of the resources. 
Therefore he concludes that it is unfair for orthodox theorists to just assume 
that fishermen compete with each other, with no interest in organizing for 
conservation purposes, without also considering the barriers that inhibit 
organizing efforts.
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According to anthropologists like Acheson, Poggie, Pollnac, et al. 
It Is the orthodox assumptions of a homogenous fishing Industry and 
competitive Individual fishermen, that cause many of the problems 
associated with much of the orthodox perspective fisheries management 
policies. They, for example, conclude that since the fisheries are very 
diverse In terms of social organizations and communities, the only 
acceptable solutions to management problems will be solutions that are 
both diverse and sensitive to the social Institutional and community 
contexts In which they are applied (Acheson, 1980:818). They note that 
the many of the present day problems of the fisheries stem from policies 
that are rooted In the inadequate theories of orthodoxy. For example they 
write that:
...many of the problems currently facing managers of the 
marine resources of the United States and elsewhere stem from 
theoretical Inadequacies. Since o thodox researchers such as 
Hardin (1968), Crutchfield (1964), Scott (1955), and Gordon 
(1954) are not concerned with social systems, and we believe 
that the weakness In the body of theory they have developed 
stem from some of their presuppositions concerning the 
motivations and social organizations of fishermen (Acheson et 
al, 1980:82-821).
All of these anthropological concerns over the orthodox perspective 
assumptions about the nature of common property, fishermen Individualism, 
and Institutional neutrality help provide a framework for explaining the 
negative reaction that many fishermen and communities have when over- 
simplistic, and generalized orthodox perspective policy solutions are 
imposed. Many anthropologists by means of their challenge to the orthodox 
approach have concluded that this perspective appears to be focused 
towards rationalizing and justifying the existing economic power structure
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and dominance of the fisheries by the industrial sector (McCay and 
Acheson, 1988:23-24). For example, policies based on the orthodox 
approach tend to support developments that encourage vertically integrated 
control over the harvesting, production and marketing processes by a few 
companies without considering the social, economic, and cultural 
implications and costs to communities that arise from such developments."
Nevertheless, there are a number of important points overlooked by 
the maritime anthropology critique, which centre on the ’benign nature of 
capitalism.’ Some of these overlooked points include: the internal
diversity of the fishery such as the class differentiation between 
fishermen (for example, independent fishermen as petty capitalists using 
industrial technology); the dynamics of capital (profit imperative) versus 
industrial technology (technological imperative); and the role of the 
state versus capital. Despite the significant critiques made by the 
welfare economists and the maritime anthropologists, the orthodox based 
theories of fishery management continue to reign supreme. In response to 
their critiques orthodox theorists have re-emphasized the concept of 
common property, modified their methodologies and continue to ignore much 
of the work done outside their own perspective.
" However, in spite of the vigour in which orthodox theorists have 
advocated their policies, Acheson takes some satisfaction in the fact that at 
the time of the implementation of the United States EEZ, the Congress clearly 
recognized that management of the fisheries affected not only availability of 
fish resources and the viability of the fishing industry, but also the culture 
and welfare of coastal communities. As a result they enshrined in the Fisheries 
Conservation Management Act (FCMA) 1976 a general management goal (Optimum Yield) 
rather than the more orthodox goal of MSY (Acheson, 1980:111).
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4. Conclusion
This chapter has shown the shortcomings exposed by the liberal 
critique of orthodox theory. Nonetheless, orthodox theory has succeeded 
by expanding and modifying their own paradigm and by Ignoring other 
paradigms In maintaining their dominance In the fishery management 
literature. It Is orthodox theory, albeit a somewhat revised version, 
that still provides the main guide to defining, understanding and solving 
fishery management problems. Orthodox theory's present form argues that 
the fisheries are a common property resource, It's problems are rooted In 
the tendency of participants to maximize their own Individual gain without 
concern for the continued biological and economic viability of the 
resource. The modern day solution the theory proposes, Is to change the 
common property aspect by Instituting property or ownership rights over 
the resources thereby restricting public access." This solution, orthodox 
theory argues, offers two benefits for society. First, the resource will 
be conserved since participants will be less Inclined to ruin their own 
property. Second, the harvesting and production operations will become 
modernized through the application of maximizing efficiency criteria to 
the Industrial processes. This solution purports to establish the most 
beneficial (I.e. profitable) conditions for those Involved." This modern
" It Is argued that by restricting access to the resources the tendency 
towards excessive numbers of fishermen with low Incomes and excessive over­
investment of capital In harvesting equipment and Infrastructure will be curbed.
" Benefits for society are perceived to be disributed between 
individualistic or atomistic competitors. Each Individual has a certain 
potential for success and In a free society should have an opportunity to achieve 
their potential and be successful. Therefore the best means for distributing
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version of orthodoxy underlies most approaches used throughout the world 
to manage fishery resources. The question Is, how does this version of 
the theory translate Into policy and practice? The next two Chapters 
examine attempts to do this In both Canada and the United States.
the benefits to society are to create the necessary conditions so that competing 
members of society can maximize their Individual gains.
CHAPTER FOUR 
Paradigm, Policy, and Practice:
The State and Fishery Management Structures 
In Canada and the United States
1. Introduction
In this chapter I argue that the single most important evidence of 
revisions to the orthodox fishery paradigm appeared in the mid-1970’s and 
early 1980’s with the emergence of fishery management policies tempered 
by the welfare economic critique of bio-economics. This was true in both 
Canada and the United States. Orthodox based policy objectives remained 
illusive with the intervention of historical, cultural, social, and 
political practicalities: the complexities of which are nowhere more
apparent than in the contrasting fishery management structures that 
evolved in Canada and the United States. Each structure has largely 
failed at managing the fishery but for different reasons. I argue that, 
in the case of Canada, this was a consequence of state imposed policies 
that instead of protecting fishery resources and creating industrial 
stability, have inadvertently increased problems of over-fishing, 
industry Instability and dependence on state support programs.' In the
' The period between the early 1970s and early 1980s saw the Canada lead 
the world in imposing fishery management mechanisms that attempted to create 
the economic conditions called for by orthodox th.aory proponents to ensure short 
and long term Industrial viability.
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case of the United States this was a result of administrative anarchy 
caused by a management structure where the authority and responsibility 
for fisheries are claimed and shared by industry participants as well as 
non-participants (federal/state politicians, recreational representative 
and the general public).
2. From Paradigm to Policy
Modern day fishery management policies in both Canada and United 
States are based on a modified orthodox paradigm and can be traced back 
to the joint participation of both countries on the International 
Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF).* ICNAF was 
established in 1949 as a forum for member statas to meet and mutually 
resolve the difficult and complex fisheries management Issues in the
 ̂The history of international cooperation between Canada and United States 
in managing common fishery resources and developing shared objectives Is a long 
one. For example, the halibut stocks on the west coast have been jointly managed 
by Canada and United States since the 1920's under the provisions of the 
International Halibut Commission. In spite of some early management successes 
achieved through the Commission, by the mid-1960*s halibut over-fishing was once 
again occurring on a large-scale. In 1974, Canada's halibut catch had decreased 
to a level that was 20% of the previous decade. However, Canada and the United 
States experiences within ICNAF have been the most Important in shaping and 
structuring their present day management systems. This was because the crises 
that occurred In the groundflsh fisheries of the North Atlantic during the early 
1970's helped precipitate the extended fisheries jurisdiction Initiatives of each 
country.
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Convention Area. At its height ICNAF had 10 member countries.’ Canada 
and United States were charter members and played Influential roles In 
ICNAF deliberations up to Its dissolution In 1978. The participation of 
both countries was rooted In a mutual concern with the Increasing fishing 
effort of foreign fleets off their coasts. The activities of these fleets 
were having dramatic negative effects on their domestic fishing Industries 
as available resources became depleted.
ICNAF's original task was to coordinate scientific fisheries studies 
for those stocks being exploited by more than one country In the North 
Atlantic. And the first rather tentative management objective of ICNAF 
was to establish the principle that fishing effort had to be controlled 
on the basis of rational scientific stock production Information. As the 
effects of over-fishing became more and more apparent, this objective 
expanded to Involve the development and Imposition of fish harvesting 
restrictions. During the early 1960’s restrictions agreed upon In ICNAF 
Included closed seasons and areas and mesh sizes on fishing gear. Later 
as over-fishing Increased, restrictions began Including limits on the 
total allowable catches and Individual country allocations. During the 
1970*s enormous amounts of time and effort was devoted by ICNAF on just 
determining the annual allocation or share of the resources for each 
country. Because ICNAF was unable to adequately enforce any of the 
restrictions being applied to the North Atlantic fisheries, it was unable
* Original signatory countries of ICNAF Included Canada, Newfoundland, 
United States, Britain, France, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Norway and 
Italy. During the 1970’s other member countries Included USSR, Poland, Rumania, 
Bulgaria, Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, Iceland, Japan 
and Cuba.
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to control over-fishing. This, in turn, eroded the Commission’s 
credibility as an effective fisheries management regime and by the mid- 
1970*s its relevance had significantly declined.*
The decline of ICNAF lead to a rise in interest for the 
international UNCLOS III negotiations that were being conducted at the 
time. For those nations concerned with protecting, conserving and using 
fishery resources UNCLOS III offered the possibility for individual state 
management over the resources.' As we saw in Chapter Two, these 
negotiations, and the subsequent declarations of 200 mile fishing 
management zones by a number of countries, resulted in new fishery 
management structures and policies emerging. Canada and United States 
each began a process of designing and developing their own particular 
fishery management policies. These new policies were founded on the 
maximum economic yield concept (MEY) developed by the bio-economists of 
the 1950s and 1960s (see Chapter 2), as the most appropriate prescription
* After 1977, the United States withdrew from participation in ICNAF and 
has not chosen to become a member of the Northwest Atlantic Fishery Organization 
(NAFO) which replaced it. Canada, on the other hand, has continued its 
participation in an effort to maintain a management organization for the 
important resources that exist beyond or overlap its 200 mile fisheries 
jurisdiction limit.
' An interesting example of how conflicts over issues shape and influence 
public policy decisions (conflicts that orthodoxy largely ignores or 
oversimplifies) is Iceland’s role in attaining legitimacy internationally for 
its extended fisheries jurisdiction claim. Four times in 1952, 1958, 1972 and 
1975 Iceland succeeded in extending its fisheries jurisdiction, despite serious 
diplomatic, trade and military confrontations, including ramming Iceland coastal 
patrol vessels against British warships, and losing a decision in the 
International Court of Justice. However, these confrontations and the 
multilateral developments occurring within the UNCLOS 111 negotiations resulted 
in unilateral extensions eventually being accepted by most international fishing 
nations.
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for future fishery management prescriptions. By 1974, with yet another
major crisis occurring throughout the fishing industry in Canada, the
Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) objective had finally lost legitimacy with
most fishery management officials. Once settling on their new objectives,
Canada and United States set about creating management structures and
processes that would achieve them. Therefore, in 1976, the federal state
refined Canada's main national objective for fisheries management to be
"best use" or "optimum utilization" of the resources. The new objective
in the future for Canada’s commercial fisheries would
no longer be maximization of the crop sustainable over time 
(MSY) but the best use of society's resources. "Best use" is 
defined by the sum of net social benefits (personal income, 
occupational opportunity, consumer satisfaction, and so on) 
derived from the fisheries and the industries linked to them.
While private enterprise, individual, cooperative and 
corporate would continue to predominate in the commercial 
fisheries, fundamental decisions about resource management and 
about industry and trade development would be reached jointly 
by industry and government ( Environment Canada, 1976:53).
The objective of "best use" was aimed at maximizing economic yield 
as the orthodox paradigm prescribed but also acknowledged a number of 
social factors raised by welfare economists in their critique of orthodox 
theory. The state felt strongly that their active role in the fishery was 
necessary in order to stabilize the industry when resource or market 
conditions threatened its long-term viability. Although the orthodox 
'efficiency* criteria of theory contradicted any role for the state to 
provide support funds to bail out the larger industrial sectors of the 
fishery, the necessary funds have always been provided in Canada.
For example in Canada by the early 1970s the Atlantic groundfish 
fishing industry was on the verge of collapse, necessitating the creation
68
of a short-term government assistance program which provided funds worth 
over 140 million dollars. These funds were distributed In the form of 
deficiency payments to the fishing Industry as a means to keen the core 
sectors viable (for example the larger companies with offshore vessels). 
During the years 1974-78 deficiency payments to the harvesting sector 
amounted to over 60 million, with over 43 million going to the processing 
sector. Through a rehabilitation program another 10 million was provided 
to the larger companies for Inventory financing, vessel dislocation 
adjustments and incentives to fish In non-traditlonal areas (Atlantic 
Fisheries Review, 1981).
Fishery management policies In Canada have also reflected the 
State’s continuing attempt to deal with regional disparities by promoting 
economic development of Its natural resources." Since WW II Keynesian 
policies In Canada have attempted to balance economic Inter-regional 
disparities between provinces and sub-regions (OECD, 1980: 136-141). This 
has resulted in the fishery resources, which are generally located on the 
poor regions of the country, being managed within the framework of its 
national regional development policy agenda. Since orthodox theory now 
argues that the fisheries are a common property and their optimum 
utilization and protection Is best provided through the process of 
modernization (by Increasing industrial efficiency), the uncritical 
acceptance of orthodox fisheries assumptions by federal policy makers is 
easy to understand. That is orthodox fishing theory compliments the wider 
regional development objectives that sees regional problems In terms of
"See Stewart Bates, 1944, 1952; Harold A. Innis, 1978 (reprint); Ronald 
Tallman, 19^7; Watt, 1963.
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backwardness and underdevelopment. Therefore, Improving the fishing 
Industry by encouraging modernization of Its Industrial sector, Is 
consistent with the Canadian federal government’s regional development 
objectives, as well as providing the means for the fisheries to be managed 
and protected In the most optimum way (Government of Canada Documents, 
1928-1988).
The United States Implemented Its approach to fisheries management 
with the enactment of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act. 1976 
fFMCA. 19761 now called the Magnuson Act. The overall objective of United 
States fisheries management approach was similar to Canada’s as It drew 
on the same paradigmatic foundations In bio-economics tempered by welfare 
economics. As stated In the FMCA. 1976 the management objective specifies 
that any fishing effort placed on the resources must be conducted at an 
"optimum yield" level. The optimum yield of a fishery Is determined as 
the level of catch which "provides the greatest overall benefit to the 
nation". This level was based on the maximum sustainable yield from each 
fishery, modified by relevant economic, social or ecological factors 
(Hennessey ana LeBlanc, 1982:15; Vanderzwagg, 1982:102). The optimum 
yield objective however, was to be established not by the state, as was 
the case In Canada, but through public participation. The optimum yield 
objective was similar to Canada’s "best use" objective In that both were 
derivatives of a modified b1o-econom1c approach. Each country’s fishery 
management objective Included some acknowledgement of the social 
dimensions of the fishery. They both, however, continued to fixate on the 
orthodox ’efficiency’ Issue that maximizing criteria remain the ultimate 
concern In policy formulation. The major modification was therefore, a
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rhetorical one. While each country acknowledged other dimensions of the 
fishery such as the social and ecological needs, neither actually 
accounted for them In meaningful and practical ways because they took 
second place to traditional neo-classical concerns.
3. From Policy to Practicality
The 1976-81 period saw fishery management policy in Canada and the 
United States being operationalized on the basis of their experiences in 
ICNAF and the political conditions at the time. The objectives were 
essentially identical but as each country attempted to concretize them, 
divergent management policies and structures began to emerge. These 
reflected each country’s different historical, political, economic and 
cultural conditions. Nowhere was this more clear, paradoxically, than In 
attitudes toward the role of the state itself.
A. Centralization and Adhocerv;
The Canadian Fisherv Management System
The most prominent feature of the Canadian approach to managing the 
fisheries over the years has been its centralized federal authority 
(Government of Canada documents 1928-1988; Fairley, 1980; Forrest, 1981). 
This feature reflects the historical Importance that the fishing Industry 
has traditionally had to the economies of the seacoast provinces. In 
fact, concerns over the exploitation rights of the fisheries played such 
an important role In the British North American colonies that they were
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a key factor in the formation of the Canadian Confederation.' The 
British North America Act. 1867. which bound the fishing provinces of Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick together with Upper and Lower Canada, was drafted 
to ensure that the authority for protecting the fisheries was given to the 
new federal state. As Tallman (1975) explains, the consensus reached at 
the time of Confederation placed fisheries matters under federal 
Jurisdiction and allowed the federal cabinet to have exclusive legislative 
authority over all the "seacoast and inland fisheries" (Tallman, 1975; 
Thompson, 1974:1972). The exclusivity of this centralized authority has 
not kept individual provinces from arguing at various times for a greater 
say in managing various aspects of the fishery resources. However, 
provinces have not seriously challenged the exclusive federal authority 
and have not achieved any jurisdictional claims other than what has been 
clearly delegated by the federal government (Thompson, 1974). In New 
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island and Newfoundland, provincial 
governments regulate parts of the freshwater fisheries, much of the 
processing sector, and industrial development. In British Columbia, the 
province manages the freshwater fisheries except the anadromous species. 
However, the continuing legitimacy of centralized state power in Canada 
stems from a focused and overwhelming concern with the protection of the
' Johnston (1977:18-22) argues that at the time of Confederation the new 
government faced two potentially explosive situations. First, was the need to 
impose effective fisheries law enforcement on Canadian fishermen, while at the 
same time control American fishermen were literally getting away with ’murder* 
in Canadian fishery waters. Second, was the reality that Canadian fishermen 
had to compete for fish resources with the independent New England fishermen 
(who felt that they were outside any treaty provisions limiting their operations) 
while at the same time being dependent on the expanding U.S. market for selling 
their catches.
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fisheries, for example, from large scale intrusions by New England 
fishermen on the east coast in the 1860*s and later by foreign factory 
trawlers in the 1960’s and 1970*s (Tallman, 1975:68; Redding, 1979:36). 
Through the exclusiveness of its legal authority over the fisheries, the 
Canadian state has created a strong centralized administrative structure 
that has determined clearly stated positions on most fishery issues and 
matters right up to the present time."
In Canada, the federal Cabinet has the ultimate responsibility for 
the management of fishery resources. Within Cabinet one member is 
appointed as Minister of Fisheries. This person is responsible for the 
Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) which is the administrative 
organization for managing fisheries. A consultation convention has 
developed over the past 15 years to deal with the conflicting tensions 
that exist between the interest groups participating in the fisheries. 
The process involved in this convention consists of essentially ad hoc 
advisory committee meetings where topical issues are discussed with 
fishermen and processor organizations as well as local provincial 
governments (see Appendix A).
The policy formation process within this convention generally begins 
when the Department's senior executives (the Directors General Committee) 
receive scientific advice on the status of the resources from their own
'An important feature of the Canadian fisheries historically has been that 
the legislation for management (see Appendix A) has always been drafted in such 
a way as to give extensive discretionary powers and authority to the federal 
level of government (Thompson, 1974; Tallman, 1975). Thus the Canadian 
legislation has allowed for decision making to be "relatively direct and 
expeditious: (Hennessey LeBlanc, 1982:5).
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research staff.* After Initial review this committee forwards the advice
in the form of recommended Total Allowable Catches (TACs) and their own
draft fishing plan recommendations to an appropriate fisheries advisory
committee for consultation and feedback. After the advisory committees
have discussed the proposed catch plans (In closed meetings with selected
fishing industry representatives) the final management decisions are
taken. The plan Is then forwarded to the Minister for approval. The
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans has the ultimate responsibility for
allocating fish quotas among the recognized fishing Interests including
the Inshore and offshore fleets, the large fish companies, and other
countries. These allocations are politically sensitive and so are
considered in terms of positive reaction and acceptability by the
different fleet sectors. Industry, and provincial governments who are
affected by the decisions. As Hennessey and LeBlanc observe in their
summary of the Canadian management process
one can see how the discretionary authority of the Minister
and his senior civil servants Is reflected in this process.
Scientists and bureaucrats dominate the process until the 
latter stages at which time consultations are undertaken with 
the different sectors of the industry (Hennessey and LeBlanc, 
1982:4).
The Canadian policy-formulation process is relatively flexible in 
administrative terms. The federal government (DFO) has a lot of 
independent autonomy to control the agenda, issues and timetable for the
* A major difference exists between Canada and United States system with 
regard to the production of scientific information. This work is done by 
government scientists in Canada and there are no mechanism for representation 
from the Industry, provincial government or public during the development phases.
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management process of the fisheries. They can develop, alter and adjust 
the process almost at will to suit the particular conditions and issues 
confronting the fisheries as events evolve. Despite these structural 
advantages however, there is no mechanism that allows formal public input 
into the process when considering wider political, economic, ecological 
and cultural factors. As a result the management process involves the 
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans being subjected to the intensive lobbying 
efforts of the various interest groups. In Canada, politics plays an 
important role in the development and modification of fishery management 
decisions.
At no time was this more evident that after the 1980-81 crisis in 
the Canadian fishery. After 1981, the industry was once again in disarray 
and financial crisis, both on the east and west coasts of the country. 
The state responded by commissioning high profile officials to review the 
fisheries and recommend policy solutions to address the problems. A Royal 
Commission (Pearse) for the west coast fisheries and a Task Force (Kirby) 
for the east coast were struck and both began' to recommend policy 
improvements which again drew heavily on the orthodox theory of fishery 
management.
The Kirby Task Force studying the Atlantic Fisheries concluded that 
the causes of the 1981-1982 crisis were related to the over-expansion of 
fishing effort which occurred after the 1977 extension of fishery 
jurisdiction." The attempts to control this expansion, Kirby reasoned,
"Kirby argued that the 1982 crisis had three specific roots including to 
much optimism following the extension of jurisdiction, resistance to change 
inherent in the industry and the current politics of the fishery.
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failed largely because of the traditional fishermen's resistance to accept 
change (that Is too modernize their Industry). Kirby noted that the 
politics of the fishery conducted at the federal, provincial, and Industry 
levels had inhibited change, sheltered the less efficient, and led 
participants to pick sides and 'fight-for-turf' (Kirby, 1982:142). In 
other words, Kirby felt that orthodox theory’s economic objectives (MEY) 
needed to be re-asserted. That Is, the problem was not with the theory, 
but with the emergent state apparatus which had failed to manage the 
resources properly. The state had become overly concerned with social and 
political Issues which should have been considered as secondary Issues 
outside of the primary economic Issues of the fishery. Kirby recommended 
that new priorities be set and that in the future Canadian fishery 
management objectives be ordered with economic viability of the industry 
having the highest priority.
Similarly, the Pearse Commission studying the Pacific fisheries 
concluded that the most Important need Is to trim the numbering of fishing 
privileges to the availability of fish stocks (over-expansion of fishing 
effort). By reducing excessive fishing capacity, he estimated that as 
much as $100 million annually could be generated In profits to fishermen 
and the people of Canada. In other words the MEY of the fisheries was not 
being achieved in the fishery and this explains the fundamental problem 
of the fishery (Commission on Pacific Fisheries Policy, News Release - 
September 28, 1982). He, like Kirby, also recommended that the economic 
viability of the Industry must take clear precedence over all other
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concerns, If the industry is to survive and prosper.” This orthodox 
concern of the state in creatir the necessary conditions for obtaining 
the MEY from the fishery continues the historical connection of management 
policy being developed and associated closely with the economic interests 
and welfare of the industrial sector. For example, the conservation needs 
of particular stocks at times have been totally disregarded (the set 
harvest arbitrarily increased beyond recommended biological advice levels) 
as a result of demands by this sector for more resource to ensure the 
continued viability.’* As well financial support programs to the 
industrial sector are periodically created when economic conditions are 
negative for the individual sector. The Temporary Assistance Program (TAP) 
1974 clearly illustrates this selective support. Most of the TAP funds 
allocated by the state in reality were directed to the vertically 
integrated large processing ccmr ,ies, even though the crises had affected 
all sectors of the fisheries (Environment Canada, 1976:1). Similarly, 
other incentive programs generally in the form of granting non-retractable
” However, on closer examination, we find that the recommendations of both 
Kirby's Report and Pearse’s Commission essentially re-affirmed the 1976 economic 
fisheries management objective of "best use" (including minor adjustments for 
the prevalent social concerns) and so in reality their recommendations remained 
consistent with the approach that had been guiding policy since EFZJ.
’* I was present at a January 1980 meeting in Lunenburg, Nova Scotia called 
as a result of the offshore fishing vessel captains strike against the increased 
regulatory requirements and resource allocation policies of DFO. Frustrated, the 
captains with the encouragement of the large company owners (HBN and NSP), 
demanded a meeting with the Minister to resolve the dispute (discussion - 
Kingsley Brown). An Assistant Deputy Minister of DFO came from Ottawa to meet 
with the striking captains and quell the protest. The results were that offshore 
vessel enforcement no longer had the same priority and that negotiations for a 
larger offshore share of the 4VsW cod TAG began.
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grants have been consistently provided to this sector to increase private 
company diversity and ensure continued viability (i.e. the Northern Cod 
Incentive and Fleet Diversification Program in 1981). Many support 
programs for the industrial sector were implemented during the very period 
that Kirby and Pearse were arguing that the Canadian state had been overly 
concerned about the non-economic concerns of traditional fishery sectors. 
It has been noted by some researchers that the first priority of Canada’s 
fishery management policies has always been and continues to be directed 
towards addressing the economic concerns of the corporate sector of the 
fishery, while the concerns of traditional dependent fishermen, local 
communities and small plants have been a distant second (Williams, 1985). 
The state policy support for the interests of the dominant sectors over 
other sectors of the fishery reflects the orthodox theory approach. That 
is orthodox theory is founded on the assumption that because the stability 
of the fishery depends entirely on the stability of the dominant large 
company sector, state policies must therefore focus on ways to support and 
strengthen this sector.
B. Decentralization and Anarchy;
The U.S. Fishery Management System
The United States federal state has never been seen as a strong 
proponent of fishing industry interests McEvoy, 1986; McHugh, 1987). For 
example, up to 1976, the U.S. state had consistently sought in 
international forums to limit the seaward extension of local coastal state 
jurisdictions. The U.S. state has instead, chosen to support and preserve 
the historical principles such as unfettered freedom to use the marine
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resources and the right for unrestricted passage of vessels on the high 
seas (Mangone, 1977). This federal state position while supporting the 
military and other marine based industries (such as oil, marine trade 
fleets, etc.) seriously alienated the local domestic fishing interests, 
who like their Canadian counterparts, consistently yearned for national 
extended fisheries management jurisdiction.’*
Compared to the situation in Canada, the fishing industry of the 
United States has historically been of minor Importance to its overall 
economy or international interests. Ann Hollick observed that, "Since 
fisheries policy is scarcely a prominent concern in the hierarchy of 
national policies, the full weight of governmental influence would never 
be brought to bear in this area" (Hollick, 1978:62).
The United States fishing industry has always been structured by 
market place economics and local community interests. For example, since 
WWII, the U.S. fishing interests has been subjected to and affected by a 
general contraction of the total industry. This is reflected in a decline 
in employment levels and capital investment. For example, the average age 
of fishermen has increased and the capital equipment of the harvesting 
sector is largely obsolete (see Smith and Peterson, 1977; Peterson and 
Tierkla, 1987). This illustrates the economic marginally of the industry 
relative to the other sectors of the overall economy.
Prior to 1977, under the American constitution, responsibility for 
managing the fishery resources had always been the sole responsibility of
’* See International Court of Justice: Case concerning delineation of the 
Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area [Canada/United States] Reply 
submitted by U.S.A., 12 December 1983:13.
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the coastal states. In 1976, however, the federal government was forced 
to assume some management responsibility for fisheries beyond the coastal 
state marine boundaries. Pushed by the growing International consensus 
for establishing exclusive management zones which It had historically 
opposed, the federal state was forced to reverse It’s traditional stance 
of favouring International freedom of the seas principles and passed the 
FMCA. 1976. thereby claiming an exclusive 200 mile Fishery Conservation 
Zone (Snow, 1978:298-299)." The FMCA. 1976 legislation defined for the 
first time management responsibilities for the U.S. fishery resources at 
a federal level." The legislation was drafted In such a way as to share 
the responsibilities for fisheries management between the vederal and 
state government levels and the general public (Magnuson, 1977). It 
established and assigned different species management plans, licensing 
foreign fleets and defining fishing boundaries offshore from Individual 
state and protectorate marine jurisdictions to different Institutional 
agencies. For example, the federal National Marine Fisheries Service 
(NMFS), Regional Management Councils and Individual state governments all
" The local fishing Interests in United States, had conducted for many 
years before the FMCA. 1976. a long and arduous campaign seeking protection of 
their fisheries from the harvesting efforts of foreign fishing fleets off their 
coastlines. However, other Important interest groups Including the military,
been able to exert more public policy influence 
de these smaller local campaigns.
oil and marine Industries had 
on the federal state and overr
’* In addition to the FMCA. 1976 a number of other federal laws also 
directly affect the U.S. fisheries management process. Some of these other laws 
Include the National Environmental Policy A c t . 1970. the Executive Order 12291. 
M I )  the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 1976. the Freedom of Information Act. 
M 6 ,  the Administrative Procedures Act. 1976. the Regulatory.,F.kXifallity_Act., 1981. and the Paperwork Reduction Act. 1981 (Hennessey and LeBlanc, 1982:25-32; 
NOAA, 1986:3).
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have fishery management responsibilities (see Appendix B).
The FCHA. 1976 legislation created a formal system for managing 
fishery resources within the new Fisheries Conservation Zone (FCZ) 
according to species fishing plans. Developing the fishing plans is the 
responsibility of Regional Management Councils which by law must consist 
of representation from both the processing and harvesting sectors as well 
as other interested public members. The fishing plans must also meet 
national standards which again are set out in legislation." Eight 
Regional Management Councils were created under the FMCA. 1976 legislation 
and their authority is separate from the federal government's." 
Membership of these regional councils must include representatives from 
each coastal state, a federal representative (usually from NMFS) and 
knowledgeable non-governmental fisheries representatives from the region
" These national standards are that: conservation and management measures 
must prevent over-fishing but achieve optimal yield for each fishery; these 
measures must be based on the best scientific information available to the extent 
of practical, and additional stock of fish should be management as a unit 
throughout it’s range; conservation and management measures should not 
discriminate between residents of different states; the measures should promote 
efficiency in the use of fish- ' resources; the measures shall take into account 
variations among fisheries ano iishery resources and catches; where practicable, 
they should minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplications (United States 
Department of Commerce 1978:1-7).
" The sole responsibility for nominating Council members rests with the 
individual state governors represented on the Regional Management Council. The 
federal role is to review the Regional Fishery Management Councils species 
fishing plans, draft regulatory provisions, enforce the provisions with other 
agencies, undertake scientific research, and provide administrative support for 
licensing and statistical collection (Peterson and Tierkla, 1987:18).
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who are appointed for a three year term (Redding, 1979:246).'* Each 
Management Council Committee has an elected Executive Committee which 
hires their own staff, contracts for the necessary biological and socio­
economic advice from the private sector and universities, and organizes 
their own species committees for developing plans. Council members vote 
on all Issues requiring decisions. The process allows local state 
governments and selected Industry representatives a strong say and 
influence on the United States fishery management policies.
Regional Management Councils are required to hold public hearings 
during each major phase of plan development. The public has an 
opportunity to attend meetings and comment at several stages of 
development before a species fishing plan becomes final and implemented. 
Although the Secretary of Commerce retains the final authority to approve 
or disapprove implementation of a species fishing plan there is formal 
public accountability and involvement throughout the entire process. The 
Secretary is guided by the Council’s species fishing plans and does not 
have independent authority to create new management policies without the 
Council’s approval. The exception to this general rule is an emergency 
management authority held by the Secretary of Commerce under Section 
305(e) of the FCMA.1976. Under this authority the Secretary can prepare 
a species fishing plan if a particular Counc 1 fails to do so within a
'* For example, the New England Fishery Management Council has one 
representative each from Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusettes, Rhode Island, 
and Connecticut, one from NMFS, and eleven from industry representing the 
interests of the fishermen and community levels of each state for a total of 
seventeen members. As well, other agencies such as the Coast Guard, State 
Department, and other fishery Management Councils and Commissions are represented 
by non-voting members.
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reasonable period of time.
Unlike the Canadian process, the U.S. procedure follows a strict 
timetable schedule. There are time specifications and public meeting 
requirements at every stage of the process. Any major amendment to any 
species fishing plan requires a full public hearing. Although this 
arrangement guarantees local representation and Input Into the decision 
making process, Peterson and Tierkla (1987) write that the results In 
practice are less than Ideal. For example, they point out that the New 
England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) Is the setting of much conflict 
both Internally and externally. The Council must deal in an environment 
where adversarial relationships with other external agencies exist and 
also where management responsibilities conflict with the Individual and 
Interests of its Internal membership. Since the Council has 
Institutionalized fishing Industry Input, votes on policy are cast by not 
only members who work for fishing companies, but other Interest group 
members Including recreational fishermen, fishermen and leaders of fishery 
organizations.'* The results, Peterson and Tierkla argue, when compared
'* Peterson and Tierkla note that the NEFMC has formed a number of species committees for each fishery being managed. Members of these committees are appointed by the Council's Executive Committee. The species committees In turn are provided with advice from Advisory Committees made up of representatives from Individual firms, fishermen associations, recreational enthusiasts, and academics. For example, the Groundflsh Advisory Committee has over 50 members that can potentially contribute to meetings. They also bring attention to the fact that any Individual person (of the many thousand of fishery participants) can Influence the approval process for any plan (because of any personal dissatisfaction with a plan provision or new regulation) either by raising It publicly at a regular Advisory Committee Meeting, or by holding back their comments until plan details are formalized, and then lobbying behind the scenes for changes, using threats of non-compliance If approval is given (Peterson and Tierkla, 1987:14-19).
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to the Canadian situation, is that achieving integrated fishery management 
plans is almost impossible because of the competition and conflict 
involved in the entire process. As a result plan development is extremely 
lengthy and in the end essentially ineffective because of the many 
legislative steps involved and availability of procedural mechanisms for 
blocking FMP at any given time.'" The planning process takes a minimum 
of 287 days and may take longer (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1988:39-50). 
Since the biological status of any fish stock can change dramatically in 
a short period of time, a plan approved within this type of process is 
often implemented even though the premises upon which it was originally 
based are often no longer valid.
Peterson and Tierkla (1987) also write that many of the states have 
in practice given fisheries management authority to individual towns for 
specified fisheries. This arrangement is further complicated in cases of 
the migratory species where developing a coordinated approach to 
management becomes quite problematic, considering the levels of federal, 
state and regional authority involved." As a result, for some migratory 
species that are trans-boundary, management conflicts do arise between
The U.S. planning process takes place in seven distinct phases including 
pre-planning, draft fishery management plan development, public review and 
council adoption, secretarial review, regulation promulgation, continuing fishery 
management, and FMP amendments (Hennessey and LeBlanc, 1982:23).
" For a good example of the jurisdictional problems that can arise from 
state/federal relationships in United States is illustrated in an article 
entitled "State-Federal Issues Raised by Regional Attempts to Manage Lobster 
Fishing" in Marine Law Institute Vol. vi. Number 4, December 1986. The article 
discusses the implications of nationwide restrictions on lobster fishing in terms 
of whether state authority under the Magnuson Act would be usurped by the federal 
government.
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towns, states, federal/state and Industry Interests.”
Furthermore, since there is no formal method for determining, 
quantifying, and incorporating economic, political, cultural or ecological 
factors into the management decision making process, the regional 
management councils do not function efficiently. This is primarily 
because of the many conflicting interests involved in the process all of 
whom have voting rights. As a result the fisheries of the United States 
are extremely individualistic, competitive, and pluralistic. They do not 
have one fishery but many fisheries, they do not have several interests 
they have many interests, and so the lobbyists are very important and very 
active (Redding, 1979:257).
Despite the numerous federal legislative requirements involved in 
the U.S. Fisheries management process, the most noteworthy aspects may be 
what the legislation does not address. In the United States there are yet 
no consistent methodology or general provisions to limit entry into a 
fishery, unless actually specified as a particular measure in a species 
fishing plan. This means that there are no available management 
mechanisms for controlling total fishing effort and investment in a 
fishery. In addition, the U.S. legislation has not restricted the powers 
of individual coastal states from managing the fisheries within their own 
territorial three mile limits as they see fit. This results in numerous 
local regulations being developed by individual states which often 
conflict with the overall management objectives of the Regional Management
” This situation in the United States has fundamentally affected its 
fisheries relationship with Canada during periods of negotiation and conflict 
throughout history.
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Councils and federal state/' Since many fish stocks are migratory and 
move over the boundaries of coastal states jurisdictions throughout the 
Extended Economic Zone, the legislative deficiencies and overlapping 
responsibilities create complex administrative problems (both domestically 
and internationally) that are difficult to impossible to resolve.
4. Conclusion
This Chapter has shown that both the United States and Canada have 
fishery management objectives that stem directly from the orthodox 
paradigm of fishing management. In order to translate these objectives 
into practice each country has had to create it's own particular 
administrative structures and processes. The Canada and United States 
structures differ significantly because of different political, economic, 
and cultural contexts within which they have developed. In Canada, 
fisheries management is under the total jurisdiction of the federal state 
(see Appendix C). This reflects the importance of the fishing industry 
to the national economy, it’s concern for regional disparities, and the 
reality that Canada has depended historically on a mixed public/private 
sector economy. Legislation gives discretionary power to the federal 
government to develop coherent fisheries management approaches within
" It should be noted, however, that there is a mechanism in place under 
the FMCA. 1976 that can limit or restrict state powers in certain cases. For 
example, if a Regional Fishery Management Council species plan is ever 
jeopardized as the result of either an inaction or action by an individual state 
the federal state can intervene with the imposition of overriding restrictions. 
This federal power has not been used in any fishery to date.
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which it’s fishery objectives are concretized. Decision making for the 
fishery resources lies mainly at the federal level and It Is legitimated 
through a consultative process. Selected fisheries Interest groups are 
heard within this process but It Is entirely up to the federal government 
which advice will be heeded and what fishery management decisions will be 
taken. With this kind of system, decision making Is relatively 
expeditious. As a result fishery management plans are developed, 
Implemented and enforced on a coherent and regular basis (usually on a 
yearly basis). These plans have as their primary aim the creation of the 
conditions for ensuring that the Industry is operated on an economic basis 
(i.e., viable and efficient), while at the same time acknowledging a 
concern about the social and cultural dimensions of fisheries. The fact 
that the Canadian fishing Industry Is not economically stable is 
attributed by orthodox economists to the government's exaggerated concern 
for the social and political aspects of the industry at the expense of the 
economic aspects. Critics attribute the industry’s continued Instability 
to the government's ad hoc support of the large corporate sector over the 
interests of the small and medium size fishermen and processors who 
compose the fishing communities.
In the United States, fisheries objectives are enshrined In the 
FMCA.1976 or Magnuson Act. This legislation details and specifically 
delegates management responsibilities and authority for managing the 
fisheries to the federal and state governments and local fishery 
participants. This legislation reflects the fact that the fisheries are 
not a major concern for the U.S. economy, but rather are Important only 
to particular coastal states and regions of the country. This also
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reflects the general U.S. view that government should stay out of the 
industry. Under the U.S. system each Individual participant has access 
to and can influence virtually every fishery management decision under 
consideration. Except for an ambiguously defined responsibility for 
ensuring overall stock conservation, the federal government is excluded 
from the formal decision making processes which defines how the resources 
are to be harvested and used. Decision-making takes place at the local, 
state, and regional levels in Regional Management Councils. Since 
participant interests are so diverse, (consisting of virtually all 
interested commercial and recreational fishermen, as well as small and 
large processing companies and the general public), the development of 
acceptable management plans and policies becomes an impossibility. 
Because the federal government provides no coordinate guidance or 
sustaining support to its fishing industry, the fishery participants are 
much more subjected to the vagaries of market forces than is the case in 
Canada. The fact that the U.S. fishing industry has been over-fishing 
and destroying its groundfish resources is attributed by orthodox 
theorists to the management process being too democratic and the failure 
of the state to exert control over common property resources.
CHAPTER FIVE 
Policy and Practice;
A Case Study of the Groundfishery
1. Introduction
This chapter focuses on how the fishery objectives of Canada and 
United States systems have been concretized into policies and what success 
these policies have had in achieving the objectives. Using examples of 
representative policies used to manage the groundfish resources' of 
Atlantic Canada and Northeastern United States, I show that not only do 
these management policies significantly differ between the two countries 
but they also differ in practice from the expectations of the theories 
themselves.* I argue that the differences in both cases result from 
intervening political, cultural and economic influences which modify or 
undermine the policies as they are translated into practice. I use these 
differences as evidence that orthodox perspective theories and policies
' Groundfish or bottom dwelling fish is a term used to describe several 
commercially important species of demersal finfish inhabiting the continental 
shelf of the northwest Atlantic. Groundfish species include; cod, haddock, 
redfish, halibut, American plaice, yellowtail flounder, witch flounder, Greenland 
turbot, winter flounder, pollock, white hake, cusk and catfish. The five most 
important species historically and economically to the U.S. and Canadian fishing 
industries are Atlantic cod, haddock, yellowtail flounder, pollock and redfish.
'The differences between the two countries essentially lies in the extent 
that they have been able to establish systems of rights over the marine 
fisheries. In the United States, management measures are largely non-exclusive 
(access to the resources is unlimited) while Canada has developed exclusive 
measures (access is controlled).
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fall to explain fishery problems or to provide adequate and predictable 
policy solutions. With this evidence, I conclude that the theories are 
essentially rationalizations by orthodox perspective proponents for 
supporting the interests of the industrial fishing sector over the 
interests of the traditional sectors.
2. Policy in Practice: Groundfish Management In Canada
Success or failure in achieving the specified management objectives 
for Canada’s groundfish fisheries (resource rebuilding, conservation and 
the promotion of industrial stability) depends largely on the level of 
participant agreement for the annual AGMPs and the regulatory policy 
measures implemented to control fishing effort. In the next section I 
show how two important control methods, which are clearly drawn from 
orthodox theory, have been developed and used to manage the Atlantic 
groundfish fisheries.® These two methods are appropriate for illustrating 
my argument because they are particularly characteristic of the Canadian 
fisheries management approach, as well as the types of policies orthodox 
theory promotes. These methods are limited entry policies* (input 
controls) and quota and enterprise allocation (EA) policies' (output
'See DFO Documents 1968-1988 and Government of Canada Documents 1973-1968 
in Bibliography.
'Limited entry is a method for establishing exclusive harvesting privileges 
for fishermen by controlling access to the fishery resources.
'Quotas (and EAs) are methods for establishing property rights for fishery 
resources and allocating fish shares between fishermen and fishing companies. 
They can be categorized as catch quotas (i.e. TACs or fleet sector /gear type 
quotas) or company quotas (enterprise allocations).
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controls).
A. Limited Entry Policies
The theoretical basis supporting the use of limited policies arises 
from the orthodox understanding that fishing effort in any fishery has a 
tendency to grow in an uncontrolled manner. The solution proposed Is to 
restrict participant access (input) to the fishery and control any future 
potential growth in fishing effort (Meany, 1975,1977,1979,1980; Mundt, 
1974; Nielson,1976; Sanders, 1972,1975). As we saw in Chapter one, 
orthodox theory argues that the build-up of effort in a fishery is an 
organizational problem resulting from the fact that open access resources 
cannot be protected from excessive fishing. By controlling the number of 
participants and vessels, it is argued that the state is able to tailor 
the total amount of fishing effort to the long-term availability of 
resources.
In Canada, access is controlled by the federal state which since 
the early 1970s has developed and imposed comprehensive licensing policies 
on fishery participants. The state represented by the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) requires commercial fishermen and fishing 
vessels be licensed in order to conduct harvesting operations and land 
catches from the Atlantic groundfish fisheries.*
* Limited entry is now an integral part of the Canadian management approach. 
Licensing policies now apply to not only all Atlantic commercial groundfish 
fisheries but also the pelagic and shellfish fisheries.
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DFO has used several rationales to justify the imposition of 
restrictive licensing policies. One reason has been to fulfil what 
orthodox theorists see as a primary role of the state. That is to support 
those sectors of the fishing industry who have made the largest capital 
investments and contribution to the overall economy by helping ensure 
their certainty for a share of any potential harvests. This support, it 
is argued, indirectly benefits the other less capitalized sectors of the 
fishery through economic spin-off effects created by the dominant sectors. 
Another reason is that limited entry measures help create the necessary 
conditions for sharing resource management responsibility between the 
state and the user participants. Co-sharing is ideal for society, it is 
argued because those participants who have the strongest attachment and 
commitment to the fishery are also the best suited to assume 
responsibility for their long-term husbandry and conservation. Finally, 
and perhaps the most important reason is that limited entry policies 
impose the necessary conditions to allow industry to become more 
efficient. Productive efficiency must be the primary management goal 
orthodox theorists argue if the benefits of the fishery are to be optimum 
for society.' Efficiency, for the state is defined in terms of firm 
efficiency. This definition of course favours those participants and 
companies making the largest capital investments in the fishery. Other 
participants, including those who are tied to the resources for cultural
' The rationale for limited entry policies is supported by the orthodox 
notion that it is not economically efficient for a fishery to have a larger than 
necessary industry capturing and processing the available resources. Rather a 
fishery to optimize benefits should be exploited by fleets/plants that are of 
a size which allows economic viability for all participants during average levels of fish availability.
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or historical dependency reasons or who are operating small scale vessels 
on a seasonal or part time basis, are considered less capable of becoming 
an efficient sector and so their Interests are dismissed as less relevant."
How have limited entry policies worked In practice over the years 
and have they achieved the fishery management objectives expected of them 
In the Atlantic groundfish fisheries? In order to answer these questions 
some understanding of Canada's limited entry policies Is In order. The 
following Is a brief overview of the developments that have led to the 
present day limited entry policies used In Canada to manage It’s Atlantic 
groundfish resources."
Canada's Imposition of limited entry policies began In earnest on 
August 13, 1973, when the Minister of Fisheries, Jack Davis announced a 
three month freeze on government construction subsidies for fishing 
vessels greater than 35 feet In length and a freeze on the Issuance of 
new licences for groundfish vessels greater than 65 feet In length. The
"The definition bias which favours the larger capitalized sector Is 
reflected In how companies perceive their contribution to the regional economy. 
For example, Gordon Cummings, President and Chief Executive Officer, National 
Sea Products (NSP) speaking before the Senate Committee of the whole on the 
Canada-France Fisheries and Boundaries Agreement described his company's stature 
and role In the following way "National Sea Is Canada's largest fish based food 
company and one of the largest vertically Integrated fishing companies In the 
world. We own and operate 59 vessels and provide employment for more than 8,000 
people. However, we are more than just a large offshore fishing company. 
National Sea Is deeply Involved In every sector of the Atlantic fishery. It Is 
the second largest private-sector employer In the province of Newfoundland. For
many communities there Is no economic alternate, since National Sea
purchases the dally catches from hundreds of Inshore fishermen who fish the coves 
and Inlets all along the shores of Newfoundland" (Senate Debates, February 
17,1989:532).
• With respect to licensing fishermen, the Canadian federal government's 
legislative authority Is restricted to the tidal waters. Non-tldal waters are 
subject to the property right provisions of provincial legislatures and therefore 
licensing for resources In these waters are their responsibility.
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reason was to provide the government an opportunity to review it’s fleet 
development and subsidy programs. This review was caused by the dramatic 
increase in fishing vessel construction which had depleted federal subsidy 
funds being offered at the time. This fishing vessel construction boom 
had been encouraged by high groundfish prices, by provincial governments 
pushing development programs and by the anticipation of increased 
availability of resources for Canadian fishermen." After the review, the 
Minister announced new policies that focused on matching the number of 
fishermen and fishing vessels to the availability of resources. The 
policies included; a continued freeze on the issuance of offshore
licences, introduction of a universal licensing programme" and the
establishment of licensing advisory committees.
For the offshore fishing sector (vessels >65 feet in length) an 
Offshore Groundfish Advisory Committee (OGAC) consisting of selected
company representatives was established in the spring of 1974. In the 
following year (April 1975), the then Minister of Fisheries, Romeo LeBlanc 
approved new policies based on OGAC advice for licensing offshore fishing 
vessels in the future. The policies consisted of guidelines establishing 
the terms and conditions for existing licence holders, the rules for 
replacing licensed vessels and the process for deciding licence
eligibility for new entry vessels. As well, a list of reserve unrestricted
" The anticipation was fuelled by ICNAF which began considering larger 
country allocations for Canada, as well as the UNCLOS III negotiations which 
were progressing in the direction of extended jurisdictions over marine resources 
for the coastal states.
" The universal licensing programmes included not only the groundfish 
fisheries but also all the other important commercial fisheries including; the 
lobster, scallop, salmon, herring, snow crab fisheries,
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licences was established to account for those vessels lost at sea, 
scrapped, or sold during the period when the restrictions were Imposed 
(I.e. 1968-1973).’*
Later on June 17, 1976, Romeo LeBlanc, placed a moratorium on the 
reserved list of licences (Environment Canada press release). He 
justified the moratorium by reasoning that there was already Insufficient 
availability of groundflsh stocks to support the existing fleet. The 
action of the Minister and the economic concerns of the larger fishing 
vessel owners, who at the time faced Increased threats of future 
harvesting competition, coincided. This was an important factor which 
reinforced the legitimacy among the larger company owners for the limited 
entry policies at this time. From 1976 to the early 1980s when EAs were 
first Introduced, the licensing policies governing the offshore groundflsh 
fleet sector have remained essentially the same, aside from some procedure 
adjustments for approving licence requests.’*
However for the traditional groundfish fishery sector (vessels less 
than 65 feet in length), increasingly restrictive licensing policies were 
being put Into place after the declaration of the EFZJ on January 1, 1977. 
By 1979, the pressure being exertud on DFO by fishermen for fishing
’* Vessels on this reserve list could only be reintroduced into the fishery 
under specified conditions. Although holders of reserved licences (companies) 
were free to re-introduce their licences into the fisheries, the scarcity of fish 
and difficult financial times that the industry was experiencing resulted In very 
few doing so.
’* Romeo LeBlanc decided to personally approve or reject all offshore 
licence requests rather than having DFO employees making decisions. This 
decision-making prerogative has been retained by all federal Fisheries Ministers 
since LeBlanc. In making their decisions they can take into account the political 
considerations at stake when deciding to Issue new licences.
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privileges appeared to be Increasing almost as a direct result of the 
limited entry policies. An Internal DFO review, the Levelton Study, was 
undertaken to provide recommendations for licensing the Inshore fishing 
fleet. Two key recommendations from this study Included the development 
of a procedure for categorizing fishermen and a significant licence fee 
Increase (Levelton, 1979). By 1980 many of Levelton’s recommendations had 
been acted upon and Imposed on the traditional fishing sectors. Later, as 
a result of another fishing Industry crisis, the TASK Force on Atlantic 
Fisheries (Kirby, 1982) made It’s own recommendations for licensing 
inshore fishermen, which In turn were adopted and Imposed by the federal 
government. These policies of the state continued the trend of Imposing 
more and more restrictions on the operations of the traditional fishing 
sectors of the fishery. For example, fishermen were now being categorized 
as either full time or part-time, the traditional rights to fish were 
being assigned as fishing privileges to qualified fishermen and the 
geographic operating territory of Inshore vessels was being reduced as a 
result of the administrative reorganization of DFO (DFO Sector Management, 
1981)."
By January 1989, the Minister, Tom Siddon released the latest 
version of the Atlantic coast licensing policy (DFO, 1988). This policy, 
once again re-affirmed the state’s orthodox understanding of fishery 
problems and continued It’s justification for limiting access to the
" Many of these restrictions were not readily accepted by Inshore fishermen 
and smaller plants owners who depended on their catches. As a result a great deal 
of political pressure was exerted on both DFO and the government to have these 
new licensing policies changed or modified, however without much success 
(Discussion Paper Commercial Fisheries Licensing Policy for Eastern Canada, December 1985).
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fisheries as necessary
to provide for an orderly harvesting of the fishery resource, to promote satisfactory incomes to the average participant 
and, finally, to adopt policies which are consistent where 
consistency Is desirable and practical, while at the same time 
recognizing that specific unique measures may be necessary for 
specific fisheries and geographical locations of Eastern 
Canada (DFO, 1989:1)."
The expected benefits after the limited entry policies were 
Implemented for the groundfish fisheries have remained consistent over 
time and are presently priorized in the following way: first, to aid in 
the conservation of resources; second, to promote the stability and 
economic viability of fishing operations; third, to promote equitable 
access to fisheries resources and; fourth, to promote orderly fleet 
development by limiting the number, size and types of new vessels (DFO, 
1989:3-4).
Achievement of these expected benefits would have greatly supported 
and enhanced the limited entry prescription for fishery problems. 
However, in practice we see that the results of the policies over the past 
15 years have been somewhat different from the expectations and rhetoric 
of their proponents. Some of the unexpected results, in addition the 
failure to protect the resources in the longterm from over-fishing have 
included: a dramatic growth in inequality and conflict between fishermen 
and fishing fleets (instead of state-public sharing of responsibilities); 
a failure to resolve the inherent economic in stability of the groundfish 
industry (instead of providing the basis for a more stable, viable 
Industry) and; an inability to control the Increase in the harvesting
" Inshore fishermen’s reaction to the policy provisions has followed the 
traditional pattern set since the early 1970s and been hostile.
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capacity of the fishing fleet (instead of the creation of a smaller, 
efficient industry).
B. Limited Entry Practices: Unexpected Results
Limited entry policies are promoted as a means for providing not 
only greater opportunity and equality for fishery participants, but also 
an opportunity for them to assume greater management responsibilities 
(Mikalsen, 1985). However, in practice, the results for Canada’s 
groundfish fisheries do not indicate that this has occurred (Needier, 
1979; Nicholson, 1981; Sinclair, 1987; Surette, 1984). The process of 
categorizing fishermen and their vessels according to operation size, 
mobility and gear type has, in reality, restricted the opportunity to fish 
for large numbers of fishermen. At the same time, the introduction of 
limited entry policies have encouraged the establishment and tremendous 
growth of a new highly technical and very competitive harvesting component 
to the fisheries. Some licensed vessels (draggers) have been progressively 
replaced by larger more capitalized and specialized vessels and in effect 
have formed a new fishing component with a greatly increased harvesting 
capacity. The new component has come to dominate the traditional inshore 
fishing fleet sectors, disrupting historical fishing patterns and reducing 
or eliminating opportunities to fish. These changes have increased the 
level of conflict between fleet components, distorted the traditional 
economic character of the fishing industry and lessened the aggregate 
operating flexibility of the overall Atlantic groundfish fleet, especially
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the traditional Inshore fleet sector after 1976/' For example, In Nova 
Scotia, since the 200 mile limit was declared, community based vessels 
along the Eastern Shore have not been able to successfully access and take 
their share of the groundflsh resources adjacent to their communities/' 
The reason is that highly mobile offshore company-owned trawlers and 
smaller specialized draggers from other areas (such as southwestern Nova 
Scotia) have been able to catch the quotas before the eastern shore 
vessels can physically leave their harbours In the spring. Many of these 
outside vessels have financed their technically advanced and efficient 
vessels with a combination of state supported subsidies (in the case of 
offshore company owned vessels) or by having the easiest accessibility to 
rehabilitated stocks'* adjacent to their own communities (in the case of 
many SWNS dragger vessels). Because the licensing policies do not 
differentiate between participants and objectively treat all fishermen and 
vessels equally on paper, they In practice provide a competitive advantage 
for the newer technically advanced vessels over the less advanced
Fishing vessel specialization had previously only been a characteristic 
of the larger, vertically Integrated companies operating offshore vessels greater 
than 65 feet LOA.
"Michael Belli veau, Acting Executive Secretary, Maritime Fishermen's Union 
uses this development as one example of how state policies work against the 
traditional fishing sectors during his presentation to the Senate committee of 
the Whole (Senate Debates, March 24, 1987:715-717).
"ICNAF efforts in the early 1970s to rehabilitate the haddock stocks on 
Brown's and Georges Bank succeeded after specific controls were Imposed and 
respected by the international fishing fleets. This created an opportunity for 
coastal dragger fishermen to exploit a readily available and highly marketable 
resource. Using their unusually high Incomes dragger owners re-invested in their 
operations, using larger more specialized vessels. The newer vessels were capable 
of fishing all year and at greater distances. This resulted In the available 
local fish quotas being captured faster and thereby shortening the fishing 
opportunities of other fishing sectors.
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traditional vessels.'* The licensing policies rather than decreasing 
Inequality and destructive competition, have In practice Increased 
Inequality and competition In the groundflsh fisheries. That is, limited 
entry measures do not result In an even playing field for equal and fair 
competition, but Instead provided conditions that favour specialized fleet 
sectors to the detriment of the traditional sectors.
Another result of Canada's licensing policies has been the failure 
to overcome the fishing Industry’s characteristic Instability. As fishing 
vessels Increasingly specialized their operations using highly capitalized 
equipment and concentrating on only the highly marketable fisheries, (for 
example cod, haddock, redflsh and later pollock) they became more 
vulnerable to the biological and market fluctuations of the fisheries. The 
economic viability of these specialized vessels change whenever either 
the availability of resources or market conditions upon which they depend 
changes. As a result, specialized vessel operators are forced to appeal 
to the state for support In order to survive periods of economic downturn, 
largely because no alternative uses for their vessels exist. Traditional 
multi-purpose vessels, which are characteristic of the Inshore sector have 
historically been much more capable of changing operating patterns as 
biological or marketing conditions varied. Therefore It can be argued 
that limited entry policies, rather than Increasing overall fishing
"Michael Belllveau, Acting Executive Secretary, Maritime Fishermen’s Union 
speaking before the Senate Committee of the Whole on the Canada-France Fisheries 
and Boundaries Agreement classified for the Senators the differences between the 
fishing fleet sectors by noting "you must make a distinction between Inshore and 
midshore. When I say ’midshore’, I am talking about vessels In the 60 to 65 feet 
range, usually draggers. These boats have a lot of fishing power. They also have 
a lot of political power (Senate Debates, March 24, 1989:722).
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Industry stability as the theory predicts, have actually Increased the 
instability that is now characteristic of Canada's groundfish fisheries.
Another result not anticipated by theorists promoting the imposition 
of limited entry control measures has been the failure to tailor fleet 
harvesting capacity (fishermen/vessels) to the availability of groundfish 
resources. Since 1973 when the first restrictions were imposed in the 
groundflsh fisheries, the total catching capacity of the fleet has not 
decreased as the theory anticipates, but has dramatically expanded. 
Despite having limited entry policies in place for over 15 years, the 
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans was forced to form a joint DFO/industry 
committee to deal with what was now termed the persistent overcapacity 
problem in the Scotia Fundy groundfish fleet (see Appendix 0). The 
committee held extensive consultations and submitted a report with 
recommendations. In their study, they determined that problems had been 
developing well before 1977. The committee found that not only was the 
existing fleet over-fishing the available resources but that they had
capitalized their operations to the point that they were also not even
utilizing their potential catching capacity. Specifically the committee 
estimated
that Inactive capacity in the groundfish fleet is as large as
the active capacity. In other words, the fleet has the
potential to exert four times the effort required at FO.l."
(DFO,1988:2)*
This review of several unexpected results of Canada’s limited entry
"However the recommendations of the capacity committee which were presented 
to the fall meeting of the AGAG re-enforced the orthodox approach of treating 
fishermen as individuals and placing limits on their operations.
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policies In practice Illustrates the shortcomings of management policies 
which are based on orthodox theories. That Is the theories fall to account 
for any of the implications that arise once they have been applied as 
policy. As a result, when orthodox policies are Imposed, more problems 
seem to be created rather than are resolved.
C. Quota and Enterprise Allocation Policies
Canada's system of quotas and enterprise allocations (output 
controls) in the Atlantic groundflsh fisheries Is the other characteristic 
fishery management method I use to Illustrate my argument. The system 
Involves setting a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and a process for sub­
allocating quotas to fishery participants. The system dates back to 
Canada's membership in ICNAF. The allocation process divides the TACs 
Into catch quotas, which are In turn allocated to the different fleet 
sectors in the form of competitive quotas (for the Inshore fleet sectors) 
and exclusive quotas or EAs (for the offshore fleet sector) according to 
the AGMP. As already discussed In Chapter 1, the orthodox perspective 
theories of the 1950s and 1960s argue that the open access (later modified 
to the common property) character of the fishery Is the root cause of 
over-fishing. The theory Is based on the assumption that by simply 
changing the character of the fishery, the causes of over-fishing can be 
resolved. Changing the character of the fishery, orthodox theorists 
proposed, can be done by allocating portions of the Total Allowable Catch 
(TACs) In the form of quotas (later modified to EAs), directly to 
fishermen or companies. Orthodox proponents felt that by removing
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competition from the fishery, participants are no longer forced to engage 
In a destructive race to fish In order to acquire a share of the 
resources. Quotas and EAs thus enable fishery participants to plan their 
fishing operations and remove their Incentive to over-fish. This allows 
participants to reduce operating costs and optimize market opportunities.
It was assumed that natural economic forces, would reduce the number 
of fishermen and fishing vessels to the availability of harvestable stocks 
and existing market conditions." Therefore some of the more Important 
expected benefits promoted for quotas Include: protection of fish stocks 
from over-fishing by capping the total harvest level that can be taken 
from any fish stock; more orderly harvesting activities; more efficient 
use of capital and labour; and a more equitable distribution between the 
participants of the harvests.
The subsequent development of EAs Is an excellent example of the 
continual revision or modification of failing orthodox based policies. 
In the early 1980s, EAs were Introduced for offshore fishing sector as 
the means to address the larger company owners concerns that their 
operations had become over-capitalized. The causes of this over­
capitalization at the time were blamed on the failure of the groundflsh 
quota management policies. The policies, as we saw earlier, had Initially 
focused on the open access character of the fishery. This focus was 
revised and modified In order to maintain legitimacy. The theories began 
emphasizing the common property character as the key problem to be 
addressed (Harding, 1968). The common property concept was proposed, as
" The reduction of fishing effort would also create the necessary 
conditions for efficient harvesting and processing operations In the industry.
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a term more applicable for describing the character of the fishery which 
inevitably leads to over-fishing and industrial inefficiency. By 
identifying and emphasizing the property dimension of the fishery as the 
key problematic, the theoretical justification for EA policies assigning 
property rights directly to individuals and companies by the state was in 
place.
The assumption underlying EAs therefore, is the same orthodox notion 
that contends individual or private companies must have maximum 
flexibility and freedom to re-organise and rationalize their operations 
in order to optimize benefits. This need for flexibility is based on the 
understanding that free market principles are the most effective means for 
achieving industrial efficiency (or maximize profits). The expected 
economic benefits used to justify the implementation of EAs reflect the 
same Justifications used earlier for the imposition of quotas and 
essentially include; increased labour and capital efficiency, improved 
quality and marketing conditions, as well as more orderly harvesting and 
processing operations (DFO, Press Release, December 30, 1989).
In addition to these strictly economic benefits for companies, 
promoters of EAs argue that fishing industry workers (fishermen and plant 
employees) also benefit. The expected benefits for them include; increased 
average incomes, a less regimented and exhausting work environment, and 
increased employment opportunities.
Finally the EAs are promoted as a means to further clarify what is 
termed the different and proper role to be played by the state and the 
private sector in the fishing industry. By allowing a company the 
opportunity to rationalize it’s operations (by using it’s guaranteed share
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of the resource In whatever manner they wish), the private sector role 
would be directed towards developing a more efficient and stable Industry. 
Likewise, after Initial assessment of the allocations had been permanently 
assigned to companies, the state’s role could be significantly reduced and 
focus on assessing of fish stock productivity, monitoring fleet harvesting 
operations and enforcing regulations.
Beginning In 1981, EAs were temporarily assigned and exclusive 
harvesting privileges for the Atlantic groundflsh resources were allocated 
directly to the larger offshore companies (at no initial cost to them).” 
Participation in the EA program was restricted to those companies who held 
offshore groundfish fishing licenses (vessels greater than 100 feet length 
overall (>100*LOA)) and who had a history of active participation in the 
groundfish fisheries. The %  share for each participant was pre-determined 
In closed negotiations held between company representatives and DFO and 
provincial government representatives. The calculations involved 
complicated formulae based on historical catch patterns, company catch 
capacity, adjacency to resources and relative fishing performance. The 
allocations were set for a trial period of five years and based on a 
percentage share of each TAC. The five year period was intended to allow 
enough time for the companies to reorganize and scale
” These companies operated trawling vessels greater than 100 feet LOA 
fishing groundfish resources along the Atlantic Coast. Each offshore vessel 
carries a crew of 12-15 persons, uses an otter trawl and operates 24 hours a 
day while at sea. The average trip duration, port to port is about twelve days. 
Offshore vessels fish 12 months of the year and except for short periods In the 
winter months are not affected by poor weather. The offshore fleet Is permitted 
to fish anywhere along the Atlantic coast (Davis Strait to Georges Bank) and on 
average they land collectively about million metric tonnes of fish each year or 
percent of the total groundfish catch.
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harvesting/processing operations In order to optimize their share of the 
resource in relation to existing market conditions. As well, proponents 
termed the EAs as a trial in order to allay the concerns that other fleet 
sectors, especially the inshore, began having over the direction that 
fishery management policy was taking.”
Successful achievement of fishery management objectives by Canada's 
system of quota and enterprise allocation policies in the Atlantic 
groundflsh fisheries, would have (like was anticipated for the limited 
entry policies) increased legitimacy for orthodox prescriptions to fishery 
problems. Although the quotas and EA policies in theory offered management 
options that aimed at creating an economically viable fishing industry and 
protecting the fishery resources from over-fishing, the results during the 
past two decades in Canada have not, in general, reflected these aims. 
Two of the more important results (unexpected) of the quota and EA 
policies in addition to the failure to protect the groundfish resources 
from overfishing include: an expanded and active role of the state in the 
fishery (instead of a reduced neutral role) and an increase in competitive 
illegal fishing activities between fishery participants which was 
undermining the fishery management objectives (Instead of eliminating 
destructive competition between fleet sectors and encouraging more orderly
” The concerns arose when it became apparent to the other fishery interests 
that the large companies could freely and openly buy and sell (permanently 
transfer) their fish allocations between themselves regardless of the affects 
on traditional user groups, fishing industry patterns and dependent communities. 
Given the potential negative impacts that permanent transfers of EAs would have 
on employment and community structures throughout Atlantic Canada the federal 
government was publicly forced to place conditions on EAs and place minimal 
restrictions on indiscriminate transfers of EAs. The EA proponents (theorists 
and company owners), however, argued that this political wavering undermines the 
intent and goals that the policy was trying to achieve for the fishery.
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fishing).
D. Quota and Enterprise Allocation Practices: Unexpected results
Although prevention of over-fishing as well as the elimination of 
destructive competition and the reduction of the role of the state in 
fishing industry activities were promoted for the exclusive quota/EA 
(output) policies, the results for Canada’s groundfish fisheries do not 
indicate that this is the case. The process of imposing quotas and later 
EAs on the fishing fleet sectors over the past two decades has, in reality 
had a number of unexpected results and these results are opposite to what 
the orthodox theories have promoted.
One unexpected result, after some initial successes in the late 
1970s, has been continued over-fishing of the Atlantic groundfish 
resources. The quota and EA system in Canada has not been able to contain 
and limit over-fishing. For example, for the important groundfish 
fisheries off the coasts of Nova Scotia, the DFO/Groundfish Industry 
Capacity Advisory Committee, after studying the status of the stocks 
reported that
heavy fishing pressure has helped to deplete Scotian Shelf 
groundfish stocks throughout the 1980s. Total allocations 
for cod, haddock, rcdfish, flounder, and pollock dropped from 
279,750 tonnes in 1982 to 172,440 tonnes in 1989 - a more than 
one-third decline. Strict conservation quotas and stringent 
regulations have failed to control fully the fleet’s excessive 
fishing power. Fishermen have continued to invest in bigger 
and bigger boats. By depleting traditional stocks and 
preventing potential growth, overfishing has cost fishermen 
millions of dollars (DFO, 1987:2).
107
The overfishing activities have taken the form of participants 
misusing the catch quotas and EAs by misreporting, discarding, dumping 
and highgrading and these types of activities are now inherent to all 
fleet sectors fishing the groundfish resources. In response, DFO has had 
to place activity restrictions on Individual fisherman’s licenses 
(conditions of licence) in order to control the number of trips and amount 
of fish that vessels can take at any one time.” For example on the 
Scotian shelf fisheries (NAFO Divisions 4VW, 4X, and Subarea 5), before 
any fishing begins, license conditions must be issued to individual vessel 
owners for each trip they undertake (See Appendix 0). Licence conditions 
are issued by a Fishery officer and signed for by the fishermen or owner 
of the vessel. The licence must be on-board the vessel for the duration 
of the fishing trip and it states exactly the amount of fish that can be 
caught, the areas where fishing can take place and the period of time when 
fishing can occur. Therefore one can see that the quota system has not 
diminished the competitive drive to overfish the resources, but rather has 
increased the efforts of fishermen to avoid quota restrictions. This 
response, which is now endemic to the groundfishery is essentially the 
same characteristic phenomenon that has been the focal fishery problematic 
since fishery management began to be studied in the last half of the 19th 
century.
"Because of the reports of offshore vessels abusing the quota/EA management 
system, operators must now notify DFO on a daily basis when and where they will 
be landing catches. This procedure has greatly increased the involvement and 
costs to the state for monitoring vessel activities and ensuring compliance to regulations.
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Another result has been that as the quota and enterprise allocation 
policies are refined and modified over time In response to the Illegal 
activities, they have become Increasingly complex and administratively 
cumbersome,*' For example, when a quota for a species of fish Is caught 
and closed to directed fishing, fishermen are allowed to redirect their 
fishing effort to other species. Because of the problems of by-catches In 
multi-species fisheries fishermen are allowed to keep specified amounts 
cf so-called Incidental catches of the closed fishery species (1,e. 10 
percent by weight of the total catch onboard). This regulatory policy, 
while Initially addressing a typical fishing operational problem, has In 
practice changed the behaviour of fishermen and the traditional fishing 
activity patterns. Now fishermen catching more fish than they are 
allowed, have to make a choice. They can cheat by altering their catch 
logs In order to meet the regulatory requirements or dump the fish (which 
Is also Illegal) and lose potential money. Many fishermen catching large 
amounts of incidental catches In the groundflsh fisheries now routinely 
choose to either mis-report their excess Illegal catch landings or dump 
the excess fish at sea In order to meet the harvesting restrictions.
Therefore despite the fact that Canada has Imposed both non­
exclusive and exclusive policies, In the groundflsh fisheries, the results 
have not been what the promoters anticipated. For example, overfishing of 
the fishery resources continues and Illegal fishing activities are
*®The Nielson Task Force Report on Fisheries (1986:29) reported that since 
declaration of Canada's EEZ that DFO In trying to meet the conservation and 
socio-economic objectives had "put in place a myriad of regulations aimed at 
allocating stock by geographic sectors, boat sizes and gear types. The operation 
of this regulatory system In 1984 required 2,882 PYs and cost $236 million."
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increasing, instead of the fishing activities becoming more orderly, less 
competitive and destructive on the fish stocks.
Another important unexpected result of the quota and EA policies in 
Canada has been the expanding and active role of the state in the 
groundfishery (rather than a reduced neutral role as orthodox proponents 
predicted). Since the early 1970s the Canadian state has been assuming a 
larger and essential role in managing the Atlantic groundfish fishery 
resources. Examples of the increasing role of the state in the groundfish 
fisheries can be seen in the number of consultation meetings undertaken 
(meetings with industry and the provinces to establish allocations and 
regulatory control measures), the increased regulation of fishing 
activities (including monitoring, control and surveillance), and the 
increased infusion of public funds to support the fishing industry over 
the years (1974 Temporary Assistance Program (TAP), 1977 Atlantic 
Development Review, 1982 Kirby Task Force, 1987 Capacity Committee, 1989 
the Northern Cod and Scotia Fundy Task Forces).
The consultation meetings for developing the Atlantic groundfish 
management plans has grown exponentially since 1973. For example, in 1977, 
the Atlantic Groundfish Advisory Committee (AGAC) met 4 times to discuss 
the development of an Atlantic wide management plan. By 1988, AGAC, as 
well as the four additional Regional Groundfish Advisory Committees, 
comprised of over 35 industry interest groups and provincial government 
representatives held over 100 government sponsored meetings to discuss the 
development of the AGMP. For the Bay of Fundy and Scotia shelf groundfish 
resources alone, the Scotia Fundy Groundfish Advisory Committee and two 
Area Groundfish Advisory sub-Committees for southwest Nova Scotia,
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southwest New Brunswick and eastern Nova Scotia held over 70 DFO supported
closed meetings. Each of these committees consist of memberships who
represent over 25 different fishermen/industry Interest groups or
affiliations. In addition to the meetings of AGAC, the Regional
Groundflsh Advisory Committees and Area sub-committees, consultations are
regularly undertaken throughout the year with provincial governments
through a Deputy Minister’s Committee and the Federal/Provincial Ministers
Fisheries Committee.
With respect to the continual infusion of public support funds Into
the fishing Industry over the years and especially to the dominant company
sector many examples are readily available. Even Gordon Cummings, NSP
admitted to the Senate of the Whole on February 17, 1987 that
In the 1982-1984 period, when there certainly were 
difficulties In the Atlantic fisheries, we understand and 
realize, as do you, that over $100 million of Canadian funds 
was Infused by the Government of Canada l .to several companies 
in Atlantic Canada (Senate Debates, February 17, 1989:536).
It Is Ironic that over the past two decades, as Canada has Imposed
more and more exclusive management policies (limited entry and quotas/EAs)
It has had to maintain the traditional non-exclusive policies (closed
seasons, gear restrictions, area closures, fish size limits, etc.) that
they were supposed to replace as quotas/EAs gradually rationalized the
Industry. As well, Instead of controlling over-fishing activity, reducing
the role of the state and eliminating destructive competition between
participants, the problems have actually Increased, as Is readily apparent
on an almost dally basis In the news media. The state has expanded It’s
role and become more Involved In the affairs of the Industry. Instead of
eliminating or decreasing destructive competition between fishery
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participants and creating the conditions for orderly fishing , the 
policies have increased competition between participants since they began 
being imposed over twenty years ago. Illegal fishing activity has also 
been increasing. And the fishery management response to all of these 
unexpected results has been to almost continually refine the non-exclusive 
control treasures and further revise and modify the exclusive policies 
advocated by orthodox theory proponents. This ongoing orthodox approach 
to control over-fishing and create a viable stable groundfish fishing 
industry in Atlantic Canada continues up to the present.
3. Policy in Practice: Groundfish Management in United States”
A. Policy: The Northeast Fishery Management Plan
As we saw in Chapter 3, the United States fishery management policy 
development process is legislated. This has resulted in much less 
discretion and flexibility for the state to impose the exclusive 
restrictive management control policies (limited entry and quotas/EAs)
"Information on the New England groundfish fisheries management practices 
was gained in my discussions with Douglas G. Marshal, Executive Director, New 
England Fishery Management Council, Saugus, MA., Susan Peterson, David Tierkla 
and Peter Doeringer, Boston University, Boston, MA. and the Northeast New England 
Fisheries NMFS staff; Richard Rowe, Regional Director, NMFS Gloucester MA., Dave 
Crestin, State Fisheries co-ordinator and Frank Gaice, Senior Staff Officer, Sea Grant Co-ordinator.
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called for by orthodox perspective proponents, as is the case in Canada." 
Because policies are developed openly in public forums, the process of 
imposing restrictive measures on the groundfish fishery is complex and 
intricate. Unlike Canada, the process Is conducted over multi-year periods 
and any changes to existing policy can (and does) take several years 
before becoming operationally incorporated into Fishery Management Plans 
(FMPs).
As noted earlier, the management of the groundfish fisheries in 
the United States prior to 1976 was similar to Canada's management 
approach and rooted in their joint experiences as members or' ICKAF. Both 
approaches focused on reducing fishing effort and rebuilding depleted 
groundfish resources and both were firmly based on an orthodox 
understanding of fishery problems and solutions (Pontecorvo, 1974). 
However, because of the different political, economic and cultural 
contexts from which the fisheries are conducted and managed in each 
country, the approaches began to diverge dramatically after 1977. Canada 
moved towards greater application of exclusive management prescriptions 
to fishery problems (limited entry and quotas/EAs). The United States on 
the other hand, was forced by particular political considerations to 
reject exclusive policies and adopt a more laissez faire or free 
enterprise approach for managing its groundfish fisheries (Pontecorvo, 
1977), This approach rejected the need to control the fishing fleet
"Limited entry is one way of regulating the amount of fishing effort by 
restricting the number of available fishing licences and therefore the number 
of fishermen. Because of the social, cultural and economic consequences of 
denying access to a fishery to those without licences, the U.S. industry has 
opposed such policies.
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through limited entry and quota management policies (Peterson and Tierkla, 
1987:31). The United States approach involves a minimum of regulation 
(using non-exclusive control policies such as closed seasons, fish sizes, 
gear restrictions etc.) and a maximum amount of public participation.
The policy framework for developing FMPs (In effect for multi-year 
periods) plans for meetings to be conducted over a several year span. 
The FMP describes the processes by which each fishery will be managed. 
Including the limits of any proposed regulatory changes being considered. 
Pre-season and In-season adjustments of FMP regulations cannot be made 
without a formal FMP amendment proposal and only by following the 
established procedures set In the FMP policy framework. How has the U.S. 
groundfish management approach worked In practice?
B. Practice: The Northeast Fishery Management Plan
Since the FMCA.1976 legislation was Implemented, the benefits 
anticipated for the U.S. groundfish fishery management approach have not 
been realized.” In fact It Is generally understood that the United States 
has failed to meet It's primary national objective as set out In 
legislation, which Is the protection of the marine resources from over­
fishing.” Why?
21 During the development of the FMCA.1976 legislation and continuing up 
to the present orthodox theory proponents in United States have been generally 
outraged at what Is seen as the failure of the state to Implement policies that 
would restrict access to the fisheries and thereby encourage Increased 
rationality and efficiency In the fishing Industry.
”lhe primary objective of U.S. fishery management is to conserve the stocks 
and ensure adequate use by the public of the available resources.
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The first U.S. FMP for groundflsh was implemented on March 14, 1977. 
The federal government imposed the FMP under emergency federal legislation 
because the full fisheries management system legislated by the FMCA.1976 
was not fully staffed and functioning.®** Almost immediately problems were 
encountered which over the years have greatly affected the practice for 
managing the U.S. groundfish fisheries. Because the 1977 harvest catch 
rates were much higher than anticipated, the quotas set in the emergency 
FMP were exhausted ve-y early in the fishing year. The FMP was soon 
subjected to intense political pressure by industry participants who began 
seeking amendments. The response to this pressure by the newly organized 
New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC) was to begin to rely less 
on the federal NMFS staff and the quota management policies they 
advocated. At first, the Council began revising the federally imposed 
emergency groundfish FMP.®’ During the next three years many such 
revisions were made to the emergency FMP, resulting in significant 
increases to the allowable harvest levels (quotas) and relaxation of some 
of the more stringent fishing control measures. During this initial period 
the NEFMC had attempted to manage the groundfish fisheries using single 
species bio-economic fishery management models based on orthodox theory, 
despite the wishes and concerns of the fishery participants themselves.
®° This initial emergency plan continued the former ICNAF regulatory 
practices such as limiting catches, setting minimum fish sizes, closing areas 
to fishing, limiting fishing seasons and restricting fishing gear mesh sizes.
*’ The New England Regional Council (NERFMC) has the primary responsibility 
for managing the groundfish resources in the Fishery Management Zone (FMZ) and 
consists of seventeen voting members from both large and small operators of the 
processing, commercial and recreational harvesting sectors as well as monitoring 
representatives from the Coastguard, State Department, Atlantic States Marine 
Commission and the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council.
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However, because the fishery participants had the opportunity to play a 
direct role In the fishery management decision-making (ensured by the 
FMCA.1976 legislation), they soon began Influencing how the process was 
to be conducted. This Influence was expressed during public council 
meetings and hearings. The many revisions and amendments to the FMP made 
after It’s Initial Implementation reflected the participants concerns and 
desire for significantly Increased catch limits. The Council executive 
themselves, also began having fundamental disagreement with many of the 
restrictive provisions of the emergency FMP and soon were Identifying and 
In agreement with the concerns of the fishermen and Industry participants. 
However, in spite of this Identification and agreement, the Council was 
forced by the provisions of the emergency FMP and the FMCA.1976 to 
continue developing restrictive management control measures that abided 
by formal evaluation requirements which were being monitored by the 
federal agency NMFS.” The measures Imposed on the fishery participants 
eventually became so disliked that both the theory which justified them 
and the federal agencies which required them lost credibility and 
legitimacy. This was the social, political and cultural context for 
fishery management policy development during the period 1977-80 as the 
NERFMC Council attempted to manage the groundflsh fisheries for which It 
had responsibility. The almost universal negative reaction by the fishery 
participants to the Initial emergency FMP had been strong and often quite
” In 1981, the Fisheries Management Plan proposed by the NERMC (the 
representatives of the fishermen and Industry themselves) was rejected by the 
federal government because It didn’t satisfy conservation requirements of the 
FMCA.1976. An Interim Management Plan was later developed and Imposed while a 
comprehensive Multi-species FMP was being developed.
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bitter. The collective perception of the participants was that the
orthodox based control measures, however much they were diluted by
subsequent lobbying activities, were too restrictive and not appropriate.
The control measures were criticized for not being sensitive to their
traditional rights of access to the fishery and individual freedoms. This
criticism in turn formed the basis for fishery participants rationalizing
and Justifying illegal fishing activities and non-compliance with the
provisions of the FMP." Out of frustration with the FMP’s restrictions
many fishermen regularly discarded small fish, landed fish in excess of
set quotas without reporting them, and misrepresented their landed
catches. Fishermen also used prohibited fishing gear which in turn
destroyed potential future harvests. Misreporting became serious and
resulted in accurate scientific analysis of the stocks becoming next to
impossible. By mid-1980s the United States groundfish fisheries were in
serious crisis and the FMP had failed to conserve the stocks. In
discussing the failure of the United States management approach Peterson
and Tierkla (1987:32) write that
The reasons for this are myriad, and fault can be found in 
the cumbersome structure of the management system, the actions 
and reactions of competing industry segments, and in the
adversarial role which has evolved between NMFS and the
Council. The Council system, combined with incredible 
diversity in the harvesting sector, ensures lowest common
denominator management.
" It is interesting to note that orthodox theory offers no guidance or 
alternatives to differing circumstances and realities of a fishery. In fact the 
very failure of orthodox policies are often used by proponents as examples of 
the behaviour of fishermen as being considered irrational and their activities 
inevitable directed at destroying the resources.
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For fishery participants the reality at the time the FMCA.1976 was passed 
was that with indications of improved fish stock availability and the 
removal of foreign harvesting competition, they should be freer to operate 
rather than having more restrictions placed on their operations.
The disastrous results of the initial U.S. groundfish management 
policies and practices in the years after the implementation of the 
Extended Fisheries Jurisdiction, 1977-1981, resulted in the FMP and 
regulatory control measures being re-examined. Of the many problems in 
the United States FMP development amendment process, the key problem is 
clearly the inability to reflect the current biological status of the fish 
stocks in the provisions making necessary in-season adjustments on a 
timely basis. After the failure of the emergency FMP in 1981, an interim 
FMP was imposed while a new comprehensive FMP was developed. By 1985 the 
"optimum yield" objective for U.S. fisheries management was under review 
by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency (NOAA) to determine it’s 
continued appropriateness. In 1987, a new Northeast multi-species FMP was 
implemented. However, in spite of the learned experiences gained under 
the emergency FMP, the interim FMP, the NOAA’s review of the optimum yield 
objective, and the eventual implementation of the Multi-species FMP, U.S. 
groundfish resources continue to be over-fished and adequate fishery 
management policies are not being undertaken (NOAA, 1985;NEFMC,1985 and 
1988).”
” In order to understand the relationship of organizations to each other 
in the U.S. system, one must know that the federal fisheries management is the 
responsibility of the Department of Commerce (DOC). Within the Commerce 
Department, the NOAA houses the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) which 
is the federal organization concerned with the individual state conservation 
agencies, the recreational interests, the fishing industry, and general public. 
NMFS is responsible for planning, organising, and implementing fishery management
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4. Conclusion
After the decline of ICNAF in 1976, major policy and practice
differences between Canada and United States fisheries management systems 
arose as the theoretical objectives of orthodox theory began to be
concretized. The fishery management objectives of each country are
essentially the same and are drawn from the same orthodox theory 
understandings of the fishery. However, the formal systems, policy and 
practices differ significantly. It was when the two countries began 
focusing their policies towards the achievement of specific fishery 
management objectives that differences began to arise. In this chapter 
differences between the policy and practices for managing the groundflsh 
fisheries have been identified. Also the chapter illustrates the 
differences between the rhetoric of orthodox theory and the practices when 
it is translated into policy. The theory is not able to anticipate the 
outcome of policy put into practice since the theory ignores the
political, economic and cultural context within which any practice is 
embodied.
Depending on the particular political economic and cultural context, 
the acceptance and compliance to fisheries management policies and control 
measures by the fishery participants varies greatly. In Canada the federal 
government historically has been able to assume and exert considerable 
management control over the groundfish fisheries and this control has
plans, providing fishery development services (commercial and recreational) and 
administrative support to regional fishery management councils.
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Increased especially after 1977. In United States after 1976, the federal 
state intended to manage and control it's fishery resources by using the 
control measures prescribed by the orthodox theories, but it was 
eventually thwarted by the industry participants themselves.
The orthodox theory of fishery management with its limited 
definition of the problems and solutions of the fishery is formulated at 
an abstract level and so fails to address the realities of a particular 
fishery. Orthodox theorists believe that theory can apply in any fishery 
with little modification (for example Gates and Norton, 1974). That is, 
the theory ignores the fact that fisheries have different biological 
characteristics, as well as different histories, different political 
economies and different cultural concerns. The reality is that as orthodox 
theory's objectives are translated into practice, there is resistance by 
the participants. This resistance takes the form of efforts to modify the 
management systems, policies and practices. These elements are shaped by 
the unique social conditions within which they are placed. Orthodox 
theorists continually argue that the theory would work if less emphasis 
was put on the political, economic and cultural aspects of the fishery and 
more on the strictly economic aspects. This chapter has shown the opposite 
to be the case: that in applying abstract orthodox theory to concrete 
situations the history, experience, interests, and conditions of the 
fishery participant’s lives cannot be ignored.
The next chapter assesses the strengths and weaknesses of research 
work that uses an alternate paradigm to that of the orthodox paradigm. 
This alternative paradigm focuses on the interrelationship of the 
political and economic factors of the fishery. The aim is to see if a
120
political economy perspective to fishery problems brings us closer than 
the orthodox perspective In understanding the Issues for effectively 
managing the fisheries.
CHAPTER SIX 
Political Economy and the Role of the State 
In the Fishery
1. Introduction
This Chapter examines how fisheries problems are posed from an 
alternative paradigm to that of the orthodox paradigm. This alternative 
paradigm does not view society as functionally and harmoniously 
Integrated. It assumes Instead that society is based on Inequality and 
contradiction resulting from this inequality. Social change occurs as a 
result of people striving to solve contradictions in their own interest. 
Within this alternative paradigm, research is not neutral and objective, 
rather it is aimed at producing knowledge which will help create a more 
equitable society. The political economy perspective falls within this 
alternative paradigm.
The political economy approach takes a very different stance from 
the orthodox bio-economic approach in understanding fisheries problems. 
While orthodox proponents concern themselves with the process of 
modernization underway in the fisheries, defined solely in terms of 
increasing firm efficiency and extracting maximum monetary benefits from 
common property, the political economists concern themselves in historical 
terms with productive relations and the nature of the economic process. 
Specifically, political economists seek explanations for problems in the 
fisheries by examining the structure and organization of the fishing
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Industry, the dynamics of group relations (the distribution of power) and 
the role of the state In the fisheries.
2. Structure and organization of fishing Industry
The orthodox approach generally Ignores the structure and 
organization of the fisheries In their analysis. They make the assumption 
that as long as modernizing firms are allowed to freely compete and become 
as efficient as possible, the unencumbered marketplace will facilitate the 
creation of appropriate structures and organizations to ensure rational 
exploitation. Political economists, however, argue that examining the 
existing structure and organization of Industry Is necessary If one Is to 
understand fisheries problems. This understanding is Important for 
analyzing the concrete practices of participants and related Interests In 
the fishery as well as the processes underway within the fishing Industry
(Barrett, 1979, 1980,1981; Barrett and Davis, 1983; Barrett and Apostle,
1987a,1987b; Williams, 1979, 1985; Clement, 1.986, 1984, 1989; Sinclair, 
1985; Fairley, 1985).
The fishing Industry Is structurally and organizationally very 
complex. It Involves harvesting operations, as well as processing, 
transportation, and marketing activities. The fishing Industry also 
defines the social and economic life of fishing communities.
Staples theorists were the first to consider the structure and 
organization of the fisheries from a political economy perspective. Their 
concern was to understand the processes Involved In natural resource
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exploitation (Clement, 1989).’ For staple theorists like Harold Innis
(1954), the characteristics of natural resources determined the structure 
and organization of the exploitation process.* That Is characteristics of 
particular resources define how those resources will be exploited and 
provide the basis for the social and economic relations underlying
exploitation processes. Furthermore Innis argued that the development of
staple resources (and especially the fishery) has been determined and 
directed by outside market forces (Clement, 1989:108). Clement (1989) 
points out that staple theorists were also concerned about the uneven 
distribution of benefits from the resources. That Is benefits were seen 
to be distributed unequally between core areas and marginal areas.
Present day political economists focus not only on resource
characteristics as Important In the formation of the structure and 
organization of fisheries, but also Incorporate the concept of property 
relations Into their analysis (Clement (1984:9).* They argue that an 
understanding of the capital and labour processes of fish harvesting, 
processing, marketing, and financing arrangements requires an 
understanding of property relations.
Political economists explain that much of the controversy In the 
fisheries Is the result of changes In the Industry’s structure and In the
’ This discussion of staple theory draws mainly on Clement’s ()989) 
discussion In The Challenge of Class Analysis. Ottawa: Carleton University Press.
* Other Important fishery researchers In the staples school Include Ruth 
Fulton Grant (1934) and W.A. Carrothers (1941).
* Clement (1984:6) defines property relations as "a set of rights or 
enforceable claims which order relations among people and between people and things."
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property relations that are underway within the entire Industry and wider 
economy. As fishing has Industrialized, drastic changes In the relations 
of production of the fisheries have occurred. Merchant capitalists of the 
saltflsh trade have been replaced by the Industrial capitalists of the 
fresh/frozen/canning processing Industry as the dominant organizational 
form, and as a result fishermen have been changing from simple commodity 
producers to Industrial workers (Barrett, 1976; Clement,1986; Ommer,1985).*
Contemporary political economists writing within a Marxist framework 
understand the present day structural and organizational forms of the 
fishing industry to be modelled on capitalist relations of production.* 
Clement (1986:191) writes that in Canada the fisheries "are not highly 
Individualistic ’vestiges’ engaging in free market relations (but rather) 
most fishing Is socialized labour and most fishers participate In an 
Industrial capitalist economy." It 1 % these dominant capital relations of 
production, Clement argues, that by the mid 1970s had replaced the 
merchant/fishermen relationships with corporate/organized labour 
relationships.
In Atlantic Canada the motivating force behind the dominant 
Industrial fishing Interests Is the need of large capital to continually 
grow and expand Its productive capacity. For example, the larger
 ̂Rosemary Ommer’s (1985) work In Newfoundland stresses the Importance of 
organization of the fisheries. For example the 19th century merchants had 
organized the Institutions of fishing In a way that development of the resources 
had been stalled. In addition the Newfoundland state failed to provide an 
appropriate development strategy to overcome these organizational blockages.
* That Is not to say that these fisheries do not at the same time consist 
of various degrees or remnants of merchant capitalism depending on the particular 
situation and stages of development (see Barrett, 1976, 1979, 1981; Clement, 
1989, 1986, 1984).
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processors have concentrated on fresh/frozen fish markets which require 
a year round and continuous supply. In order to supply this market, they 
have increased their share of the available fishery resources by 
introducing and using more capitalized equipment and labour processes in 
their operations. Company ownership of vessels has become the dominant 
organizational form in the fisheries especially after the introduction of 
steel stern trawlers that operate year round in the North Atlantic 
fisheries (Barrett, 1976, Clement, 1984).
Barrett and Apostle (1987b) have been intensively studying the 
structure of the Nova Scotia fishery. In one study they found that the 
Nova Scotia fisheries are largely seasonal and labour intensive, not just 
because of the natural characteristics of the resource, but ; so because 
this suits the needs of capital. In their study Barrett and Apostle 
address the nature of the interaction between capital and labour in terms 
of industrial structure, location, and labour process. They determined 
that the structure of the industry is directly related to levels of 
capitalization and that the levels of capitalization depend not only on 
the availability of state subsidies and market conditions, but also on the 
availability of appropriate labour markets.
In another study of boat captains in the Nova Scotia fishery, 
Barrett and Apostle (1987a) examined the organizational context of the 
harvesting sectors of the industry. They concluded that "the offshore 
fleet over 95’ is a distinctive entity defined by its integration at 
formal and informal levels into the onshore processing sector" (Barrett 
and Apostle, 1987a;30). The inshore fleet on the other hand was not 
definable in the same way. They found the inshore "is highly
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differentiated by scale, technology, enterprise«level social relations, 
location, and the nature of vertical ties to the processor sector" 
(Barrett and Apostle, 1987a:30-31). Since large social differences exist 
within this part of the harvesting sector, they conclude that 
understanding the complexities that result from these differences Is 
essential If capital/labour Interactions are to be understood 
organizationally.
3. The dynamics of group relations (distribution of power)
Explaining the dynamics of group relations (Including conflict) In 
the fisheries Is considered In different ways by orthodox proponents and 
political economists. The orthodox approach focuses on the Interaction of 
fishermen with the available resources. Fishermen, It Is argued, are 
motivated by Individual self-interest to Increasingly exploit common 
property fisheries to extinction or levels where participants are forced 
Into economic poverty. For political economists, however, the focus Is on 
explaining the problems of the fisheries in terms of conflicts between 
competing Interest groups who have unequal amounts of power (power 
Includes the ability to control and Influence fisheries management 
decisions). This focus enables political economists to Identify the 
dimensions of conflict, specify those who exert the most power and show 
the relations of dependence that exist In the fishery.
Clement explains the pervasive conflict that exists In the fishery 
In terms of the exercise of power. He points out that struggles over power 
can be analyzed as different dimensions of society. For example he writes
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that
struggles over the benefits or use of property rights 
constitute the political dimension; the justification of their 
Interests by those controlling or those excluded from property 
rights constitutes the Ideological dimension; the history of 
local/regional attitudes, traditions, and practices 
constitutes the cultural dimension" (Clement, 1986:68).*
Since the Industrialization of the fisheries, the capital Interests
have become the dominant group participating In the fisheries. Barrett
(1981) writes that up until 1976 the political economy of fisheries have
reflected the changing short-term Interests of all forms of capital. As
a result producers and workers have formed many distinct forms of
organizations to represent themselves and protect their interests In
struggles with capital over the years. For example, between 1900-1930,
Barrett (1976) classifies the Nova Scotia fishing labour Into four
categories; wage plant workers. Inshore fishers, schooner fishers, and
trawler crews. He shows how these labour categories formed and transformed
their organizations over time and used particular strategies In their
struggles with the various dominating forms of mercantile and Industrial
capital. For the period after 1976, Barrett (1981) feels that the large
* Political economists take the view that the fisheries are Inherently 
political, and so the only way to really understand them Is to analyze the social 
political and economic relations of power and dependence within them. Clement (1984:6) argues that these relations In the fisheries are based on class 
relations, and these class relations underlie the structural and organizational 
formations of the fishery. The more powerful or dominant fishing Interests, It 
Is argued, gain not only the largest share of benefits from the available 
resources but also receive the largest share of incentives and support from 
managing authorities. It Is the exercise of this power for individual or Interest 
group gain that explains the conflict between groups that is so prevalent in 
fisheries throughout the Industry. Political economists are specifically 
concerned with how those who have the controlling power over benefits from the 
fisheries have used it to affect the form of benefit distribution (Clow,1984).
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scale capital sector has come to exert the dominant power over the 
fisheries although many forms of small scale and merchant dependent 
relationships still persist in the fisheries.
For example in their analysis of the Canadian east coast fisheries, 
Political economists [Barrett (1976, 1981), Williams (1979), Barrett and 
Davis (1983), Sinclair (1984), Barrett and Apostle (1987a, 1987b)] have 
shown how large scale capital has dominated not only the decision making 
process of the state, but also the pricing and marketing arrangements of 
the entire Industry. As Williams (1979:179) puts it "the issue of price 
(paid for fish) should never be separated from problems of control and 
structure in the industry".
As already noted, in order to increase their influence and power, 
fishermen have formed many types of organizations to represent and protect 
their Interests. In the same way capital has used their power to control 
producers and workers by having state supported legal barriers erected to 
hinder to organization efforts (especially unionization) within the 
fisheries sector (Clement, 1984). For example the imposition of co­
adventure status for trawler crews, legislation in the form of anti­
combines law, and the creation of jurisdiction impediments ( both federal 
and provincial) have restricted the ability of individual fishermen to 
organize effectively and increase their influence in the fishery.
Clement (1988) observes that even though processors (capital) are 
well organized and much more powerful than are fishermen, they themselves 
are part of a chain of dependence (as well see Marchack, Guppy and 
McMullan, 1987). He explains that British Columbia Packers on the west 
coast of Canada is owned by the giant American food firm George Westen,
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and that the major Canadian east coast fish processors are either owned, 
controlled, or supported by banks, governments and highly concentrated 
export market interests. In the same way that small processors are 
dependent on larger processors for markets, the larger processors are also 
dependent through financial and marketing arrangements with even larger 
capital Interests.
At the other end of the dependence continuum (for example at the 
community and family level), an unequal distribution of power exists for 
many of those who depend on and labour within the local fishing industry. 
Connelly and MacDonald (1983) have researched household employment 
patterns in Nova Scotia fishing communities and concluded that within the 
fishing industry women have the least amount of power and control over 
their situation, they bear the heaviest burden of work, (often doing both 
domestic and wage work), and they receive the smallest share of benefits 
in the form of wages and status.
4. The role of the "state" in fisheries
Orthodox proponents assume that the role of the state in the 
harvesting, production, and management of fishery resources is neutral. 
Political economists disagree and point out that the state exerts enormous 
influence and control over the entire fishing industry and management 
process (Barrett, 1981; Barrett and Davis, 1983; Sinclair, 1985; Williams, 
1985; Connelly and MacDonald, 1986; Barrett and Apostle, 1987).
One of the key premises used by the political economist is an 
understanding or theory of the state that points out that the state does
130
not function neutrally in society. Barrett (1981:1) argues that "In any
particular historical epoch, the major function of the state is to
exercise hegemony In the interests of the capitalist class as a whole.
Such intervention is often simply to impose conformity, especially in
intra-capitalist tensions, although the coercive apparatus is available
to enforce hegemony should it be necessary."
Williams (1985:18) points out that in the literature the treatment
of the state's role in the fisheries and the understanding of policy
making and management processes have not been addressed adequately.' In
fact Barrett and Davis (1983:1) write that
The Atlantic Canadian fisheries may contain the most 
systematic and profound relationships between the state and 
the corporate sector in this nation’s history.
In Nova Scotia fisheries, Barrett (1981:i) identified three distinct
policy periods in which the state has played an important role in the
fisheries on behalf of the capital interests. These periods include; a
regulatory phase between 1930-39, a laissez-faire phase between WWII-1973,
and a renewed regulatory phase from 1974 to the present. He concluded that
the state fisheries policies during these periods were complimentary with
and supportive of the growth and development of large scale fishing
capital. With respect to the confluence of interests between large scale
capital enterprises and state agencies, Barrett's work provides some
important insights. Using a history of the origins and growth of National
Sea Products (NSP) into a large multinational company, Barrett shows how
the state has supported the restructuring and consolidation of small scale
' Some of the work completed to date includes Barrett, 1981, 1983; Barrett 
and Davis, 1983; Sinclair, 1985; Williams, 1985).
131
capital Into a large fishing monopoly (especially In the post WWII 
modernization period).
Similarly, Sinclair (1985:6; 1984:8-16) reviewed state policies In 
Newfoundland dragger fisheries and found three different categories of 
support to the Interests of capital. These Include direct Income support, 
direct capital Investment support, and resource management support (i.e. 
limited entry). He determined that state fishery managers operate In the 
Interests of both small and large scale capital over other fishing 
Interests, but not consistently In favour of one over the other.
Barrett (1981) feels that since capital Interests are for a more 
rationalized, capital Intensive, vertically Integrated fishery (as a way 
to Improve cost efficiencies), the state has played an Important role In 
helping transform the Industry In terms of those Interests. For example, 
during the regulatory phase 1930-1939, Barrett acknowledges that while 
state Imposed restrictions on the use of trawlers benefited many 
individual fishermen, they In fact were Implemented largely In the
Interests of small Southwest Nova Scotia capital. Later, during what he 
terms the laissez-faire phase 1945-1973, because of perceived 
deficiencies, the fisheries were subject to an unregulated Industrial 
expansion which transformed them. The state supported this
industrialization process by removing restrictive harvesting regulations 
on trawlers and subsidized the process of modernization In the fisheries.
The state subsidization of capital accumulation In support of the
modernization process during this period was based on the orthodox 
management prescriptions called for by b1o-econom1c theory and neo­
classical economics. Barrett characterized the 1950s and 1960s as the
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"golden age of modernization" when both the federal and provincial 
governments fully agreed on how to address the problems of the fisheries 
(Barrett, 1981:16).* He showed how the provincial Department of 
Fisheries, the Atlantic Development Board, and Atlantic Provinces Economic 
Council (APEC) and federal government all called for and co ordinated 
their support for the modernization process in the Atlantic Canada and how 
this resulted in the growth and increased domination of the industry by 
large fishing monopolies such as National Sea Products (Barrett, 
1981:19)."
Finally, the renewed regulatory phase from 1974 to the present 
represents the interests of large scale capital over small scale capital, 
in their need to control the sources of fish for their operations. The 
state has met this need by supporting the establishment and growth of 
vertically integrated firms which can control all aspects of the 
production process. Even though the state has been well aware of the 
problems of vertical integration in the fishery such as the ability to 
control prices in the market, to the disadvantage of smaller producers and 
processors, the support of such enterprises continues up to the present."
* Barrett (1981:17) points out the role that the scientific research 
section of the federal fisheries department (Fisheries Research Brard of Canada) 
has played in support of the interests of capital. They provided funding and 
published the research of H. S. Gordon (1953) which resulted in his well 
referenced orthodox formulation of the fishery problem "An economic approach to 
the optimum utilization of fishery resources."
* Barrett categorizes the modernization period into two phases. The first 
phase was the criticisms of traditional fishing methods of the 1950s and second 
was the concern for the competitiveness of the fishing effort.
" Lower overall port prices emerged from the fact that (a)n integrated 
company getting most of its fish from its own fleet is likely to be concerned 
with the total landed cost of fish than with the price for fish in the port 
market. The latter price, which is usually is set by the leadership of the
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The use and application of the common property concept Illustrates 
the most Important difference between orthodox and political economy 
approaches to fishery management policy and In whose interest that policy 
serves. Modern day orthodox theorists now view the fisheries as a common 
property which must be transformed Into private property If problems are 
to be resolved. This results In orthodox policy prescriptions that call 
for changes In peoples traditional cultural values and relationships to 
the fishery. These policies (In the form of restrictions and exclusions 
on resource accessibility) are deemed necessary In order for fisheries to 
be modernized (that is overcome their economic backwardness by achieving 
modern Industrial efficiency and profitably). However when these policies 
are Imposed, they often have dramatic and painful consequences for those 
Individuals and communities who most depend on the resources for their 
livelihood and well-being (Alexander,1977; Sinclair,1987; Connelly and 
Macdonald,1983). The orthodox approach argues that these social costs and 
dislocations are necessary for the long term benefit of the fishery and 
the society.”
On the other hand, political economists argue that the fisheries 
have never really been a "common property" In the sense defined by the 
orthodox approach. They argue that the common property concept has never 
been an historically appropriate description of commercial fisheries, that
Integrated firms themselves, assumes for them the character of an Internal 
transfer price (McCraken and Macdonald,1976).
” As a result, political economists argue that changes In the fisheries 
should reflect and enhance the core values of Individuals and their communities, 
and should ensure that the benefits from the fishery are distributed equitably 
and used In a manner consistent with those values.
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privatizing the fishery resource and giving It to corporations or 
Individuals will not ensure their protection, and that fisheries 
underdevelopment (economic poverty and dependence) has not been the result 
of Its common property or open access nature.
Clement (1986:71) argues that "The notion that the fisheries are a 
common property resource Is wrong-headed and historically questionable." 
He points out that even the commercial fisheries In pre-Industrial society 
were conducted within a restrictive mercantile political and economic 
context. During the mercantile period, Clement writes that major 
commercial fishing activities were conducted under protective and 
exclusive fishing charters or entitlements Issued to trading companies in 
return for royalty payments by imperial states. This means that contrary 
to the orthodox notion that the fisheries are common property equally 
accessible to everyone, the fisheries In fact, have always been subject 
to public access restrictions. For example, Clement makes the point that 
the commercial fisheries have always been subject to forms of regulated 
entry. That Is since they are only available to those with the means to 
capture them, access control was enforced through structural and power 
relationships. When the cost of entry was low, merchants were able to 
dominant participants by controlling access to markets and supplies. Later 
as the cost of entry increased with the use of more expensive technology, 
the processors dominate labour by Instituting lay arrangements and 
controlling the port market price of landed fish. Local fishing 
communities have regulated their use of resources by means of local 
customs, rights, and labour arrangements (for example arrangements for 
sharing; the harvesting, curing/processing of the catch, equipment and
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labour, lotteries for stage and trap locations). When fishermen began to 
emerge from traditional forms of mercantile domination with the 
Introduction of new technologies, they began exerting their Individual 
resource access rights. As a result, the state began transforming the 
fisheries In the Interests of the dominant capital sector from ’open 
access’ to state and private property (first through limited entry schemes 
and later by quota allocation arrangements)/*
In contrast to the orthodox prescription for solving the ’common 
property’ problem through the policy of privatizing the resources, the 
political economists take a much different approach. First, they 
differentiate harvestable fishery resources Into two major analytical 
categories, traditional subsistence fisheries and commercial fisheries. 
They point out that different value systems and social relationships to 
the resources underlie each of these categories.’* Political economists
* By licensing policies, the state turned traditional access rights into 
private hands thus creating private property (licences and quotas are essentially 
owned by Individuals, companies and organizations). However, because the large- 
scale offshore fishery Is only one part of the processing companies operations, 
the marketing mechanisms which are an essential element in the fishery management 
puzzle remain outside Individual fishermen control but under the control of 
corporations who exert Influence (Clement,1986).
’* The orthodox approach takes the view that the values of people are like 
individual objects, that must be changed periodically If society In general is 
to advance. That is each person is assumed to have varying amounts of Individual 
potential for success and each person In society should be given an opportunity 
to realize their potential. The ones that are most successful will rise to the 
top and assume the leadership roles in society,s institutions. Political 
economists,on the other hand, view the values of people differently. That Is the 
normative values of people are learned through Interactions between themselves 
and their physical and social environment. Positive Interactions ensure survival 
and progress. Therefore political economists argue for values that emphasize and 
support social skills that encourage positive Interactions between people and 
their environment.
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argue that since commercial fisheries have always been controlled by 
dominant Interest groups and are subject to the wider political economy 
context, the orthodox policy solutions will not work. That Is transforming 
the fisheries into private property, will not erase the fundamental 
problem, which is the control exerted by the most powerful to the 
detriment of the less powerful that has always been the key feature of the 
fisheries. For example, Barrett (1981:23-24), Barrett and Oavis (1983:12), 
Sinclair (1984:20) point out that overfishing continues despite of the 
implementation of the modernizing policies of orthodox theory. They note 
that there are many examples that show Canada corporate capital interests 
have ignored conservationist’s warnings in the short run interests of 
immediate gain and ended up ruining the resources.’* In Canada, Regier and 
McCraken (1975) provide examples of herring, redfish, crab, lobster 
fisheries that also have been overfished and depleted under the same 
conditions.
Gordon’s formulation of the fishery problem (over-harvesting and 
economic stagnation) is still referenced widely and used as the authority 
for present day fishery development approaches (despite of the criticisms 
from just about everyone except neo classical economists for the past 
thirty years). Political economists reject this understanding of the 
failure of fisheries to support economic development. For example
Williams (1979) argues that the fishery is underdeveloped not because of 
orthodox common property notions, but because of its distorted structure,
’* Barrett and Oavis (1983:12) have highlighted the fact that in 1976, the 
federal fisheries officials had determined that the reason for overfishing 
problems were the result of the activities of the large fishing companies and 
their trawler fleets, (see Environment Canada, 1976:39)
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lack of cohesiveness and overall Integration. Barrett's (1981:32)
explanation for the Inadequacies of the orthodox approach In terms of a
blueprint for fisheries development Is that the maximum social and
economic benefits are not the sum of Individual supply curves or user
costs. He argues that
The ownership question (for fisheries development) Is vitally 
Important In that there Is a very substantial difference 
whether or not one Is "rationally" maximizing private 
Interests (profits) or the social Interests (Barrett, 
1981:33).
Clement (1986:69) raises three Important theoretical questions on 
the continued use of this orthodox concept for fisheries development 
policies (fishery management policy). First he questions whether common 
property can be regarded as an absence of rights (I.e. the concept 
overlooks the claims of the collectively not to be excluded). Second he 
is concerned about the limits of the common property concept In terms of 
fisheries analysis. The term assumes that a fishery Is a closed system 
where no other opportunities for labour or economic gain exist, so that 
fisheries will always be overexploited which does not reflect a realistic 
situation. Third he points out the failure of the concept to acknowledge 
the role that social organizations play between the Irrational, Insatiable 
Individual and the fishery resource. For example the various 
social/political organizations such as co-operatives, unions, and 
corporations have been formed with collective Interests being considered 
over the Individual Interests as assumed by orthodox theory.
Finally Clement (1989:69) argues that the use of common property 
concept today Is really a distortion of Scott's original formulation
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which was concerned with capturing the landlord’s rent from commercial 
fisheries. Clement points out the confusion that the common property 
concept causes when It Is used to describe the concrete reality of both 
the commercial fisheries and subsistence fisheries. The concept, he feels 
is used simply to justify the Imposition of quotas or limited entry on 
those working In the fishery. Canadian fisheries he argues, are already 
a state property that has been transformed and parcelled out as private 
property In the form of licences and quotas to designated users. 
Therefore, the motivations and actions of fishermen are not Irrational 
(over-fishing resources to depletion), but to the contrary are very 
rational.
Barrett (1981), Barrett and Davis (1983) and Williams (1985) all 
saw the 1974 crisis in the Atlantic fisheries as the failure of social, 
economic and biological policies which were based on orthodox theory. This 
orthodox theory, they point out resulted In much of the ad hoc, self 
contradictory and ineffective policies that have been used to manage the 
fishery to date. They all conclude that until the state assumes ownership 
of the fisheries the periodic crisis will not only continue but Increase 
in severity, a point that has proved to be quite correct."
S. Conclusion
" Barrett (1981:34) argues that unless the production and marketing of 
fish products Is assumed by the state, " the age old problems of Irrational 
conflicts, and fragmentation in production and distribution will continue.” 
W1111ams(1985) "envisions a rationally ordered and integrated fishery (and the) 
need was Illustrated four years ago but smoke and mirrors act by the federal 
government evaded real change. However the crisis continues with higher stakes 
the next time around.”
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The welfare economic and maritime anthropological critiques of the 
1970s and 1980s, as we saw in Chapter two, argue that neo-classical 
fishery management theory overlooked important economic and social 
realities of the fishery. Welfare economists in their critique showed 
that the traditional definition and application of efficiency, the 
calculation of net economic benefits and the assumptions underlying 
marketing processes were simplistic or wrong. Maritime anthropologists 
in their critique showed that the theory overlooked or misunderstood the 
behaviour of fishermen, the process of adaptation by fishing communities 
to resource availability and other alternative over-fishing explanations. 
Chapter two concludes that although the welfare economists and maritime 
anthropologists provided an extensive critique of the neo-classical 
tradition, their criticisms were still formulated within the orthodox 
paradigm. On occasion their contributions are used to expand and modify 
neo-classical approaches."
This Chapter shows that the political economy approach to fisheries 
management problems falls within an alternate paradigm. Because it makes 
different assumptions about the social world, it raises issues and 
dimensions not considered by either the bio-economic fishery management
" Lee Anderson a well known orthodox theorist Incorporates a theory of 
regulation into his latest research and writings on fishery management problems. 
Because of the difficulty (or work) involved in transposing maritime 
anthropological contributions (mostly In the form of descriptive explanations) 
into mathematical variables, very little or no integration between disciplines 
has been dome to date. The most sophisticated strategy employed by neo-classical 
proponents to deal with the anthropological contribution has been to simply 
acknowledge this 'other work' and define it as outside of their research 
problematic.
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theorists, or their critics, the welfare economists and maritime 
anthropologists. Political economists examine the structure and 
organization of Industry, the distribution of power and the role of the 
state. Chapters 3 and 4 show, these factors are Indeed Important In 
Influencing and shaping the range of management possibilities and 
solutions.
Chapter 3 shows that the 'role of the state* In the fishery Is not 
neutral and objective as Is assumed In the orthodox literature. Rather 
the chapter shows that an understanding of the state's role, as the 
political economists argue, Is an Important factor In knowing how the 
fishery Is managed, how policies are developed and whose Interests are 
served? For example, Chapter 3 shows that the state In Canada, dominates 
the fishery management processes and uses extraordinary discretionary 
power in developing and differentially Imposing fisheries management 
policy on the Industry.
Orthodox theories are based on the assumption that all sectors of 
the fishery are similar In organization and are equal In power. Chapter 
4 provides Illustrations that show that the structure and organization of 
the Canadian groundflsh fishing Industry Is not homogeneous and all 
sectors are not treated equally. Instead the fishing Industry Is 
vertically Integrated, with a large company sector dominating all the 
other sectors. Understanding the fishery from a political economy 
perspective means examining first, the differing amounts of power that 
sectors have relative to each other and second, how each sector uses It's 
power to protect and facilitate It's own Interests. In Canada, the large 
company sector has more power that the traditional Inshore sector and has
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been able to use this power to ensure that It's general Interests are met 
through the policies of the state. For example, as Chapter 4 shows, 
policies such as EAs, that affected the offshore fisheries were 
essentially agreed upon in private, closed consultations (negotiations) 
meetings with the large company sector, while policies such as limited 
entry, geographic restrictions and quota systems were mostly imposed in 
the form of government directives on the traditional sectors.
As this Chapter has shown, political economists have made a
significant contribution to understanding the fishery and it's management 
problems. Still there are many questions they have yet to address. For 
example: what are the implications of implementing decentralized 
approaches for the fishery; how does the state deal with the practical 
aspects of day to day fishery management policy and administrative 
practice; how can traditional community interests be ensured and co-exist 
with a highly capitalized industrial sector and; how can populist views 
of the fishery and Industry be reconciled with the structural
reorganization that political economic cr'tics prescribe as necessary for 
the fishery?
However, the contribution already made and those still to be made 
by political economists have been and likely will continue to be ignored
by those working within the orthodox paradigm. Unlike criticisms made of
theories within a paradigm, it is not considered necessary to take 
seriously those made from an alternative and competing paradigm. Thus, 
the orthodox theory problematic, albeit somewhat modified by the liberal 
critique from within the orthodox paradigm, continues to be the only one 
"heard" in the field of fishery management research.
CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion
In this thesis, I trace the historical development of the dominant 
fishery management theories from mid 18th century to the present. I 
determine that these theories have been formulated within a general 
orthodox paradigm which views society as functionally Integrated and 
social change as evolutionary; It views research as neutral and objective.
I show that the theories resulting form this orthodox perspective are In 
fact not neutral or objective. Instead, they consistently reflect the 
economic Interests of the Industrial sector over other sectors In the 
fishery. These management theories have been and continue to be closely 
tied to the powerful Interests In the fishery, In the same way that the 
dominant orthodox paradigm Is closely tied to the vested Interests of 
society.
Chapter one shows specifically how fishery management theories, the 
bulk of which have developed from within the disciplines of fishery 
biology and neo-classical economics, have historically reflected the close 
relationship between the vested Interest concerns of the industrial sector 
and the development of the theories themselves. It also shows that 
orthodox based theories are either too simplistic or they misunderstand 
the problems of the fishery, with the result that management policies are 
undermined when implemented in practice. That is, policies derived from 
orthodox theories and implemented by the state do not work as they predict 
nor do they solve the problems Identified.
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Chapters 3 and 4 provide concrete evidence showing that despite 
It’s coherent, consistent explanation for fishery problems, the solutions 
proposed by the orthodox perspective either are not Implemented (the 
United States) or are not working (Canada). By comparing the United 
States and Canadian fishery management systems, I Illustrate the 
Inadequacies of orthodox based theories as they get translated Into state 
policy measures. This comparison shows that despite the similarities In 
the definition of the problems and proposed solutions for the fishery, the 
two countries have developed different management systems, neither of 
which have solved problems. I show that the differences In each country’s 
management systems arise out of their different political, economic and 
cultural conditions. I explain that by falling to account for these 
broader conditions, orthodox based theories do not recognize the key 
factors creating fishery management problems. For example, orthodox 
theories do not provide any explanation for an understanding of why 
certain policies cannot be Implemented In one country or why they are not 
working as expected In the other? An understanding of these questions 
would aid fishery management policy formulation. The orthodox proponents, 
generally simply argue that the state has failed In some way to fully 
Implement the necessary policy prescriptions. This avoids the orthodox 
theory proponents having to acknowledge the shortcomings of the theories 
themselves.
In Chapter 2, I review the liberal critique of the dominant bio- 
economic theories which began In the 1970s. This critique arose as a 
result of the generalized fishery management crises occurring In many of 
the world’s fisheries at this time. These crises called Into question
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the adequacy of the dominating bio-economic theories and Increased the 
concerns of traditional fishery participants and the wider society over 
the future of fishery resources. Welfare economic and maritime 
anthropology scholars began to argue that bio-economic theories were 
either too simplistic or misleading. They pointed out that the dominant 
theories were based on narrow biological and economic assumptions about; 
the character of fishery resources, the behaviour of fishermen and the 
social conditions which support the fishery. I show that despite the 
criticisms, bio-economic theories continue to dominate and prevail as the 
most legitimate and acceptable basis for addressing fishery management 
problems. These theories have retained their hegemony either by modifying 
or expanding their analytical focus or by ignoring the more fundamental 
criticisms. I argue that while the criticisms form an important 
contribution to fishery management theory, they themselves are Inadequate 
because they are essentially rooted in the same general orthodox paradigm 
for understanding society and therefore, fail to address fundamental 
fishery problems.
In Chapter S, I examine an alternate approach for understanding 
fishery management problems and solutions. I show that the political 
economy approach is rooted in a different paradigm or perspective for 
understanding society. The political economy approach shows how the 
broader political, economic and cultural conditions of the fishery can 
and do influence the way that fisheries are managed and in whose interests 
they are managed. While the political economy approach does not directly 
address policy Issues, It does, suggest directions for the development of 
alternative fisheries management policies.
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Before speculating on what political economy fishery policy might 
look like, J would like to review one orthodox policy response to fishery 
management failures. This response has been to devise and Impose more and 
increasingly complex control measures on fishery participants. For 
example, traditional non-exclusive policies such as limitations on fish 
sizes, closed areas, seasons and fishing gear types are continually being 
tinkered with and refined In the belief that the problems result from the 
competitive lawlessness of Individual participants rather than the 
Imposition of the measures themselves. In the same way exclusive policies 
such as limited entry, quotas and EAs are also undergoing constant 
revision and modification to correct what are perceived to be enforcement 
problems, not policy problems. The result is even more differentiation 
between participants and categories of fishermen, vessel classes and 
quotas/EAs allocations. In Canada, where many orthodox based policies 
have been Implemented, we saw that the number of different licence 
categories and quotas/EAs allocations has Increased dramatically. This 
has resulted In the fishery participants and fishing sectors becoming even 
more fragmented and specialized which encourages not discourages 
competition as participants compete against each other for resource share. 
Therefore orthodox policies have created more Instability not more 
stability.
Why have state policies been undermined when they are implemented 
In practice and why do they have a tendency to lead to more state 
Involvement in the fishery not less? The Implementation of orthodox 
polices, as this thesis shows, supports the Interests of the dominant 
sectors over other sectors of the fishery. Because the orthodox theory
146
approach Is founded on the assumption that stability of the fishery 
depends entirely on the stability of the dominant large company sector, 
the state policies focus on ways to strengthen and support this sector. 
However, as we have seen the policy formulation problem for the fishery 
Is actually much more complex In reality and Includes cultural and 
political economic dimensions. Because the orthodox approach either 
misunderstands or overlooks these complexities, their policy proposals 
are undermined when translated Into practice. The only remaining solution 
for orthodox proponents Is to call for even more Involvement of the state 
to properly manage and regulate the fishery. The orthodox call for even 
more state coercive involvement In the fishery can therefore be understood 
as directly related to the failure of their policies in practice.
How can the political economic approach provide a more appropriate 
basis for undertaking fishery management policy formulation? Unlike the 
orthodox approach which sees stability of the Industry as dependent on the 
health of the dominant sector, the political economic approach would see 
stability resulting from all sectors equally sharing the benefits of the 
resources. The strength of the fishery therefore Is In It’s diversity. 
All fishery sectors would be analyzed In terms their complexity and their 
contribution to supporting the diversity of the Industry. Rather than 
optimizing production/cost equations based on equilibrium conditions like 
orthodoxy promotes, political economy would concentrate on policies that 
encourage fishermen, fishing industries and their communities to develop 
the capabilities to contract/expand and absorb the Industry fluctuations. 
In so doing communities would be recognized for their contribution to 
supporting the fishery, rather than being seen as merely a source of
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labour for the Industry. Every sector would be examined in terms of It’s 
strengths and weaknesses and policies would aim to support the strengths 
and reduce the weaknesses to ensure fishery stability. While orthodox 
fishery management policies create the conditions that favour creation of 
specialized fishing vessels, dominant vertically integrated companies and 
more coercive state regulation, political economy policies could create 
the conditions that favour fishery diversity like multi-purpose vessels, 
decentralized industry structure and more democratic state regulation. 
These policy possibilities remain to be developed and tested.
To conclude: This thesis shows that orthodox based fishery
management theory has failed in the past and will continue to fail in the 
future to solve the problems of the fishery. It seems clear that a new 
perspective on fishery management is necessary if fishery problems are 
ever to be effectively addressed. The political economy approach provides 
an alternative perspective for analyzing and understanding the problems 
of the fishery. This alternative approach suggests new research and 
policy formulation directions which could lead to more effective 
management systems, more appropriate policy control measures and more 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AGAC Atlantic Groundfish Advisory Committee
Consultative committee consisting of representatives of 
provincial governments, fishermen's organizations, 
fishing companies and federal government, scientific and 
fisheries management officials.
A6MP Atlantic Groundfish Management Plan
By-Catch The catch of one species when the target
species is another. By-catch regulations are set to limit 
catches of the non-target species for conservation 
purposes.
CAF6AC Canadian Atlantic Fisheries Scientific Advisory 
Committee is a scientific committee for the generation 
of advice (stock assessments, research) on all major 
groundfish species found in the Atlantic Groundfish 
Management Plan (except NAFO stocks).
DFO Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada
DOC United States Department of Commerce
EEZs Extended Economic Zones
EFZJ Extended Fishery Zone Jurisdiction
Enterprise Allocation The allocation of groundfish
assigned to an individual company for a particular stock 
(expressed in weight or percent of a TAC).
FO.l level The level of fishing mortality at which the
r
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increase in yield (marginal yield) by adding one more 
unit of fishing effort is 10% of the Increase in yield
by adding the same unit of effort in a lightly exploited
stock
PAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
PCZ Fishery Conservation Zone
PMGA.1976 Fishery Conservation and Management Act,1976
(Magnuson Act).
FKP Fishery Management Plan
PPAFC Federal-Provincial Atlantic Fisheries Committee -
Intergovernmental committee consisting of deputy 
ministers of fisheries for the federal government 
and the five Atlantic provinces.
ICES International Council for the Exploration of the
Seas.
ICNAF International Commission of the North Atlantic
Fisheries (1949-1977)
INFKC International North Pacific Halibut Commission
Inshore fleet All mobile and fixed gear (longline,
traps, gillnets, wp^rs and handlines) less than 100' LOA
LOA Length overall means the horizontal distance
measured between the perpendiculars erected at the 
extreme ends of the outside of the main hull of a 
vessel.
HSY Maximum Sustainable Yield
MBY Maximum Economic Yield
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MAFO Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization:
International organization comprised of 18 member nations 
which is the governing body for the management of the 
fishery resources in the Northwest Atlantic outside of 
EEZs »
NEFMC New England Fishery Management Council
NM7S United States National Marine Fisheries Service.
NOAA United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Agency
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development
Offshore fleet All mobile and fixed gear (longline)
vessels over 100* LOA.
06AC Offshore Groundfish Advisory Committee (precursor
to AGAC)
Quota Regulated portion of a TAC allocated to a particular
fleet sector.
Regulated Species A species or stock of groundfish which has 
an established TAC and quota/allocation.
TAC Total Allowable Catch of a groundfish stock for any
one year.
TAP Temporary Assistance Program, 1974 '
UNCLOS III Third United Nations conference on the Law of 
the Sea.
APPENDIX A
Policy Formulation in Canada - Groundfish Management
Canada’s policies for managing the groundfish fisheries have been 
relatively consistent since 1976. The policies are Implemented each year 
In the Atlantic Groundfish Management Plan (AGMP). DFO argues that the 
AGMP’s provisions are essentially aimed at conserving and restoring 
fishery resources, while at the same time providing enough fishing 
opportunity to ensure the continued economic viability of the fishing 
Industry. The polices are concretized in the form of basic principles and 
regulatory measures which are clearly drawn from orthodox based theory 
discussed earlier (DFO, 1980, p.il-iv).
Each Plan sets out a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and the allocated 
quotas and Enterprise Allocations for each of 44 commercial groundfish 
stocks. The groundfish stocks are exploited at levels that produce over 
1,000,000 tonnes landed weight each year in Atlantic Canada. The AGMP 
development process Is controlled exclusively by DFO. The process is 
conducted in three distinct phases, a scientific phase, a formulation and 
consultation phase and a regulatory phase.’
The first or scientific phase Is the provision of catch estimates 
for each commercial stock of fish. A research protocol for providing the
’ The AGMP preparation process takes place within one calendar year and Is 
operational by January 1 of the following year (DFO, AGMPs 1977-1988).
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estimates has been developed and is co-ordinated by a peer review 
committee of DFO scientists called the Canadian Atlantic Fisheries 
Scientific Advisory Committee (CAFSAC).* A TAC estimate for each 
commercial fish stock is forwarded by CAFSAC to senior DFO managers by 
the fall of each year. These estimates are in the form of recommended 
numbers which are used to allocate set amounts of fish from each fish 
stock to the various fleet sectors. CAFSAC researchers calculate their 
TAC estimates on the basis of scientific stock assessments which are 
conducted each important commercial fishery. The assessment information 
is gathered almost exclusively by departmental research and technical 
staff. The key ' information gathering activities undertaken by DFO 
include; sampling the commercial fishery catches, conducting annual 
research surveys and analyzing the biological production parameters of 
stocks. The analysis is done using predictive fishery production models 
that have been developing since the turn of the century (see Chapter 1), 
The production factors emphasized in present day assessment models 
include; fish population size/age structure/dynamics, fishing intensity, 
and to a much lesser extent environmental/ ecological conditions.
* CAFSAC issues a schedule annually of the dates at which required 
scientific advisory documents must be provided to fisheries managers. Once a 
CAFSAC schedule has been set individual scientists work on their stock assessment 
projects during the year to provide the requested biological advice. In the 
CAFSAC sub-committee meeting research biologists submit their assessment results 
in the form of a working document. The sub-committee considers the quality of 
the research and recommends areas that may need future work. When the sub­
committee Is satisfied, It submits a report to a CAFSAC steering committee which 
reviews and approves it. A formal advisory document is prepared, but not for 
release to the public. This document is sent to the Atlantic Director-Generals 
Committee for review and release. Once the advisory document Is released the 
formal research part of the Atlantic Groundfish Management Plan process ends, 
unless there are specific problems that have to be investigated further.
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The second phase in the development of the annual AGMP involves an 
industry consultation process. Based on the TAC recommendations of 
CAFSAC, a committee of senior DFO managers, known as the Atlantic 
Director-Generals (ADGs) committee prepares the draft fishing Plan. The 
draft Plan is then forwarded to the Atlantic Groundfish Advisory Committee 
(AGAC)* for formal consultations with representatives of resource user 
groups. It has been DFO's practice to Include as members of AGAC, In 
addition to Its own staff, representatives of fishermen organizations, 
processing companies, provincial governments and in some cases native 
groups. The draft Plan is presented to the AGAC and consists of the TAC 
figures for each groundfish stock, quotas assigned or allocated to the 
various fishery participants (on a fishing fleet sector basis or 
Individual company basis) and the regulatory measures deemed necessary to 
control the harvesting operations. The provisions of the Plan are debated 
by the committee and the process finishes when members have expressed 
themselves at a final meeting held in the late fall of each year.* The
* It should be noted that for the groundfish species, the Canadian advisory 
process consists of several levels of advisory committees; regional levels (based 
on DFO management regions) and an Inter-regional level (Atlantic wide based). 
The regional advisory committees are consulted on those issues that concern only 
one region in particular. The groundfish management Issues that are more general 
and have Implications affecting all regions are addressed at the AGAC committee 
level.
* Although the formal advisory committee receives the preliminary plan with 
the understanding that they can modify and finalize details, the actual work is 
completed by a departmental working group. This working group consists of several 
federal employees, each of whom represents the Interests of their respective 
Regions and National HQs. The working group resolves, to the extent they can, 
local, regional and inter-regional problems and present a final draft of the Plan 
to the Atlantic Groundfish Advisory Committee via the ADGs committee.
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Atlantic Director-Generals Committee reviews the draft Plan In light of 
the AGAC's discussions, then finalizes and forwards It to the Minister of 
Fisheries and Oceans for approval. Industry Interest groups often 
continue to lobby both senior DFO managers and Minister If they feel their 
particular Interests and concerns have not been addressed during the 
consultation phase.
The third phase completes the AGMP development process. After the 
Plan has been approved, regulatory measures for controlling fishing 
operations are promulgated. As well, monitoring and surveillance 
strategies are developed by DFO enforcement staff In order to ensure 
compliance to the AGMP provisions. In addition a small AGAC working group 
(which consists exclusively of DFO staff) monitors the fishing activities 
and catches on a dally basis for each fish stock throughout the fishing 
year. Depending on circumstances, this working group on behalf of the 
department can and often does make minor changes or adjustments to the 
AGMP (called fine tuning) for problems not anticipated during the 
development phases.
APPENDIX B
Groundfish Fishery Management Plan formulation - United States
The U.S. policies for managing it’s groundfish fisheries formally 
involve three responsibility jurisdictions. The National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS), an agency of the Department of Commerce, has the federal 
responsibility under the FMCA.1976 authority for preserving fishery 
resources for the benefit of the nation. Eight Regional Fishery Management 
Councils have the responsibility for managing the fisheries outside the 
individual state 3 mile limits on behalf of the federal government. 
Coastal state governments have the responsibility for managing the 
fisheries adjacent to their coastlines (Peterson and Tierkla (1987:9).
The NMFS mandate is for the provision of scientific information on 
the fish stocks status and catch statistics in support of the Council’s 
activities. This biological and statistical information can be (and often 
is) is challenged by the fishery participants themselves, who can contract 
for alternative biological assessments. As well, NMFS has a legislated 
responsibility to review all Councils FMPs in order to ensure that they 
comply with the National Standards as set out in the FMCA 1976.
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The Councils mandates are to manage all marine resources from the 
state 3 mile limits to the 200 mile EEZ.' The Councils provide a public 
forum for tabling and discussing the scientific Information, developing 
management plans, and proposing regulatory control measures. The Councils 
species FMPs and control measures once developed and agreed upon through 
series of mandated public meetings are forwarded, according to the 
FMCA.1976 legislated timetable, to Washington for review by NMFS staff and 
approval by the Secretary of Commerce. At all levels of the process, (the 
federal, the public meeting and the state levels) political Influence can 
and Is exerted to modify or change the provisions of species FMPs as 
Interest groups lobby for their particular concerns and Interests.
The Individual State governments are mandated to use their 
legislative authority to manage the marine resources within the 3 mile 
territorial boundary limits off their coastlines.* For some fisheries, 
the State management authority has been further delegated to Individual 
towns (for example shellfish In most New England States) and/or shared 
between state and town governments (for example alewlves, sea herring, 
shad species which migrate along the coasts) (Peterson and Tierkla,
*In accordance with President Reagan’s proclamation of March 10, 1983 
establishing an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) the term fishery conservation 
zone was changed to EEZ. The United States now claims sovereign rights and 
exclusive management authority over all living and nonliving resources within 
200 miles of the coastline, not just fisheries.
'Under the FMCA.1976. the federal government has the authority to preempt 
state authority In state waters under narrowly prescribed circumstances. If a 
fishery Is managed under a FMP, occurs predominantly In the EEZ and could be 
adversely affected by a state government action, the federal government can 
preempt the state’s fishery management authority In It’s three mile territorial 
seas. However, before any federal action can be undertaken, formal 




’ Peterson and Tierkla (1987) provide a discussion on the administrative arrangements between the New England states for managing fisheries that overlap several Individual state jurisdictions or federal/state Jurisdictions (for example lobster, shrimp, striped bass, blue fish). They point out that programs such as the state//federal one between NMFS and the Atlantic States Marine Fishery Commission have had both successes and failures In developing co­ordinated management arrangements.
APPENDIX C 
Canadian fisheries legislation
In Canada, the federal fisheries management system is essentially 
based on three legislative Acts, the Fisheries Act, the Coastal Fisheries 
Protection Act and the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act.
Through the provisions of the BNA.1867. the Canadian parliament 
enacted the Fisheries Act which deals with the protection of the fisheries 
in Canadian waters. The Governor-in Council (Cabinet) has the ultimate 
authority (power) to make laws (regulations) for the management of the 
fishery resources. One of it’s appointed members, the Minister of 
Fisheries "in his absolute discretion" may issue fishing licences 
(Thompson,1974). The authority to licence gives the federal state the 
ability to limit access to the resources and thus control who can 
participate and under what conditions in the fishery. A measure of the 
encompassing authority of the Fisheries Act can be illustrated by the 
amendment in 1961 which subjects any Canadian fishing vessel operating 
anywhere on the high seas to it’s provisions. This feature has benefited 
Canada’s international reputation for fishery management effectiveness 
when dealing with and negotiating with other fishing nations on fishery 
matters. Most other countries lack this level of legislative control over 
the activities of their fishermen. International agreements on fishery 
management matters (conventions, treaties, control measures) can be made 
to apply to Canadian vessels regardless of where they operate (outside 
Canada’s territorial seas or not). This has enhanced Canada’s
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International stature as a nation highly concerned with conservation and 
protection of fishery resources (original ICNAF member and later leading 
NAFO member).
Another Important legislative Act Is the Coastal Fisheries 
Protection Act, which has been In a number of different forms going back 
to 1868. This Act provides Canada the authority to protect the fisheries 
within Canadian jurisdiction from encroachment by foreign fishing vessels. 
The Act regulates the conduct and activities of foreign fishing vessels
In Canadian waters and ports by requiring them to be licensed and subject
to particular fishing restrictions as deemed necessary.
The Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act Is the third Important
Canadian fisheries statute. This Act was passed In 1964 In order to 
provide a legislative mechanism for extending Canada's fisheries 
management jurisdiction. The Act Initially established a three mile 
territorial sea limit and an exclusive 9 mile fishing zone contiguous and 
seaward of this limit (Consolidated Statues of Canada, 1977). In 1970, 
the Act was amended and provided a twelve mile territorial sea limit In 
the waters adjacent to the coastlines of the mainland and Islands of 
Canada. In 1971» Orders made pursuant to the Act established exclusive 
fishery Zones In the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Bay of Fundy on the Atlantic 
coast and the Queen Charlotte Sound, Hecate Strait and Dixon Entrance on 
the Pacific coast (Fishing Wane Orders 1,2, and 3 of Canada). On January 
1, 1977, the Fishing Zones Orders 4, 5, and 6 extended Canada's fishery 
jurisdiction an additional 188 miles seaward from the territorial sea 
boundaries creating the so-called 200 mile limit.
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